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From the Editor

T

he Spring 2014 issue of the US Army War College Quarterly opens
with a special commentary by Michael G. Roskin, “The New
Cold War.” Whether we accept his premise that we are now in a
new Cold War with Russia and China, his recommendations for how to
avoid some pitfalls of the “old” Cold War warrant consideration.
Our first forum, On Military Interventions, features two articles on
ways to make interventions both more effective and more efficient. In
“Options for Avoiding Counterinsurgencies,” David H. Ucko and Robert
C. Egnell examine counterinsurgency missteps in Afghanistan, and
discuss the merits of three alternative models. Regardless of the model,
the authors remind us there are no easy solutions: military interventions
require clarity of purpose and strategic commitment. Stephen Watts’s
and Stephanie Pezard’s “Rethinking Small-Footprint Interventions”
explores the utility of Thomas Shelling’s concept of “Tipping Points,”
which indicate when conflict might shift decisively in one direction or
the other. Such information can help policymakers decide whether and
how to intervene in crisis situations.
The second forum, Challenges for Pacific Command, discusses recent
developments in Pakistan and North Korea and their policy implications. In “Pakistan’s Changing Counterterrorism Strategy: A Window of
Opportunity?” Michael Spangler suggests the United States can leverage
changes in Pakistan’s counterterrorism focus to achieve stronger bilateral cooperation. Andrew Scobell and Mark Cozad shed useful light on
the dynamic relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang in “China’s
North Korea Policy: Rethink or Recharge?” One thing is clear—Xi
Jinping and Kim Jong Un do not share the same vision for the future of
the Asia-Pacific region; this relationship thus bears watching.
Our third forum, Reconsidering Future War, offers two perspectives
on how defense departments and professional militaries should prepare
themselves for future conflict. Robert A. Johnson’s “Predicting Future
War” examines the factors that make prediction difficult, but maintains
that historical understanding combined with cautious trends’ analysis
can make for actionable, if tentative, forecasts. In “Forking Paths: War
After Afghanistan,” Michael Evans takes on the cognitive challenge
of thinking clearly about the future. He analyzes the track record of
“futures studies,” and suggests that the fog of uncertainty surrounding
the future is not impenetrable.
Our final forum, Reserve Components: Point-Counterpoint, contributes
to the current debate over the optimal balance between Army Active
and Reserve Components. James D. Campbell’s “The National Guard
as a Strategic Hedge,” makes the case that US militia (National Guard)
and other reserve components have long been indispensable and costeffective partners for America’s regulars. However, Rick Morrison’s
“Reserve Component Costs” argues that the Army Force Generation
(ARFORGEN) Costing Model shows the cost-differential between
Active and Reserve units is much smaller than one might think. ~ AJE

Special Commentary

The New Cold War
Michael G. Roskin
© 2014 Michael G. Roskin

Abstract: Russian and Chinese hostility toward the United States
creates a New Cold War, but treating the two adversaries differently
can make things break our way. US strategists should pick the bigger
long-term threat, Russia or China, and treat it firmly and the smaller
one flexibly, avoiding the rigid diplomatic and military policies that
prolonged the old Cold War.

T

he New Cold War will be long and deep only if the current SinoRussian entente turns into an alliance. A hostile Russia alone can
cause mischief but, compared to the old Soviet Union, is weak and
sufferable. Russia and China together are a much tougher challenge. The
Sino-Soviet split—Nixon must be given credit for utilizing it—marked
the beginning of the end of the original Cold War. By avoiding rigid
diplomatic and military policies that push Russia and China together, we
can make the New Cold War shorter and less dangerous.
The original Cold War ended not with a nuclear bang but with
an economic whimper. Starting under Brezhnev’s long reign, the
inefficient Soviet economy fell further behind until Gorbachev, in desperation, attempted a clumsy perestroika that achieved little but inflation.
Capitalism, it turns out, really is better than socialism, something any
good American capitalist should know. Marxists, misled by their ideology, bet that the US economy would collapse, and lost. (The United
States is not immune to economic collapse; we got a whiff of it in 2008.)
Panicked US responses did not win us the Cold War—economics and
patience did.
After 1991, the United States was marked less by triumphal strutting than by satisfied indifference. But during this time, little noticed by
Americans and well before the Crimea Crisis, a New Cold War percolated. Even under Yeltsin in the 1990s, Russian foreign policy showed
nationalistic hardening. In 1996, Russia, China, and three Central Asian
states signed the Shanghai Five agreement and turned it into the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 to oppose “US hegemony.”
SCO members occasionally practice amphibious operations, a warning
to Taiwan. The SCO is not, however, a formal military alliance.
Russian President Putin called the 1991 Soviet breakup “the greatest
geopolitical catastrophe of the century” and does not hide his aim to
reassemble the Soviet Union by incorporating the “near abroad” into
his Eurasian Economic Union, first signed in 2011 and due to begin in
2015. Putin’s 2008 invasion of Georgia to “protect” the South Ossetians
was really Moscow’s warning to Tbilisi not to join NATO. His 2014
occupation of Crimea to protect ethnic Russians (and the Russian Black
Sea fleet) also warned Ukraine not to join NATO, an improvised heavyhanded move that may push Kiev to do precisely that. Bad as Crimea is,
it is not another 1938 Sudetenland crisis, and we should stop painting
it as such.

Michael Roskin taught
in the US Army War
College (DNSS) and was
a professor of political
science at Lycoming College
in Pennsylvania. His latest
textbook is IR: The New World
of International Relations (10th
ed.) His latest teaching position was a Fulbright at the
University of Macau 2008-09
and Shandong University,
China, 2010.
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China’s commonality with Russia: how to recover from weakness
and humiliation. In 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed China’s “century of
humiliation” over, and the term is standard today. (Nationalist Chiang
Kai-shek felt the same, writing daily in his diary, “avenge humiliation.”) Soon after Nixon took office in 1969, Chinese and Soviet forces
skirmished on their Manchurian border. What was really at stake was
leadership of the world communist movement and an independent
Chinese nuclear force. Territorial questions, ostensibly settled, still lurk
in Siberia.
China, for a few years after Nixon’s 1972 visit, looked like a reasonable partner to balance Soviet power. Americans supposed that we
had “opened” China and set it on the path to capitalist democracy—an
unrealistic thought. Deng Xaioping decreed the ancient wisdom of “hide
your strength and bide your time,” a policy that received little publicity or US notice. We were living in a bit of a dream world. China still
claims Taiwan and could seize it. The 1999 “accidental” US bombing
of a Chinese embassy building in Belgrade—used as a communications
relay by the Serbian military for fighting in Bosnia—demonstrated
China-US hostility.
As China’s strength grew, it asserted absurd claims in the South
and East China Seas (and, to a lesser extent, toward India’s Arunachal
Pradesh). Beijing defines its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) as a security zone with a right to exclude naval and air forces
deemed prejudicial to its security. In 2001, a Chinese jet fighter sliced off
the nose of a United States Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft, which was
operating some 70 miles off Hainan over what most of the world (but
not Beijing) defines as international waters. Shooting over the Daioyu/
Senkaku Islands could start with Japan any time.
The 2008 financial meltdown—which seemed to show the United
States as economically weak, politically paralyzed, and strategically
foolish in Iraq and Afghanistan—emboldened both Russia and China.
China especially saw itself in the ascendancy and took 2008, when it
grandly hosted the Olympics, as time to abandon hide-and-bide. Putin
tried to showcase a modern, confident Russia with $51 billion spent on the
2014 Winter Olympics, but it was soon overshadowed by human rights
and Ukrainian political problems. Beijing’s and Moscow’s perceptions
are premature, as the United States is far from washed up, and Russia and
China face serious economic, political, ethnic, and strategic challenges.
In sum, post-Cold War US relations with Russia and China have
never been simple or smooth. They appeared tolerable but have been
deteriorating for years. Moscow and Beijing never abandoned the
“inherent bad faith” model of the Cold War. They always suspected
US motives and still do. Moscow and Beijing harshly criticized their
recent United States ambassadors, Michael McFaul and Gary Locke
respectively, something rare in diplomacy that indicates deep hostility
and cannot be resolved by reset buttons.

The Limits of Sino-Russian Alliance

The Sino-Soviet relationship during the Cold War was never
smooth sailing. We tended to see the two as more unified than they
were. Stalin—who knew little of the outside world, and what he knew
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was wrong—continually misadvised the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). Mao received practically no instructions or approval from Stalin
and won power in 1949 by ignoring Stalin.
Khrushchev’s 1956 anti-Stalin speech triggered the Sino-Soviet split.
Mao denounced Khrushchev as a “revisionist” and in 1958 launched his
destructive Great Leap Forward, wherein some 36-45 million Chinese
starved to death. Exasperated at Mao’s rejection of the Soviet economic
path, Moscow withdrew its extensive aid, technicians, and plans from
China in 1960, bringing the Sino-Soviet split into the open. The situation got worse with China’s first nuke in 1964. The Sino-Soviet alliance
really lasted only ten years, 1950-60. We reified a “Sino-Soviet bloc” that
had many cracks. This time, let us look more closely.
The former Soviet republics of Central Asia—the five “stans”—now
do more business with China than with Russia. The Kremlin cannot like
the economic reorientation of what had been part of tsarist Russia since
the nineteenth century, taken to block China from expanding west of
the Pamir Mountains. Now Putin faces this problem.
Siberia—actually, Russia as a whole—is depopulating.1 Many settlers to Siberia (including the adjacent Far Eastern District that fronts
the Pacific) have retreated back to European Russia. The timber and
minerals of Siberia and the Far East are irresistible raw materials for
resource-hungry China. Lacking sufficient Russian manpower, Russia
lets Chinese enterprises exploit these resources.
Sino-Russian rivalry over southern portions of Siberia, especially
the maritime region, began in the seventeenth century as tsarist expeditions filled in the empire to the Pacific. In the nineteenth century, tsarist
Russia fantasized that the Amur, a large river flowing into the Pacific,
could become Russia’s Mississippi, a corridor for Siberian products to
the outside world. China had claims to the region, but the Manchus
lacked military power and gave up nearly a quarter million square miles
to Russia in the 1858 Treaty of Aigun, one of what Beijing still bitterly
calls the “unequal treaties.”
A shrinking Russian population and growing Chinese presence may
awaken thoughts in Beijing that Aigun might be altered. Russia’s seizure
of Crimea in 2014 may prompt China to ask if they cannot do the same.
Primorsky Krai (capital: Vladivostok) is the finger of Russian territory
that separates China’s Heilongjiang from the Sea of Japan. A Chinese
shipping corridor through Primorsky Krai would boost the economic
development of northeast China.
Moscow will not gladly become a mere resource provider and
junior partner to China, but their different growth rates point that way.
China’s economy in 2013 grew at 7.6 percent a year, Russia’s at 1.3 percent.2 Already China’s is the world’s second largest economy, soon to

1     Russia’s population declined alarmingly in the 1990s and 2000s, but turned around by 2012 as
births increased and ethnic Russians immigrated from the newly independent former Soviet republics. UN Development Report 2013, 194, estimates annual decline at 0.4 percent from 2000 to 2005,
but improving to an estimated annual decline of 0.1 percent from 2010 to 2015. The annexation of
Crimea in 2014 added 2 million people to Russia’s 142.5 million.
2     CIA World Factbook, March 11, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html
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overtake the United States. Russia—behind Germany and barely ahead
of Brazil—will likely slip further behind.

Corruption: The Achilles Heel

Corruption in most Communist lands was pervasive but minor,
limited by the statist system to a few rubles or yuan. With the means
of production in state hands, industries could not be hijacked. With
currencies unconvertible, few funds could be hidden abroad. The shift
to market economies opened the gates to corruption, which grows at
the interface of the public and private sectors. Businesses need permits,
licenses, and loans from officials who demand kickbacks. Russians and
Chinese stash billions of dollars, many of them ill-gained, in accounts
and properties abroad through Cyprus banks, Hong Kong corporations,
and Macau casinos.
Capital flight indicates corrupt governments that seize or unfairly
tax and jail capitalists. Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption
Perceptions Index ranges from 100 for squeaky clean to 1 for totally
dirty. The Scandinavian countries rank at the top, at around 90; the
United States, Japan, and France in the 70s; and Afghanistan, North
Korea, and Somalia at the bottom, below 10. In 2013, TI awarded China
40, Russia 28, and Ukraine 25.3
Major corruption and capital flight indicate low legitimacy. Another
indicator: huge police forces, as in both Russia and China. Corruption
has sparked the overthrow of several governments, including Tunisia,
Egypt, and Ukraine. The Kremlin and Zhongnanhai know and fear
this, but corruption is hard to uproot because they need the corrupt officials to run the country. If you jail all your helpers, you will be helpless.
The CCP’s Central Committee for Discipline Inspection busts a few
crooked cadres, seldom at the highest levels. Russia pays no attention
to corruption among its Putin-appointed siloviki (strong men), who have
become very wealthy running state-connected enterprises. Corruption
breeds a cynical political culture in which citizens obey but with little
enthusiasm. This plays to our long-term advantage.

A New Strategy for a New Cold War

•• Suspend loose talk of military confrontation, which leads to push back
and rigid positions.
•• Evaluate which is the bigger long-term threat, Russia or China.
Treat the lesser with some forbearance, emphasizing diplomacy,
and the greater with firmness, emphasizing economics and military
preparedness.
•• Do not attempt to revive NATO and to pivot to Asia; pick one. First,
the US budget will not support both. More importantly, leaning on
both adversaries simultaneously pushes them together. If we get tough
on China, go lighter on Russia, and vice-versa.
•• Prepare intellectually but quietly for the possibility that in a few years
this emphasis could reverse. Eventually, Russia could turn from China
3     Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, http://www.transparency.org/
cpi2013/results
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to us.
•• Do not build expensive new weapons systems for fighting the old Cold
War. Instead, maintain compact but trained, ready, and agile armed
forces to respond to current threats.
•• Do not occupy another country. Getting bogged down weakens
us and allows our adversaries to portray us as global hegemonists.
American public opinion and the federal budget will not sustain long
overseas deployments.
•• Refrain from unilateral actions; they isolate us. Allies are politically
necessary, even if we carry the heaviest military burdens.
•• Try to revitalize NATO but do not be too disappointed if Europe
stays divided and negative.
•• Seek energy self-sufficiency so that we import little oil but export
liquid natural gas to Europe to offset Russian threats to cut deliveries.
The readiness of non-Russian natural-gas exporters to expand into
the lucrative European market could persuade Russia to maintain its
gas exports.
In sum, US strategists must avoid the diplomatic and military rigidity we fell into during the Cold War. Patience and economics tipped the
balance in our favor and will do so again.

On Military Interventions

Options for Avoiding Counterinsurgencies
David H. Ucko and Robert C. Egnell
© 2014 David H. Ucko and Robert C. Egnell

Abstract: How can the West continue to shape international order
without over-committing itself to ruinous and ambiguous operations on the scale of Iraq and Afghanistan? This article addresses
this question by examining the failures of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and by outlining three alternatives for future engagements: the Libya model, the indirect approach, and contingency
operations in support of multilateral organizations. Each presents
unique possibilities, but the imperative for strategic clarity and commitment is consistent.

B

y December 2014, the large-scale Western military effort in
Afghanistan will be over, ending more than a decade of direct
intervention in that country and Iraq. A page is being turned
in the history of warfare and, as most recognize, there is a need to take
stock of the diverse but often painful experiences of the past, and to
translate these into appropriate lessons for future interventions.
That the recent campaigns, despite substantial investment, have
yielded such limited results is difficult to accept. Yet denial will not
prepare us for the future. Indeed, if the West is to remain in the business
of shaping global affairs, sometimes by force of arms, it must resolve
the contradictions raised by its recent campaigns.1 Most pressingly, it
seems, the West wants the rights that go along with global leadership,
but not the responsibilities and costs. How can we bridge this gap? How
can the West sustain its contribution to a very particular international
order, without falling into the pitfalls that characterized the last decade?
Creative solutions are urgently needed.
This article examines three such solutions in light of the failures of
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. These alternate approaches provide
more limited applications of force and more modest roles. Recent
history suggests that—within key contexts and preconditions—such
approaches can be successful.

The Challenges in Afghanistan

An important first step to understanding the challenges faced
in Afghanistan is to broaden the scope of analysis beyond the mere
conduct of operations. Many of the mistakes in Afghanistan were strategic and, therefore, had little to do with counterinsurgency. These include
the creation of a highly centralized form of governance, the wasted
opportunities provided by the fall of the Taliban, the massive diversion
caused by the war in Iraq, and the decision to expand the International
Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF’s) area of operations beyond Kabul
without committing a fraction of the resources necessary for security
1     For a cogent list of areas of enquiry, see Francis G. Hoffman, “Learning Large Lessons
from Small Wars,” War on the Rocks, February 5, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/
learning-large-lessons-from-small-wars/.
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and stability. Underlying these missteps was the inability of international
allies to establish common political and strategic aims.
The campaign was defined by three separate and poorly coordinated efforts: the US-led counterterrorism effort of Operation Enduring
Freedom-Afghanistan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
-led ISAF effort to provide security and to enable the third mission,
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), a UN
effort devoted to political and economic development. On one side of
the spectrum, Afghanistan was a narrow exercise in counterterrorism;
on the other, it was statebuilding aimed at establishing democracy,
gender equality, and human rights. Rather than a propitious division
of labor, the broad spectrum of aims provided the West with the false
comfort of “doing it all,” all at once, and with little need for prioritization. Tensions between competing interests were glossed over, but
became strikingly apparent with NATO’s expansion beyond Kabul and
the steady deterioration of security thereafter. The bloodshed deepened
strategic divisions, both between and within individual governments.
In a context where victory was not really a relevant concept, the
lack of political and strategic direction had serious consequences. Most
importantly, it thwarted the essential process of balancing ends, ways,
and means, and the mismatches therein which became increasingly
obvious. Security worsened and the United States, having “discovered counterinsurgency” in Iraq, was called upon to rescue the effort.
Counterinsurgency was seen as the solution to a strategic problem.2
However, as an operational approach, it could not possibly provide
the answer. The fact that the launch of the “Surge” and the switch to
population-centric counterinsurgency coincided with the first talk of
withdrawal from Afghanistan clearly did not help.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Theories and concepts should be used to make sense of a complex
reality and to support the dynamic process of analysis, decisionmaking,
and implementation. This is not just an intellectual exercise; the concepts we use have an impact on how we interpret the conflict, prioritize
our resources, and conduct operations. Selecting a concept, or a term
(like counterinsurgency), requires great care: ideally, it should help us
understand the true nature of the problem, and how best to deal with it.
How does counterinsurgency measure up? The concept has been
useful in moving many armed forces from an exclusive focus on conventional warfare, yet in itself, the idea of counterinsurgency has served
better as an antithesis to past pathologies than as a prescriptive guide for
ongoing campaigns. In Afghanistan, for several reasons, the introduction of a counterinsurgency framework did not help us understand the
true nature of the problem or how to reach our aims.
The first reason stems from the misinterpretation and overgeneralization of lessons from past counterinsurgency campaigns. Historians
and military thinkers often stress the limited generalizability of operational approaches from one context to the next. One would, therefore,
assume that when a colonial policing approach was revived to support
2     Hew Strachan, “Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War,”
Survival 52, no. 5 (2010): 168.
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the state-building campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, care would be
taken to appreciate the differences separating these two worlds. Yet such
analysis was all too rare.
One result of this rather problematic reading of history was the exaggeration of the “hearts and minds” aspect of operations, and the neglect
of often equally important coercive components.3 Much of the emerging
wisdom was based on polished historical accounts of past campaigns
that were never critically examined. Instead, a liberal 21st century filter
was applied that simply reinforced preexisting biases. In fact, collective
punishment, executions, and forced population movements are but a
few examples of past tactics, employed even in the most revered yet academically abused campaign—Malaya. Much of this scholarship and pop
history was benignly intended to reverse the prior over-reliance on military force. Since then, the pendulum has swung from one extreme to the
other and it will continue to do so lest greater historical rigor is applied.4
There are also key contextual differences to grapple with. Past
counterinsurgency operations took place as “internal” challenges within
empires. 5 Today, the West engages these challenges as part of a coalition and in support of weak yet legally sovereign and fully independent
states. Despite some room for divergence, contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine still presumes a sufficient harmony of interests between
intervening and host-nation governments, or at least an ability to push
the latter toward the “correct” course of action. Actual practice provides a more sobering perspective. In Iraq, institutions either collapsed
through war or were dismantled through coalition decree, leading to
the infiltration of sectarian elements into positions of central power
and a government whose interests often ran counter to those of the
intervening coalition. In Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency campaign
confronted a deeply dysfunctional state bureaucracy and a NATO headquarters that lacked the capacity and resources to run anything but the
security aspects of operations. In both campaigns, difficulties with hostnation governments were compounded by differences among coalition
partners regarding approach, commitment, and contributions.
A further change has already been hinted at: the availability
and competence of civilian means. The strategic intent in Iraq and
Afghanistan required substantial civilian participation, large and capable
enough to compensate for in-state weaknesses. This resource was at the
disposal of past empires in the form of colonial administrations with
local experience and understanding, and local police forces that could
maintain order.6 Today, the political and civilian components of counterinsurgency are tremendously under-developed, despite efforts like the
Stabilization Unit in the United Kingdom and the ill-fated Office of the
3     Paul Dixon, “‘Hearts and Minds?’ British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” Journal of
Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (June 2009) .
4     For an elaboration of this point, see David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell, Counterinsurgency in
Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 19-44.
5     John Mackinlay made this point already in 1997. See John Mackinlay, “War lords,” RUSI Journal
143, no. 2 (1998): 25. It does not follow that historical counterinsurgency campaigns are entirely
irrelevant, as David French notes, the discontinuity can also be exaggerated. See David French, The
British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 252–253.
6     See for example I.A. Rigden, The British Approach to Counter- Insurgency: Myths, Realities and
Strategic Challenges, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2008), 13; Frank
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping (London: Frank Cass, 1971).
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Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the
United States. This deficiency has caused a distinct mismatch between
ambitions and resources.
Attempting to transplant past counterinsurgency approaches onto
contemporary state-building efforts also risks neglecting the essentially
conservative nature of counterinsurgency. The concept of counterinsurgency presumes that the problem at hand is an insurgency that challenges
the status quo. While successful counterinsurgency campaigns have
often involved certain political concessions, counterinsurgency operations are predicated on the survival of the state or preemption of violent
change through peaceful liberalization. However, this description hardly
fits the role played by the Kabul regime. Nor is it clear that the defeat
of the Taliban and other groups would really meet Western strategic
aims or even lead to stability. The question is whether “the insurgency”
was the issue? Or, was it a symptom of more profound problems in the
establishment of the Afghan state, its evolution, and the shortcomings
of Western intervention in the regional context in which all this has
played out?
Given the fact that external coalitions toppled the existing
regimes and instigated revolutionary societal changes in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, it is a stretch to argue we were merely protecting or even
reforming the status quo. Instead, the international community was the
true revolutionary agent of change, and branding its efforts as counterinsurgency led us to misunderstand the actual roles of different actors
within those respective societies, not least our own. Most critically, it
reveals an all-too militaristic and optimistic view of what it takes to
transform societies.7

The Way Ahead

Whether or not counterinsurgency ever provided an appropriate
lens through which to understand the security challenges presented by
failing states, it has proved too costly—politically, financially, and in
blood. Reaction to this realization has, to date, been far from impressive.
Much of it has been dominated by slogans—“no more Iraqs,” “no more
Afghanistans,” “counterinsurgency is dead”—none of which is particularly helpful so long as global interests are the rule. For sure, no one
wants to repeat such campaigns, but neither the Iraq war nor the Afghan
war began as counterinsurgencies. Instead, it was precisely our refusal
to anticipate and prepare for the complexity of war and the enemy’s
ability to adapt that produced these problems. Nothing here condemns
us to endless encores of similar campaigns, but neither can we return
to the military thinking that dominated before them: a vision of war
as an apolitical, militarily decisive, and technologically driven phenomenon, unfolding on an isolated battlefield. To do better in the future, we
must think more creatively about how to engage with war’s complexity
and political essence, in order to shape global security affairs yet without
repeating the traumas of the last decade. Recent history suggests three
options for future interventions: the Libya model, the indirect approach,
and contingency operations in support of regional and international
7     For a longer version of this argument, see Robert Egnell, “A Western Insurgency in
Afghanistan,” Joint Forces Quarterly 70, no. 3 (2013): 8-14.
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organizations. These three models in turn point to obvious areas of
investment, both intellectually and in terms of resources; yet, while
helpful, all are also reliant on key conditions and capabilities. Most critically, each requires far greater clarity about the nature and demands of
expeditionary operations, their typical duration, and the challenges of
operating as one member of a larger team.

The Libya Model

Following weeks of civil war in Libya in 2011, NATO’s North Atlantic
Council decided that some sort of military intervention was needed.
On 19 March, NATO commenced its Operation Unified Protector by
launching Tomahawk missiles and air sorties at government targets.
The aims of the operation, set by the UN Security Council, included
the establishment of a no-fly zone, the protection of civilians, and the
enforcement of an arms embargo. The unofficial aim, it was speculated, was regime change in favor of the National Transitional Council
(NTC)—the Libyan resistance movement established during the war.
Operating in coordination with NTC but without ever deploying
regular ground forces, NATO and coalition partners assisted in the
gradual defeat of the Libyan government. Most of the support came
from the air, with aircraft targeting vital government forces and installations. The war raged until 20 October 2011, when, during the battle of
Sirte, NTC forces located Qaddafi and beat him to death. Despite NTC
requests that NATO stay until the end of the year, the operation was
formally terminated the following week. In the campaign’s aftermath,
NTC set up a new government, paved the way for elections, and sought
to establish and maintain a level of relative security.
Western intervention in Libya in 2011 has been portrayed as a useful
contrast to the costly and drawn-out campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Airpower expert Christina Goulter argued:
[A]fter nearly a decade of counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan, . . . OUP proved that an air campaign, focused and driven by
ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance], can win a war when combined effectively with irregular ground forces.8

Yet, in a sense, the Libya campaign simply repeated the so-called Afghan
Model, applied during the initial combat phase of Operation Enduring
Freedom and lauded then, too, as a uniquely effective means of applying
Western military might.9 Then as now, the model saw Western powers ply
their advanced combat capabilities—precision-guided munitions in particular—in support of local ground forces, reinforced by a small number
of special operations forces to ensure proper coordination. Going back
further, the prototype for the approach was tested in the Balkan campaigns of the 1990s, in which NATO aircraft bombed targets from a
risk-free altitude and let local allies (the Croat forces in Bosnia and the
Kosovo Liberation Army in Kosovo) conduct ground operations.

8     Christina Goulter, “Ellamy: The UK Air Power Contribution to Operation Unified Protector.”
Draft paper in RAND study on Operation Unified Protector, Santa Monica, Calif (Forthcoming
2014), 139
9     See Stephen Biddle, “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan
and Iraq,” International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005–06): 161-76.

16

Parameters 44(1) Spring 2014

The Libya model presents undeniable advantages. First, the approach
kept costs to a fraction of those accrued in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second,
as in the NATO-led air campaign over Kosovo, coalition and civilian
casualties were minimal; again, NATO intervened without incurring a
single fatality. Third, although some ambiguity surrounded the actual
aims in Libya, the results of the intervention appeared—at first blush at
least—far more promising than those expected from Afghanistan following NATO’s withdrawal.
These advantages notwithstanding, it is critical to acknowledge the
preconditions that allowed the Libya model to be effective. Indeed, the
campaign was in many ways exceptional, undermining its potential as a
precedent. First, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s lack of subtlety, in combination with the backdrop of democratic revolutions in Northern Africa,
provided the campaign with unprecedented international support—a
sense of urgency to “do something.” From then on, much of the war was
fought in the desert, greatly facilitating aerial bombardment. There was
also a clear opposition to Gaddafi in the NTC and the rebel troops that
served as proxies. Moreover, the geographic location, at the very borders
of Europe, facilitated both basing and logistics. These conditions will
not always obtain.
Going further, and risking a cliché, the enemy has a vote. Even
in Libya, government forces sought to exploit NATO’s strategic and
tactical preferences. Having initially operated in large regular units
across the desert, government forces adapted following the initial air
attacks. As Brigadier Ben Barry explains, Gaddafi’s forces “dispersed
heavy weapons in populated areas and made extensive use of armed 4x4
vehicles, similar to those used by the rebels,” something that “greatly
complicated NATO’s ability to identify and attack them.”10 Clearly, such
adaptation came too late, yet future adversaries are likely to be more
wily, severely limiting the viability of winning wars from the skies.
Finally, it is worth considering the political consequences of the
limited ownership inherent in this approach. The model inevitably
empowers a local proxy. The key question, therefore, is what happens
after the aerial bombardment has stopped, when the model is put back
on the shelf, and it is time to establish a new political accommodation
that is both desirable and stable. These days, the Afghan war is hardly
remembered for the initial successes of the “Afghan Model”—indeed it
was precisely the political fall-out of the Taliban’s toppling that bedeviled subsequent efforts at stabilization. Similarly, although successful in
toppling the Gaddafi regime, the Libyan intervention unleashed destabilizing forces within Libya and regionally. In Libya, “factional, regional,
tribal and ideological divisions” have marked the three years since the
revolution: the “central government, far outgunned by powerful local
militias, holds little sway beyond its offices.”11 Regionally, fighters and
weapons have spread as far as Mali and Syria, destabilizing the already
fragile states in the region.12 The implication is not that NATO should
have used ground troops in Libya, but rather that the Libya model must
not be mistaken for more than it is: it does not render intervention easy,
10     Ben Barry, “Libya’s Lessons,” Survival 53, no. 5 (2011): 6.
11     “Little to celebrate.” The Economist, February 22, 2014.
12     UN Security Council’s Group of Experts, “Final report of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya,” S/2013/99, March 20, 2012, 24-38.
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but simply offloads the responsibility for political consolidation onto
others, with whom we must learn to work far more effectively.

The Indirect Approach

In the last eight years, the US military has experienced a revolution in its understanding of counterinsurgency. When the US Army and
Marine Corps published their counterinsurgency manual in December
2006, the term denoted, almost exclusively, the deployment of large
armed formations to provide security for the host-nation population
and assume responsibility for various military and civilian tasks.13 As
the doctrine was written while 144,000 US troops were actively involved
in an insurgency in Iraq, this focus on the “direct” approach to counterinsurgency was appropriate. Even then, the manual was criticized
for not acknowledging alternative approaches and this criticism has
become far more vocal with the perceived failure of the direct approach
in Afghanistan. The dominant argument now is that for strategic, political, and financial reasons, outcomes must be achieved “indirectly,” by
relying on the structures and capabilities of the host-nation and thereby
do more with less. A key precedent for this approach is the US advisory
mission in El Salvador in the 1980s, which is credited with the defeat
of the Farabundi Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The British
campaign in Dhofar, from 1962 to 1976, provides a second, increasingly cited, precedent, since Britain relied on the armed forces of the
host-nation government along with sub-state militias to achieve its aims
there. A more recent case is the US military’s assistance of Colombia in
its campaign against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(FARC). This case provides the perfect foil for the direct interventions
in Iraq and Afghanistan: they overlapped in time, but whereas the direct
engagements were ruinously expensive, politically costly, and ambiguous
in their outcome, the weakening of FARC under President Alvaro Uribe
is a counterinsurgency success story.14 Similarly, the US special operations forces-led efforts to assist the Philippines government against the
Abu Sayaff Group stands out as a low-cost, low-profile yet fairly successful intervention, at least in comparative terms.15
Proponents commonly point to five key advantages. First, the
indirect approach puts local forces in the lead and thereby avoids many
of the linguistic and cultural hurdles encountered by foreign troops.
Second, by keeping the response local, the counterinsurgency campaign
remains untarnished by the stigma of foreign occupation. Third, putting
local forces in the lead also reduces the political costs for the intervening
government. Fourth, these interventions are also commonly less costly
financially—a corollary of the smaller footprint.16 Fifth, and most fundamentally, the indirect approach puts the local government in charge
13     U.S. Department of the Army and United States Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24
MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, December 2006).
14     Thomas Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies
Institute, 2002).
15     Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The
Indirect Approach,” Military Review 86, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 2006): 2-12.
16     As Fernando Luján points out, “since the approval of Plan Colombia in 1999, the cost to
run the entire program – including all military and civilian assistance – has roughly equaled the cost
of running the Iraq or Afghanistan war for a single month during the surge.” See Major Fernando
Luján, “Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention,” Voices from the Field
(Center for a New American Security, March 2013), 8.
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for solving what is, after all, its problem: it puts the onus of the solution
on local ownership and responsibility.
The indirect approach rightly recognizes the limits on what external
powers can achieve by themselves in a foreign land, particularly one
they scarcely understand. The focus on partnerships also touches on
the essence of expeditionary counterinsurgency: the need to maintain
host-nation legitimacy, build capacity, and engage in a manner that is
sustainable. While the notion that “small is beautiful”—that indirect
deployments make more sense—is largely correct, it is dangerous to stop
the analysis at this point. Indeed, the indirect approach, like counterinsurgency or interventions of any type, comprises severe challenges that
must be fully understood.
Three caveats stand out as critical. First, recent experience indicates
that advising local security forces is an art in itself. There is a common
misconception that because the advisory approach puts the local government and its security forces in the lead, the intervening power is somehow
shielded from the complexity otherwise typical of counterinsurgency.
However, as experience shows, advisory work is, in fact, highly challenging, requiring specific skills and capacities. Two problems are historically
consistent: ensuring the professionalization of the host-nation security
force and that it uses what it learns in ways that are accountable and
in keeping with mission objectives. In El Salvador, the cap on deploying a maximum of 55 US advisors and the ban against joint operations
with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) undermined these goals.
Specifically, US advisers lacked both leverage and oversight and relied on
ESAF being willing and able to follow the guidance provided. Neither
of these conditions obtained. Although the advisory campaign was vital
for regime survival in the early phase of the war, the transition for peace
a decade later had more to do with the passing of the Cold War and other
domestic factors than the marvels of the indirect approach.17
The problems of oversight and leverage resurfaced when US troops
sought to establish security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. A consistent
finding from these theaters is that the effectiveness of advisory missions
is best guaranteed by “partnering” with local security forces: living and
operating with them, day and night, from the same base and streets. Yet
the implications of this requirement are significant: they call for specific
and extensive preparation, including language training and cultural
awareness. Notwithstanding various efforts to boost regional expertise,
it is uncertain whether Western troops are adequately prepared for this
task. Pointing to special operations forces as a solution, given their
specialized skills, is insufficient. Fewer in number and not easily mass
produced, they lack the capacity to undertake large-scale advisory missions. To be sure, successful advisory efforts are rarely light in troop
numbers: a mere 55 advisers may have deployed to El Salvador, but it
is a very small country, in close proximity to the United States where
additional training was provided and, even then, the personnel cap and
other restrictions actually undermined the proper prosecution of the
campaign. To do better, sufficient advisors are required to accompany
each unit being trained.
17     David H. Ucko, “Counterinsurgency in El Salvador: The Lessons and Limits of the Indirect
Approach,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 24, no. 4 (2013).
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Therefore, the indirect approach cannot, must not, be seen as
“counterinsurgency on the cheap.” If partnering is indeed required,
advisory missions will in all cases require sustained buy-in—institutionally to create the capabilities, and politically to allow troops to operate
from the front line over protracted periods. As seen in Afghanistan, it is
often the advisors themselves who become the target so as to sever the
critical link that partnering provides.
Another consideration for the application of the indirect approach
is the need for a partner. In Colombia, the Philippines, and most other
settings where the indirect approach is said to have worked, the advisors
operated alongside an established government and military. Colombia,
for example, has a long record of elected civilian governance and
a strong military. By contrast, it is questionable whether the indirect
approach would have worked in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq in 2003,
or in similar settings. This uncertainty clearly restricts the applicability
of this approach.
Even where the central state is extant and somewhat competent,
thorny issues of legitimacy and strategy loom large. In the quest to defeat
an insurgency, the professionalization of a country’s armed forces or
security sector is but one part of a broader puzzle. David Galula’s admonition that counterinsurgency is 80 percent political and only 20 percent
military is now a cliché, but its implications have not been grasped.18
While professional security forces are critical, they are not in themselves strategically decisive: much depends on the political objectives their
operations serve. Where this strategy is misguided or altogether absent,
security operations have little or no meaning. By analogy, it serves no
purpose sharpening the scalpel if the surgeon operating is drunk.
This point is critical, as it is typically at the political level that the hostnation partnership will fray. Partners are more willing to accept military
aid and assistance than to undergo the political or social reforms deemed
necessary for success. Governments facing an insurgency almost by definition suffer from some legitimacy deficit—hence the armed resistance.
It is not uncommon that they are more concerned with retaining power
and privilege than with undercutting dissent through effective reform.
The resultant dilemma for counterinsurgency advisers is formidable. In
Dhofar, the solution to Said bin Taimur’s refusal to reform was a military
coup carried out by his own son and with the support of the British government. Within 24 hours, various liberalizing measures were passed,
giving political meaning to the armed forces’ security operations and
producing the happy outcome for which the campaign is known.19 Yet,
for a less happy precedent, consider the advisory years in Vietnam (195065) and the US decision to remove the recalcitrant Ngo Dinh Diem, a
desperate measure that opened the door to sending more US ground
troops in 1965. In other words, nothing within the indirect approach
removes the need for suasion and compulsion—diplomatic tasks where
the West under-performs. This requirement once again limits what we
can expect to achieve from the indirect approach. Much like any other
18     David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Pall Mall, 1964), 89.
19     Ian F.W. Beckett, “The British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Dhofar 1965–1975,” in
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey
Publishing, 2008), 175–190.
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model of intervention, it must be tailored to specific circumstances and
support a sound strategy.

Contingency Operations

Another means of burden sharing is by limiting the role of Western
forces and ensuring residual tasks are carried out by international,
regional, or local partners. The role played here might entail the provision of quick-reaction forces to assist a peace operation or protect it from
a sudden crisis. Such a “contingency operation” would in principle be
similar to that played by the British military during its intervention in
Sierra Leone in 2000 or by the French-led coalition force in Operation
Artemis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2003.
The benefit here is that in assisting a preexisting mission, the intervening power is allowed to focus on just one phase of the campaign, thereby
limiting its exposure and risk. Yet by the same token the effectiveness
of these interventions also relies on the ability to transfer demanding
follow-on tasks to competent actors with greater staying power.
Operation Artemis is a cautionary tale. In response to the destabilization of eastern DRC, a French-led Interim Emergency Multinational
Force (IEMF) deployed to Bunia to help strengthen security and rescue
the local UN peacekeeping mission. Per the conditions tied to its
deployment, IEMF spent three months in Bunia, during which time it
expelled militia elements and reestablished security. It then handed over
responsibility to the newly created UN “Ituri Brigade,” a 5,000-strong
unit. On these merits, the operation was a success. Yet the IEMF’s
limited mandate, temporally and geographically, meant that its effects
were transient. As a later UN report found, “The strict insistence on the
very limited area of operations—Bunia—merely pushed the problem
of violent aggression against civilians beyond the environs of the town,
where atrocities continued.”20 Moreover, despite the UN force’s expansion, it remained undermanned and ill-equipped to sustain the gains
of the intervention, greatly undermining its longer-term significance.21
The British military has enjoyed successes with “contingency operations,” illustrating the value of these types of interventions but also what
they typically require. Initially deployed in Sierra Leone in 2000 to evacuate Westerners from the war-torn country, General David Richards saw
an opportunity to side directly with the Freetown government against
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). British forces were involved in
a number of confrontations against the RUF and maintained a presence
off-shore to demonstrate resolve. The combat phase ended quickly but,
notably, the British force then supported, trained, and reinforced Sierra
Leone’s army and the local UN peacekeeping mission, so the country’s
newfound stability could be sustained. Even after, Britain maintained a
140-strong force in Sierra Leone to advise the army and has remained
one of the country’s greatest bilateral donors of aid.22

20     Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (Military Division), “Operation Artemis: The Lessons
of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force” (New York: UN Department for Peace Keeping
Operations, October 2004), 14.
21     Mats Berdal, Building Peace After War (Abingdon: Routledge for International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2009), 112.
22     Ibid., 120.
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Here, too, the results are far from incontestable. Nonetheless, the
point is clear: the effectiveness of military force depended on, inter alia,
coordinated and properly resourced follow-up actions. Civil–military
cooperation and the ability to raise the competence of local and international forces to enable a smooth transition were also key. In that sense,
the use of Western troops on contingency operations calls for many of
the same capabilities as those needed for the indirect approach, which
again highlights this area as requiring more urgent attention.

Conclusion

A major factor behind the relative success in Sierra Leone was the
auspicious timing of the intervention. The role of Guinea and local
defense forces, the expansion of the UN mission, and general war weariness were all critical in achieving peace.23 These factors do not devalue
the British effort in Sierra Leone but raise an important point about
knowing when to intervene. Such knowledge is a requirement for all
modes of engagement discussed here. Simply put, interagency coordination, advisory skills, or carefully honed military capabilities will never
suffice if the strategy underlying their use is unworkable or no conducive
entry points have been found (or exist) for effective intervention.
What is needed, in part, is finer strategic thinking—the art of using
what we have in ways to meet our desired goals at an acceptable cost. Yet
at a deeper level, what is necessary is also a more sincere interest—across
the relevant arms of government—in the lands, peoples, and contexts
in which military operations are to be launched. Only by understanding the environment (its politics, history, terrain, and population) will
outsiders ever discern the opportunities for more effective intervention:
the potential partnerships, the contextual enablers, and the strengths
and weaknesses of both friend and foe. In Sierra Leone, much came
down to the initiative of the in-country commander. It would be hopeful
to rely on similar improvisation in future engagements.
Another common thread is the emphasis on broader, multinational
frameworks in which Western forces play but one part. At best, such
cooperation brings legitimacy, shared capabilities, and greater capacity.
Yet fighting with allies is not easy. Separate “partners” enter the fray
with greatly varying levels of commitment and for disparate (sometimes
entirely wrong-headed) reasons. This is a challenge for even the strongest of contributors. Indeed, it is necessary to ask, before we consider
any of the options outlined above, why it is that we intervene in the
first place and how convincingly such efforts are tied to our national
interest. Limited investment in the relevant instruments and the lack of
clear thinking going into these endeavors certainly suggest a low overall
priority. So, in our search for viable models of intervention, we must
ensure that we select our approach on the basis of strategic soundness,
not because it presents the dubious promise of an “easy war.” These interventions are never easy, and will only be made much harder if we mistake
them as such.

23     David Keen, Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone (New York: James Currey/Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), 267-73.
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Abstract: This article reexamines the practices of small-footprint
military interventions in light of the concept of “tipping points” as
conceived by Thomas C. Schelling. If the concept is accurate, it can
improve how we conduct such interventions.

P

opular accounts of civil wars and insurgencies are filled with
references to “windows of opportunity” and “tipping points”—
moments in time when the dynamics of a conflict are supposedly
shifting in ways that may portend a decisive change in a war’s trajectory.
These concepts have been used in mainstream media accounts, professional journals, and special reports to explain recent events in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Syria, and elsewhere.
If windows of opportunity and tipping points accurately describe
critical junctures in conflicts and can be identified either ahead of time
or as they occur (rather than solely through the benefit of hindsight),
the policy implications are substantial. After the painful experiences of
Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is committed to avoiding largescale entanglements in other nations’ internal conflicts, seeking instead
to “develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to
achieve our security objectives.”1 Unfortunately, US military doctrine
and numerous other sources make clear that decisive intervention in
civil wars and insurgencies typically is a manpower-intensive and costly
endeavor.2 If there are particular moments in time when a conflict is at
a critical turning point, it may be possible for small-scale interjections
of external forces to have disproportionately large effects. Conversely, if
there are only short-lived opportunities in which the course of a conflict
might be turned without a massive commitment of resources, then that
knowledge might help the United States better identify when it should
avoid intervention.
Despite the widespread appeal of concepts like windows of opportunity and tipping points to explain the trajectories of civil wars around
the globe, there have been few attempts to apply them in a systematic way
and even fewer efforts to explain their implications for foreign military
intervention.3 As they are typically used, the terms do not distinguish
between simple changes in a conflict’s trajectory—potentially fleeting
and insignificant—and more meaningful junctures.
1     US Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), 3.
2     US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (December 2006);
James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995):
59–69.
3     For exceptions, see Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, MG-965-MCIA, 2010); Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A.
Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third World Quarterly 28,
no. 2 (2007): 321–367; and I. William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in
International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, eds. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington,
DC: National Academies Press, 2000).
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This article explores the concept of a tipping point and its implications for America’s reliance on low-cost, small-footprint approaches to
stabilizing embattled partner governments. More specifically, the article
asks two questions: Are there identifiable opportunities in the course of
an insurgency in which even relatively small actions could help tilt the
conflict decisively in favor of the government? And if so, how can the
United States best take advantage of these opportunities?4

Tipping Points

The concept of tipping was first formalized by the Nobel Prizewinning economist Thomas Schelling.5 Tipping points are a subset
of “critical mass” or “threshold” dynamics in which the behavior of
a certain proportion of the population—a proportion that is different
in every circumstance—causes others to behave in a similar manner,
leading to cascading effects. Tipping point dynamics typically occur as
an iterated process. In the first step, a “critical mass” or “threshold”
number of people makes a particular decision—for instance, to participate in a protest against a regime. Their behavior, in turn, provides
information that causes other people to act in a similar fashion. After
witnesses of an anti-regime demonstration observe that the regime did
not engage in violent repression, they may become emboldened to participate themselves.6 As more and more people make the same decision,
pressures continue to mount on those who had initially opposed such
behavior. Loyalists, for instance, might have preferred that a regime stay
in place, but once most of their neighbors change loyalties, they may
feel uncomfortable, or even unsafe, engaging in public support of the
regime. This description of tipping points assumes that relatively small
events can have disproportionately large consequences if they lead to the
crossing of certain thresholds.7 The crossing of such a threshold may not
be necessary to achieve a particular outcome (for example, the overthrow
of a regime, which might collapse due to foreign invasion or other causes
unrelated to tipping point dynamics), but it should be sufficient.
The concept of a “window of opportunity” has already been applied
extensively to internal conflicts, particularly in the form of William
Zartman’s arguments about the “ripeness” of conflicts for negotiated settlements. Tipping points, on the other hand, have not seen a
similarly sustained discussion, despite the fact that journalists, experts,
and practitioners frequently invoke the concept to explain conflicts or
argue for or against intervening in them.8 If tipping points truly are
sufficient to propel a conflict toward one outcome or another, being
4     This discussion is entirely focused on efforts to secure an end to conflict on terms favorable to the
partner government, rather than on efforts to topple foreign governments. Tipping point dynamics are
likely to be very different in the case of efforts to overthrow other governments; see Stephen Biddle,
Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002).
5     Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 99–102.
This concept was popularized in Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a
Big Difference (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2000).
6     Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution
of 1989,” World Politics 44, no. 1 (October 1991): 7–48.
7     Economists describe this situation as “increasing returns to scale.” For a closely related discussion of increasing returns, see Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study
of Politics,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 251–267.
8     For partial exceptions see Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, and McCormick, Horton,
and Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars.”
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able to identify them reliably and to understand their implications for
foreign intervention is perhaps even more important than understanding windows of opportunity. Conflicts may tip in a variety of ways:
toward resolution (an end to large-scale violence), toward qualitative
differences in the nature of a conflict (such as from political to more
criminal forms of violence, or from predominantly ideological to ethnic
or other communal ends), toward a new equilibrium at a higher or lower
intensity of violence, or toward a change in geographic expanse (such as
from cities into rural hinterlands or from containment within a single
country to spillover throughout a region). Each of these changes has
implications for American strategic interests. Those interests may be
secured by tipping a conflict toward one outcome or another, such as
by confining it to rural peripheries or by containing it within a single
country. Of particular importance is the relationship between tipping
points and conflict termination.

When Do Tipping Points Occur?

If tipping points can only be identified after the fact, when hindsight
has made a particular course of events appear inevitable, then they are of
little use to policymakers. While it is impossible to specify tipping points
across a broad range of conflicts, previous work on the dynamics of war
termination suggest several broad categories of events in which tipping
points would most likely occur.
Belligerents will continue to fight so long as the expected returns
(based on each party’s perceptions of the balance of power) exceed
the anticipated returns from negotiation. Consequently, tipping points
should emerge from one of three sources: a change in the balance of
power, a similar change in the expected benefits of peace, or new developments that significantly alter the parties’ perceptions of either of the
sources just discussed. The list of events provided below is only intended
as a summary of the most commonly cited potential tipping points.

Changes in the Balance of Power

In order to fight, a belligerent requires people to take up arms and to
provide support to the fighters, resources with which to fight (weapons,
money, and so on), and an organization and leadership to connect the
various elements of the struggle and give them purpose. Sufficient
degradation of any of these factors might induce a tipping point in a
conflict. More typically, a tipping point evolves when several of these
factors interact with one another.
•• Resources. One of the strongest predictors of a decisive turn in a war
is the loss of foreign state sponsorship to one or more of the parties
to the conflict, particularly if easily lootable natural resources are not
readily available to compensate for the shortfall.9 Especially in those
cases where an insurgency gained much of its support through material incentives (for example, cash payments, opportunities for looting),
the loss of revenues may touch off a cascade of defections.10 At least
9     Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End; Stephen Watts, “Enforcing Democracy? Assessing
the Linkages between Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Democratization,” paper presented at
Columbia University’s International Politics Seminar, March 2009.
10     Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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a half-dozen cases of wars that terminated decisively in the post-Cold
War era were tied either directly (for example, Cambodia, El Salvador,
Mozambique, and Nicaragua) or indirectly (for example, Guatemala
and South Africa) to the end of the Cold War and the elimination of
the resources both superpowers had been directing to their proxies.
The loss of markets for contraband can significantly weaken a faction,
but it seldom is as decisive as the loss of state sponsorship due to the
presence of alternative markets and the existence of other criminal
opportunities (for example, kidnapping for ransom).11
•• Organization and Leadership. Without leaders and structures in
place to guide fighters, an insurgency is no more than widespread
mob violence. Disrupting a faction’s organization can, therefore,
have potentially decisive effects. Two of the most powerful means
to disrupt an insurgency are attacks on the group’s leadership and
the creation of splits among different factions within an insurgency.12
The capture of the leaders of the Shining Path movement in Peru
(Abimeal Guzmán), the Kurdistan People’s Party in Turkey (Abdullah
Ocalan), and UNITA in Angola (Jonas Savimbi) are often cited as
examples of successful “decapitation” that led to a rapid disintegration
of movements that had previously been strong.13 Although evidence
suggests that successful leadership targeting produces important
short- to medium-term effects, the longer-term effects are less clear,
particularly if the government fails to build on the opportunity.14
•• Recruitment. Damage to an insurgency’s resource base or organization may harm its recruitment efforts—either because they
demonstrate the insurgency’s weakness or limit its ability to reward
and protect supporters. But other events may directly affect rebel
recruitment. Particularly for insurgencies in which revolutionary or
religious fervor or communal solidarity play a greater role in motivating insurgent participation than do immediate material incentives,
major shifts in popular perception of “the narrative” of the conflict
might have significant effects on recruitment. If a government is able
to enact significant reforms, or it is able to protect authoritative figures
who challenge the legitimacy of “warlords,” the popular appeal of rebel
leaders may erode. Attrition strategies may also represent a means to
reach such a tipping point, but they usually require large-scale—and
protracted—interventions and are likely to fail if the opposing side

11     The divergent trajectories of Mozambique and Angola in the 1990s are revealing. After the
end of the Cold War, both countries lost superpower sponsorship for their warring factions. The
ready availability of oil and so-called “conflict diamonds” in Angola, however, helped to substitute
for superpower subsidies and permitted that conflict to continue for over a decade longer.
12     On the “decapitation” of insurgencies, see Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?
Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International
Security 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 47–79. On offering incentives to split insurgencies, see Sir Robert
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (1966; reprint, Saint
Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005).
13     Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?” Michael Tiernay, “Killing Kony: Leadership Change
and Civil War Termination,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (2013).
14     See, for instance, Michael L. Burgoyne, “The Allure of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru’s
Fight against Sendero Luminoso,” Military Review (September-October 2010): 68–73.
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shows exceptional cohesion and commitment.15

Changes in the Benefits of Peace

Changes in the costs of continued fighting are not the only way in
which a war might take a decisive turn. Tipping points in a conflict might
also arise from changes in the anticipated benefits of peace. Credible
international peace operations to monitor and potentially enforce the
implementation of a peace deal provide one of the most important
means to make peace appear more attractive.16 The promise of economic assistance to make peace “pay” can also play an important role.17
Moreover, by inducing moderate factions to support peace, they may
also facilitate military victory over the more extremist or criminal factions within an insurgency who are unwilling to accept a peace founded
on compromise. Combining peace operations with offensive military
operations designed to defeat “spoilers” can pose difficult challenges,
but such a balancing act has been performed by international forces in
Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and elsewhere.

Changes in Perceptions

Ultimately, what matters less than the costs of war or the benefits
of peace is the parties’ perceptions of them. Systematically assessing the
ways in which perceptions diverge from underlying realities is beyond
the scope of this article. Numerous observers, however, emphasize two
points in time at which perceptions of wars’ costs and benefits may shift
in important ways.
First, the onset of war offers important information to the leadership of all sides. Wars are typically caused by misjudgments of other
parties’ capabilities or intentions. Once violence escalates, leaders may
quickly adjust their expectations. Wars may begin, for instance, when
one party—either the government or insurgents—resorts to violence
based on the expectation of a quick victory due to either the element of
surprise or the expectation that the opposition will be unable to overcome internal divisions and quickly organize resistance. In such cases, if
the initial onslaught is thwarted, the attacker may seek to defuse tensions
rapidly rather than committing to a lengthy conflict. In cases of foreign
military intervention, the initial days and months of a conflict may indelibly shape a population’s perception of the invader’s intentions, as in the
concept of the “golden hour” used to explain the escalating violence in
the months after the 2003 US intervention in Iraq.18
If a war is not defused in its very early stages, it will typically endure
for an extended period as the warring parties accumulate information on
the others’ capabilities and willingness to endure prolonged bloodshed.
When neither side is able to defeat the other, the parties may eventually
come to a common understanding of the costs of continued fighting
15     John E. Mueller, “The Search for the ‘Breaking Point’ in Vietnam: The Statistics of a Deadly
Quarrel,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 4 (December 1980): 497–519.
16     Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 51,
no. 3 (Summer, 1997).
17     Carrie Manning and Monica Malbrough, “Bilateral Donors and Aid Conditionality in PostConflict Peacebuilding: The Case of Mozambique,” Journal of Modern African Studies 48, no. 1 (March,
2010): 143–169.
18     James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington,
DC: Potomac Books, 2007).
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and the probabilities of success on the battlefield. At this point, William
Zartman’s “mutually hurting stalemate” is reached, potentially representing another juncture in the conflict at which events may turn decisively.
It is important to note that not all conflicts have clear tipping points.
Identifiable tipping points on the path toward durable conflict termination are relatively uncommon in part because truly decisive outcomes
in wars are rare. Many if not most conflicts do not end decisively.
Approximately half or less of politically inclusive countries with weak
state institutions, for instance, return to war within five years of the
end of a conflict.19 Since insurgencies so frequently draw on existing
social networks for recruiting, they retain a strong ability to reconstitute
themselves even after suffering substantial setbacks.20 Even conflicts
that end decisively may have no identifiable tipping point; instead, they
tend to come to an end through a gradual process of stalemate (as in the
Northern Ireland conflict or Mali’s civil war in the 1990s) or attrition (as
in post-Soviet Russia’s second Chechen war).

Small-Scale Interventions and Tipping the Balance

From a policy perspective, more interesting than the examples previously mentioned concerning wars in which tipping points are clearly
identifiable, are cases that may have had potential tipping points but
failed to “tip” in the government’s favor. Is it possible for outsiders to
influence outcomes at these critical moments? And if so, what might
such policies look like?
The previous discussion suggests at least six mechanisms through
which external interveners might use “small footprint” interventions to
induce decisive changes in an internal conflict:
•• Early intervention. Early intervention—seizing advantage of the
so-called golden hour—may help tip conflict dynamics in at least a
couple of ways. First, counterinsurgents can attempt to disrupt rebel
organizations before they grow robust and resilient. Second, counterinsurgents can help to set both popular and insurgent perceptions of
the government’s will and ability to fight in the early days of the war,
while expectations are still relatively fluid.
•• Resource interdiction. As discussed previously, the end of state
financing has often played a decisive role in conflicts. In most cases
state support for insurgents has ended either due to diplomatic efforts
or to factors internal to the state sponsor, but military operations
can also play a role. NATO airstrikes, for instance, were one of the
factors that led Serbia to threaten to eliminate support for Serbian
militias in Bosnia, thus bringing the ethnic Serbs to the negotiating
table.21 Military operations to interdict criminal trafficking are sub19     Stephen Watts et al., Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions
in Local Context (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, RR-513-SRF, 2014).
20     For one revealing case study, see Maya M. Christensen and Mats Utas, “Mercenaries of
Democracy: The ‘Politricks’ of Remobilized Combatants in the 2007 General Elections, Sierra
Leone,” African Affairs 107, no. 429 (2008): 515–539.
21     Although these airstrikes were one of the factors that led to the Dayton Accords, they were
clearly only one factor among many, and they likely were not the most important one. For a skeptical
view of the effectiveness of the airstrikes, see Office of Russian and European Analysis, Central
Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Vol. 1
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002).
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stantially more difficult, as the counternarcotics efforts in Colombia
and Afghanistan have demonstrated. Typically, there are too many
channels for contraband for military interdiction efforts to be decisive; however, there may be some exceptions. While contraband is
highly mobile, markets are not. Cutting off insurgents from access to
critical markets—as the United States did in the Battle of Sadr City
and the Kenyans did by denying al Shabaab the markets and ports of
Mogadishu and Kismayo in Somalia—can play important, if seldom
truly decisive, roles.22 Where rebels are dependent on heavy weapons
and armored vehicles—such as the Serbian militias in Bosnia—military operations may deny them the fuel they need to remain mobile.
•• Decapitation. As discussed above, successfully targeting top insurgent leadership can also be effective, particularly in the short to
medium term. Intervention by technologically sophisticated powers
like the United States may offer significant technical advantages in
targeting rebel leadership.23
•• Splitting strategies. Interveners may either help induce splits
among rebel groups or take advantage of pre-existing ones. Providing
resources to the government may help the government offer more
incentives to defecting rebels, and external military assistance may
help the government protect rebel defectors who might otherwise
fear reprisals from their former brothers-in-arms. Policies designed
to induce splits among rebel groups are a two-edged sword, however.
Inducements such as the promise of amnesty and redress of certain
grievances (for example, land reform) have been used to pry rebels
away from an insurgency and to provide intelligence on remaining
insurgents, thus leading to the cascading effects typical of a tipping
point. On the other hand, fracturing an insurgency into multiple factions may make a conflict harder to terminate through a negotiated
settlement because no single leadership can speak for the rebels.24 If
the government is too weak to offer meaningful inducements to rebel
defectors or to protect them, splitting strategies may create greater
incoherence among rebels without any corresponding strategic gains.
•• Strengthening pro-peace constituencies. Warring factions often
have a material interest in the criminal economies that form during
wartime and may even seek to perpetuate conflict as a means to profit.
Consequently, one of the most powerful means of drawing away
support from insurgents may be by strengthening those portions of
society—such as the licit business community—that have a vested
interest in peace. Some religious leaders may also have an interest in
peace, particularly since periods of conflict often draw power away
from traditional sources of authority (such as religious leaders and
elders) and concentrate it in the hands of military leaders and warlords.
To the extent that outside interveners can protect and strengthen these
pro-peace constituencies, they may be able to undermine the recruiting
22     David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, and Brian Shannon, The 2008 Battle of Sadr City (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RR-160-A, 2011).
23     Sean D. Naylor, “Years of Detective Work Led to al-Qaida Target,” Army Times, November
21, 2011; and David Spencer, “The Sword of Honor Campaign in the Cauca Valley: 2011-2013
Colombian Conflict Focus of Effort,” Small Wars Journal, May 31, 2013.
24     David E. Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration,” American Journal of Political
Science 50, no. 4 (October, 2006): 875–892.
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potential of rebel leaders. Providing protection and support to such a
large, dispersed group of actors, however, is extremely difficult to do
through “light footprint” military operations unless the major parties
to the conflict have already accepted a negotiated settlement (as in
consensual peace operations).
•• “Playing for the breaks.” Finally, in many cases, small-scale foreign
interventions will neither create tipping points nor take advantage of
them to bring a conflict to an end. Rather, they will simply prevent
the defeat of a partner government.25 Given sufficient time, either
the international environment may shift in favorable ways, or the
insurgents may make mistakes that the government can capitalize on.
Both the intervener and the partner government, in other words, are
“playing for the breaks.”26 Such an approach minimizes the risk of
over-reach by either the intervening state or the partner government.
On the other hand, it is not clear that countries like the United States
can sustain foreign military interventions indefinitely, and there are
significant spillover costs associated with long-running conflicts.27
This brief overview of the mechanisms by which external interveners may seek to capitalize on tipping points suggests many of the
difficulties of successfully implementing such a policy. To fully understand the challenges the United States may face in attempting to tip
conflicts in favor of partner regimes through small-footprint operations,
it is helpful to examine a number of recent cases.

Recent Small-Footprint Interventions: A Complex Record

Analysts have frequently invoked the examples of recent US operations in the Philippines and Colombia to argue in favor of small-footprint
interventions. This article instead examines a variety of lesser-known
cases, in part because the Philippines and Colombia have been so
thoroughly analyzed elsewhere and in part because these interventions
remain ongoing, with the final outcome still to be determined.

Russian Intervention in Tajikistan

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Tajikistan’s emergence as an independent state, a civil war rapidly evolved between the
country’s Communists and supporters of the democratic and Islamist
opposition. Although initially reluctant to become involved in the conflict, growing concern over Islamic radicalism and narcotics trafficking
ultimately prompted Russia to intervene.
Russia possessed by far the largest and most capable fighting force in
Tajikistan, the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, and it largely controlled
the Border Forces along the border with Afghanistan. These forces were
present in Tajikistan from the beginning of the war and began to act
on behalf of the pro-Russian leader Emomali Rakhmon after he seized
control of the government in December 1992 and relegated the Islamists
25     Stephen Watts et al., The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, MG-1226-RC, 2012).
26     Lincoln B. Krause, “Playing for the Breaks: Insurgent Mistakes,” Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn
2009): 48–64.
27     For spillover costs, see Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development
Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), Chapter 2.
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and others to the role of an armed opposition movement, the United
Tajik Opposition (UTO). Russia, therefore, had the opportunity to tip
the conflict in a favorable direction due to its early intervention and its
potential to interdict the UTO’s supply routes from Afghanistan.28
Despite these opportunities, the war raged for five years. Rather
than tipping the conflict toward a decisive outcome, Russian support
did little more than keep the Rakhmon regime from disintegrating. The
Border Forces were incapable of interdicting the UTO’s supply routes
from Afghanistan, in part because of the inherent difficulty of policing
a long and mountainous border and in part because Russian and government forces were themselves complicit in the smuggling.29
In 1997, Moscow helped broker a peace deal between the Rakhmon
government and the UTO featuring numerous power-sharing mechanisms. Within the first few years after the treaty was signed, however,
Rakhmon engineered the removal of many opposition figures from the
governmental positions they won as a result of the peace accords, and a
number of prominent opposition politicians were assassinated. In 1999,
the president won reelection with 97 percent of the vote. In part as a
consequence, much political power in the country has remained concentrated in informal institutions beyond the control of the state. In most
cases the various warlords of the civil war period retained the loyalty and
capabilities of their paramilitaries, allowing them to remain the de facto
political authorities of much of Tajikistan.
Both narcotics trafficking and Islamic radicalism have flourished in
this environment. Through its intervention, in other words, Russia was
able to keep its preferred leader in power, helped to end the country’s
civil war, and helped to keep the country at peace afterward. But its
intervention did little to ameliorate the main factors driving its intervention in the first place.30

French Intervention in the Central African Republic

The Central African Republic (CAR) has historically been an
extremely weak state with small security forces and little penetration
into the regions beyond the capital of Bangui. From the time of its independence it has been subject to repeated coups and governed for more
than half of its existence as a modern, independent state by rulers who
seized power by force.31
France had played a significant role in the country’s politics since its
independence, maintaining a military base in the country and subsidizing the CAR’s armed forces, the Forces armees centrafricaines (FACA). In
28     Lena Jonson, The Tajik War: A Challenge to Russian Policy, Discussion Paper 74 (London: Royal
Institute for International Affairs, 1998); and Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The
Cases of Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
29     Sergei Gretzky, Russia’s Policy Toward Central Asia (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center,
1997); Barnett R. Rubin, “Russian Hegemony and State Breakdown in the Periphery: Causes and
Consequences of the Civil War in Tajikistan,” in Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building,
eds. Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (London: Routledge, 1998).
30     Nasrin Dadmehr, “Tajikistan: Regionalism and Weakness,” in State Failure and State Weakness
in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003);
International Crisis Group, Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats, Asia Report No. 205 (May 24,
2011); International Crisis Group, Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace, Asia Report No. 30 (December 24,
2001).
31     Andreas Mehler, “Why Security Forces Do Not Deliver Security: Evidence from Liberia and
the Central African Republic,” Armed Forces & Society 38, no. 1 (2012): 49–69.
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part as a result of the end of these subsidies in 1993, government payments of FACA wages fell deeply into arrears, ultimately leading several
hundred soldiers to mutiny in 1996.32
France was well-positioned to intervene at the beginning of the
conflict, when it had the opportunity to impress upon the mutineers the
costs of fighting and to disrupt their nascent organization. In Operations
Almadin I and Almadin II, French forces put down two coup attempts
in a matter of days in April and May 1996. France helped broker a series
of peace deals involving the payment of back wages (by France), an
amnesty for the mutineers, and ultimately a broader power-sharing
deal (the Bangui Accords) monitored first by the African peacekeeping
mission MISAB and later by the UN mission MINURCA. Thus, France
seized on many of the strategies that might be expected to tip a conflict
decisively in favor of the government. It acted at the very beginning of
the crisis. By paying back wages to FACA soldiers, France could potentially split those mutineers with limited and legitimate grievances (wage
arrears) from those with broader ambitions. And by helping to create a
power-sharing agreement buttressed by external peacekeepers, France
hoped to strengthen constituencies for peace.
Despite these efforts, another major coup attempt was launched a
year after the foreign peacekeeping presence finally withdrew. Three
years after the end of MINURCA and seven years after France had
intervened, the government France had helped to prop up was overthrown.33 That government, in turn, was itself overthrown within a
decade. The conflict, in other words, failed to tip decisively.

African Interventions in Somalia

A wide variety of observers—ranging from the Secretary General
of the United Nations to reporters and academics—have suggested
that Somalia may have reached or passed a tipping point in the past
couple of years.34 Thanks to a conjunction of events: the end of the
country’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and inauguration of
the internationally recognized Somali Federal Government (SFG) in
2012; the fracturing among the various factions of al Shabaab and its
loss of popular support; and the military successes of the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF)
against al Shabaab—Somalia seemed finally close to a possible victory
against insurgent Islamist groups and to a functional government in
Mogadishu.
Somalia has experienced four foreign military interventions since
2006: by Ethiopia (in 2006–09 and again since 2012); by AMISOM
(since 2008); and by Kenya (since 2011). Although the first Ethiopian
intervention was widely considered a disaster and resulted in larger
32     Fiona McFarlane and Mark Malan, “Crisis and Response in the Central African Republic: A
New Trend in African Peacekeeping?” African Security Review 7, no. 2 (1998): 48–58; Watts et al., The
Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions, 77–83.
33     Watts et al., The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions, 77–83; Gabriella Ingerstad,
Willing and Able? Challenges to Security Sector Reform in Weak Post-war States: Insights from the Central African
Republic (Stockholm: Ministry of Defense, October 2012).
34     United Nations Security Council, “Special Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia,”
S/2012/74 (January 31, 2012), 9; veteran Somalia observer Ken Menkhaus offered a more measured judgment—see Ken Menkhaus, “Somalia at the Tipping Point?” Current History (May 2012):
169–174.
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support for al Shabaab, interventions by AMISOM and Kenya have had
very different results, in part because these countries were not perceived
as negatively as Ethiopia. In these interventions, Kenya, AMISOM,
the Somali government, and other external players such as the United
States attempted to use several of the mechanisms described herein to
ensure their interventions would lead to decisive changes. Kenya and
AMISOM contributed to cutting al Shabaab’s revenue by taking control
of Mogadishu, whose markets and businesses represented an important
source of revenue for the group, and Kismayo, which is a major port
and a hub for the charcoal trade that sustained al Shabaab. Decapitation
was also employed: US-targeted killings of top operatives, such as Aden
Hashi Ayro in 2008, have played a disruptive role and may have compelled the group to rely on leaders of lesser quality.35 AMISOM and the
KDF have also taken advantage of ideological splits within al Shabaab.
The relative peace that Mogadishu was experiencing as of late 2013 has
led many in the Somali diaspora to return; this population represents a
pro-peace constituency that has everything to gain from a lasting stabilization of the country. Their increasing presence and investments in
Mogadishu may eventually act as a tipping point by creating incentives
for more groups to invest in licit business opportunities rather than
profiting from wartime economies.
There are limits, however, to what has been achieved in Somalia. It is
unclear whether the loss of Mogadishu and Kismayo represents a tipping
point for al Shabaab, which has proven highly capable of diversifying its
sources of revenue from taxation of populations to weapons trafficking
and piracy. The group is still reaping considerable benefits from the
charcoal business of Kismayo, which a recent UN report claimed had
been revived and even expanded, in part with the complicity of Kenyan
forces.36 It is also worth noting that many of the setbacks experienced by
al Shabaab were brought about by the group’s own misguided policies,
such as the mishandling of the 2010–12 famine and the resulting loss
of popular support and recruits. External interveners benefitted from
these mistakes, which may make their achievements difficult to replicate
in the future; insurgents, after all, are as capable of learning from their
mistakes as are counterinsurgents. Perhaps most importantly, the optimism that accompanied the SFG’s creation only a year ago has already
started to fade. Thus far the SFG has proven itself nearly as corrupt
and weak as its predecessors.37 Without a capable and inclusive government to attract potential defectors from among rebel populations and
to protect and reward pro-peace constituencies, even potential tipping
points are highly unlikely to tip.
Somalia, however, may have tipped toward a change in the nature of
its conflict. It is still unclear the extent to which al Shabaab has morphed
from a Somalia-centered group that seeks to control large swathes of
territory and could aim to take over the central government to a mainly
terrorist group that operates indifferently between Somalia and other
35     Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Qaeda Leader Reported Killed in Somalia,” The New
York Times, May 2, 2008; Interview by authors with subject matter expert, Washington DC. October
2013.
36     United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (July 12,
2013), paragraph 152.
37     See, for instance, Matt Bryden, Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali Federal Government
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2013).
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countries in the region. A series of events affecting al Shabaab over
the past few years has certainly pushed it toward the latter direction.
Sheikh Ahmed Abdi Godane’s rejection of humanitarian aid during the
2010–12 famine that killed an estimated quarter million people created a
rift between al Shabaab and the population and within the group itself.38
This happened at a time when the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops
took away one of al Shabaab’s main rallying causes, the resistance to
the Ethiopian “invasion.” Popular support had been the backbone of al
Shabaab’s rise during the Ethiopian intervention (2006–09). It provided
the group with recruits and facilitated the acceptance of its presence in
entire regions of Somalia. This territorial control, in turn, represented an
important source of revenue. Although much about al Shabaab’s internal
dynamics is still unknown, there are indications that the group’s loss
of popular support, combined with improved military performance
on the part of AMISOM, may have had a cumulative effect. Groups
that cannot recruit easily often turn to coercive methods; this further
antagonizes populations, which in turn are less likely to join the group
voluntarily. Imposing taxation on a smaller population base may have
the same effect. The combination of al Shabaab missteps with improved
AMISOM capabilities, in other words, does not appear to have tipped
Somalia toward an end to its violence, but it may well have tipped the
conflict to a phase in which forces hostile to the current government
are unable to pose an existential threat. Even this result, however, is
likely dependent on the continued presence of international forces for
the foreseeable future.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

Tipping points are seldom defined, and seem to signify little more
than an important change—or possible change—in a conflict. We have
argued that “tipping points” should be seen as a conjunction of conditions sufficient (or usually sufficient) to achieve an end of the conflict or
a transformation of its character. The purpose of this article has been
to flesh out this concept and its implications for small-footprint military
interventions in support of partner governments. The very short descriptions of the post-Cold War conflicts in Tajikistan, the Central African
Republic, and Somalia, as well as the even briefer mentions of other
conflicts, have not been intended as rigorous empirical tests. Rather,
they were intended to serve as illustrations of conflict and intervention
dynamics at particular points in time that had the potential to be tipping
points. Although we cannot draw any definitive conclusions from the
illustrative cases, they do nonetheless offer a number of insights.
First, the term tipping point is almost certainly overused. The term
is invoked by analysts far more frequently than they actually occur. If this
question were only one of semantics, then playing fast-and-loose with
the term would be harmless. But the term implies something substantive about a conflict: that its dynamics are likely to change in ways that
fundamentally alter the course of the war. Seeing tipping points where
none exist thus overstates the likelihood that conflicts can be decisively
38     Mary Hope Schwoebel, “Déjà Vu: Famine and Crisis in Somalia,” (Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace (USIP), September 12, 2011); United Nations Food and Agricultural
Program (UN FAO) and Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), Mortality Among
Populations of Southern and Central Somalia Affected by Severe Food Insecurity and Famine During 2010–2012
(Rome and Washington, May 2, 2013), 53.
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resolved—and, as a corollary, the likelihood that military interventions
can take advantage of these opportunities to secure durable changes that
favor the strategic interests of the United States. In the cases of Tajikistan,
the Central African Republic, and Somalia, external forces intervened
at points in time and in ways that could be expected to be particularly
favorable. Yet in neither Tajikistan nor the Central African Republic
did interventions tip the course of a conflict toward a decisive conclusion. In the CAR, France secured a temporary peace that was quickly
reversed once French forces and peacekeepers withdrew. In Tajikistan,
Russia secured an enduring end to the civil war, but the post-conflict
state that emerged was so weak that it was unable to make significant
gains against either radical Islam or illegal narcotics trafficking—the
primary interests that prompted Russian intervention. In Somalia, it is
too early to say if the events of the past two years have created the basis
for conflict termination or enduring gains in the strength of the Somali
state. Recent events suggest that a decisive end to the conflict is unlikely,
although the conflict may have entered a lengthy phase characterized
more by transnational terrorism and lower-intensity violence than full
civil war. Even this result, however, is almost certainly dependent on the
continued willingness of AMISOM troop-contributing countries (especially Uganda and Kenya) to maintain a substantial presence in Somalia.
Tipping points do occur in some cases. The elimination of state
support for an insurgency has often led to a decisive end to a conflict,
particularly when the conflict-affected state does not have ready alternatives to support insurgency on a large scale (such as “conflict diamonds”
or oil deposits readily controlled by rebels). Decapitation of insurgent
groups has sometimes had decisive effects, particularly when the government is capable of exploiting the opportunity by offering reconcilable
insurgent groups credible positive inducements (such as amnesty and an
economic stake in peace).
The evidence in favor of many other potential tipping points is much
weaker. Early interventions, for instance, did not help Russia, France, or
Ethiopia. Although support for a partner government might be particularly effective if provided before a conflict escalates to the point of war,
once a conflict does escalate, golden hours seldom appear to represent
true tipping points. Similarly, if a government is not strong enough to
act decisively, “wedge strategies” designed to split insurgent groups can
lead simply to a more fractious opposition incapable of negotiating an
end to conflict. Somalia’s TFG, for instance, did not secure any lasting
gain from its co-optation of moderate Islamist opposition. Efforts to
cut insurgents off from their black market revenues are seldom as decisive as ending state support to insurgents. Illicit trafficking is extremely
difficult to interdict fully, and often the intervening forces of poorer
states become captured by the criminal economies they are trying to
police—an outcome observed in the Tajikistan and Somalia cases examined in this article and in many other instances. Finally, strengthening
constituencies for peace is ultimately necessary to bring a decisive end
to conflict, but without a large-scale stability operation of the sort the
United States currently seeks to avoid, the empowerment of pro-peace
constituencies is usually the outcome of conflict rather than a tipping point
itself.
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Small-footprint interventions may help the United States secure at
least partial successes by weakening dangerous adversaries or by providing partner regimes a temporary reprieve in which to reform themselves.
The examples offered here and many others, however, suggest their
effects will usually not be decisive. Most conflicts, in other words, fail to
tip decisively, even at particularly opportune junctures.
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Pakistan’s Changing Counterterrorism
Strategy: A Window of Opportunity?
Michael Spangler
Abstract: In spite of growing US uncertainty about Pakistani intentions, a window of opportunity may be opening for the United
States to put in place new counterterrorism measures with Pakistan.

O

ver the past decade, Pakistan has been increasingly viewed in US
foreign policy circles as a reluctant, almost recalcitrant, partner
in efforts to end the long Afghan war and to combat global terrorism. While steadfastly India-centric in its defense posture, Pakistan’s
regional role in South Central Asia is widely viewed as indispensable.
To help the United States engage more effectively on counterterrorism,
American analysts advocate a wide range of policy options. Some scholars such as Ambassador Peter Tomsen argue that “Washington should
stop praising Pakistan’s generals for their cooperation on counterterrorism, stop showering them with unconditioned military aid, and stop
embracing them with benign diplomacy sprinkled with ambiguous warnings that current conditions are not acceptable.”1 Others, like former
Pakistani Ambassador Hussain Haqqani, seem to agree, “since 1947,
dependence, deception and defiance have characterized US-Pakistan
relations. We sought US aid in return for promises we did not keep.
Although even strong allies do not have 100 percent congruent interests,
in the case of Pakistan and the United States, the divergence far exceeded
the similarities.”2
In spite of growing US uncertainty about Pakistani intentions, most
observers, and Washington, hew to a middle course. US-Pakistan relations became tense after the killing of Osama Bin Laden in northwestern
Pakistan in May 2011; since then, policymakers sought greater continuity
and cooperation with Pakistan. On the eve of Pakistani Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington in October 2013, White House Press
Secretary Jay Carney noted, “We want to find ways for our two countries
to cooperate even as we have differences on some issues, and we want to
make sure the trajectory of this relationship is a positive one.”3 Despite
the need for improved US-Pakistan relations, however, so-called “transformational” steps needed to reinvigorate Pakistan’s counterterrorism
efforts along its 1,640-mile border with Afghanistan and to forge more
preemptive measures against global terrorism have been avoided in favor
of risk-averse business-as-usual. Pakistan’s evolving security interests
may be converging with the Coalition’s counterterrorism efforts; these
1     Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great
Powers (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 694-95.
2     Hussain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of
Misunderstanding (New York: Public Affairs, 2013).
3     United Press International, “Obama-Sharif Meeting Described as Important” UPI, October
22, 2013.

A career member of the US
State Department’s Senior
Foreign Service,
Dr. Michael Spangler is a
State Department Visiting
Fellow at the US Army
War College. He worked in
Afghanistan and Pakistan for
three years after studying the
Pashtu language. From 2004
to 2006, he was Principal
Officer in the US Consulate
in Peshawar. From 2009
to 2010, he served as the
Economic Counselor at the
US Embassy in Kabul.

38

Parameters 44(1) Spring 2014

new developments may open a window for stronger engagement with
Pakistan on the joint Afghanistan and global terrorism fronts.

A New Window?

A window of opportunity may be opening for the United States
to put in place a new set of counterterrorism measures with Pakistan,
coupled with badly needed visibility on future financial assistance to the
country, if the US Congress buys into a confidence-building approach.
This new approach requires nesting Afghanistan’s transition, US counterterrorism policies, the intra-Afghan peace process, and endorsement
by Coalition states and other allies. While such a future course is complex,
its promise of better traction on counterterrorism results in Afghanistan
may outweigh the risks of the current open-ended US policy that seems
to be “playing not to lose” rather than achieving clear goals permitting
a permanent drawdown of Coalition forces in Afghanistan.
This policy opening cannot be described as transformative,
however, because it remains uncertain if Pakistan’s complex civilianmilitary authority structure can and will agree on identifying specific
terrorist groups as internal security threats. Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders are not unified in their perceptions of national priorities and
interests. As a result, the central thesis argued here is that the United
States needs to engage with those officials who are supportive of broader
counterterrorism engagement while using aid more explicitly to bring
other quarters on board.
The first part of this article will outline three key objections to
the explicit linkage of US counterterrorism assistance to Pakistan. The
second part will describe recent developments that appear to provide
a new policy opening for broader US-Pakistan counterterrorism talks.
The final part will propose four steps that could be taken in such talks.

Part One
First Objection: Losing US Leverage

US policymakers appear concerned that linking military assistance
to counterterrorism results could be counterproductive, eroding US
influence within the Pakistan Army. The Army might view the linkage as
a coercive “stick” and reject its application. In this scenario, the United
States may find its use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) curtailed
in Pakistan’s tribal areas as well as losing influence over other potential issues such as discouraging (1) a military takeover of a civilian-led
government, (2) its use of terrorist proxies to challenge India’s control
of Kashmiri territory, and (3) any newly emerging nuclear proliferation
opportunities. Taking into account these realpolitik issues, however, the
United States should acknowledge that it has little influence to lose. Thus,
it should focus on establishing stronger cooperative mechanisms with
Pakistan to prevent and deter such developments while also permitting
the United States to reduce its counterterrorism efforts in the region.

Second Objection: Pakistani Response to Terrorism is Sufficient

Even though many Western analysts contend Pakistan is playing
a two-faced game with Taliban groups, since 9/11, the Pakistan Army
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has sustained over 50,000 casualties in its effort to dismantle, disrupt,
and destroy al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups operating in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) adjacent to
Afghanistan. Concomitantly, Pakistan's economy has likely suffered
approximately $100 billion in lost revenue, as foreign investors steered
clear of what they saw as a relatively unstable country among emerging
market countries.4
Pakistani government and Army leaders nonetheless insist they
remain committed to the counterterrorism effort. Their standard
response to US requests is, “Tell us where they are and we will take
action. Seek our covert permission to launch UAVs but do not otherwise
operate in our country.”5 Since Pakistan has “done all it has been asked
to do” and maintains Coalition supply lines into Afghanistan, there is
no need to seek additional cooperation through explicit aid linkage.
Moreover, the Pakistan Army may not be able to deliver on new steps
in light of its India-dominated focus and might even disagree with its
civilian leadership over key counterterrorism measures, contributing to
political instability.

The Pakistan Army is India-Centric6

Having unsuccessfully fought four wars with India, Pakistan remains
vigilant on her eastern border, facing the world’s third largest Army,
after China and the United States; its military forces overall rank eighth
after North Korea, Russia, Turkey, and South Korea. Pakistan's military
annually lavishes about 10 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP)
on the Army budget and its nuclear arsenal. As a result of growing
US military assistance after 9/11, Pakistan agreed to station roughly
150,000 troops along the Afghan border beginning in early 2002, while
keeping 100,000 troops oriented towards India and Kashmir.7
Given this background, it is not surprising to find that in May 2010,
when Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Leon Panetta sought
then Pakistan Army Chief of Staff Ashfaq Kayani’s help following the
arrest of Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad for attempting to bomb
Times Square, Kayani replied, “I’ll be the first to admit, I’m Indiacentric.”8 Even after Shahzad revealed that he had been trained by the
Haqqani Network, a Pakistani Taliban group in North Waziristan, US
officials failed to budge Kayani beyond permitting more UAV strikes in
North Waziristan.9 This objection is primarily based on accepting the
4     Ashan Guirez, “Pakistan Briefing,” lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA,
January 13, 2014.
5     Jon Boone and Peter Beaumont, “Pervez Musharraf Admits Permitting “a Few” Drone Strikes
in Pakistan,” The Guardian, April 12, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/12/
musharraf-admits-permitting-drone-strikes.
6     The Pakistan Army’s defense posture has been India-centric since its inception in 1947, largely
shaped by its aim to win disputed Kashmiri territory from India. Former Ambassador Haqqani
emphasizes, “In the case of Pakistan and the U.S., Pakistan’s primary interest, as defined by its elite,
is to become India’s military equal and to wrest control of Kashmir. Those two interests are not
in America’s interests. And yet America has built up Pakistan’s military potential over the years and
continues to arm Pakistan, assuming that Pakistan will eventually use those arms for agendas the
Americans set for them. That is not going to happen. That has not happened in the last 66 years.”
Hussain Haqqani, “Pakistan-U.S.: Doubtful Friends,” Lahore Times, December 1, 2013, 1.
7     Ahsan Guirez, “Pakistan Briefing.”
8     Robert Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 366.
9     Ibid.
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Pakistan Army’s India-focused threat posture, which we will return to
below.10

Third Objection: Pakistan Sees Terrorist Groups Differently

Our current relationship with Pakistan contrasts starkly with the
one defined by the George H. W. Bush administration. In January 1993,
Secretary of State James Baker sent a letter to Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif warning that Pakistan could be designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism, chiefly because of terrorist activity in Kashmir and the Indian
Punjab.11 This step was not pursued by President Clinton. A decade later,
Pakistan was listed as a Major Non-NATO Ally of the United States
in 2004, following the post-9/11 decision taken by President Pervez
Musharraf to increase Pakistan Army operations along the AfghanistanPakistan border. This volte-face in our relationship reflects the fact that
we need to work with Pakistan even if it remains more committed to
opposing its historic antagonist, India.
Pakistan apparently calculates that by fighting the Tehrik-e-Taliban
but providing tacit support to other groups such as the Haqqani Network,
Pakistan (1) stays close to a bloc that could emerge as a key power-broker
in Afghanistan; (2) sustains asymmetric proxies harassing an Indian
presence in Afghanistan and Kashmir; and (3) secures Pakistan’s northwestern border by restraining some Taliban groups from coalescing with
others to oppose Pakistan’s secular authorities. Accepting this objection,
however, boxes the United States into maintaining a middle-of-the-road
foreign policy with Pakistan that neither accomplishes nor risks much.

Pakistan’s Role in the AF-PAK War

As the nascent Barack Obama administration began positioning
itself during the 2008 US presidential election campaign, the Afghan
conflict was widely portrayed as an ongoing war of necessity and
Pakistan as key to its conclusion. The acronym, AF-PAK, was introduced to indicate that both countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, should
be considered a unified theater of operations requiring a joint policy.12
In tandem with this term, an Iraq-inspired military surge strategy was
launched in mid-2009 to protect Afghan population centers and give the
fledgling Afghan state time to train its security forces and deliver basic
services to its people.
At present, more work needs to be done on the NATO coalition’s
missions of stability and transition; and the future remains cloudy for
Afghanistan, despite over 3,000 Coalition casualties and about $700

10     The United States designated the Haqqani Network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) in September 2012. This group joined the already designated Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
rooted in South Waziristan, both supporting the Afghan Taliban mainly fighting in Afghanistan’s
South and East. The so-called Quetta Shura, representing the former Afghan Taliban leadership
led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, constitutes a moral center of gravity for the Afghan Taliban in
Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. In light of Pakistan’s harboring of these and other Taliban groups
operating on the Afghan side, the United States has routinely called for stronger Pakistani actions to
close down sanctuaries and training camps used by these terrorist groups, particularly as the Taliban
began to regroup and fight more effectively in Afghanistan beginning in 2005.
11     Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 513.
12     The inventor of the term was, perhaps, Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke. Richard C.
Holbrooke, Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly, March 22, 2009.
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billion in US costs alone.13 A key pillar of the Coalition strategy was the
hammer-and-anvil approach launched with the Pakistan Army to deny (to
the Taliban and other extremist groups) sanctuaries along the AF-PAK
border to regroup and continue the conflict within Afghanistan. As
the surge wound down in mid-2010, US policymakers stopped making
references to AF-PAK, despite the fact that Pakistan was receiving significant military aid to serve as the anvil to the Coalition’s hammer.
Coalition and Pakistan Army operations sustained a high operational tempo throughout 2009-12 before slowing down in 2013. This
slower tempo coincides with newly trained Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) leading military operations on the Afghan side and
stop-go efforts to start peace talks with Taliban groups. As international
actors wait to see if the US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement can be
concluded in 2014, Afghanistan’s future remains uncertain.

Part Two
At a Crossroads?

Despite more than three decades of war and an Indian presence
in Afghanistan, Pakistan Army strategists reportedly still regard
Afghanistan as their country’s “strategic depth” a rear engagement area
in case India invades Pakistan.14 According to this construct originating in the 1980s, Afghan territory would permit Pakistan to disperse
assets (including nuclear weapons) across the border, thereby increasing its ability to absorb an Indian attack and to strike back.15 Just as
importantly, the Pashtun area lying on both sides of the Durand Line
defining the AF-PAK border constitutes a prime recruitment ground
for dual-use religious madrassa and training camps that have fueled
Afghan and Kashmiri insurgencies for more than three decades. Indeed,
terrorist groups in Pakistan represent a key asymmetric offensive capability against India and reportedly carried out the coordinated Mumbai
attacks of 2008.16 Since these geopolitical realities seem deeply rooted in
Pakistani strategic calculus, why would they suddenly be open to critical
reexamination and change within Pakistan?

First Development: A New Chapter

In early 2013, the Pakistan Army doctrine incorporated a new
chapter entitled “Sub-conventional Warfare,” spelling out military
operational preparedness, capacities, and objectives.17 According to this
new doctrine, guerilla actions stemming from the tribal areas along the
Afghan border and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the
Army and civilians have been identified for the first time as the “great13     Anthony H. Cordesman, “The US Cost of the Afghan War: FY2002-2013,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, May 15, 2012, https://csis.org/publication/us-cost-afghan-war-fy2002fy2013; National Priorities Project, “Cost of War in Afghanistan since 2001,” http://nationalpriorities.org/cost-of/.
14     George Garner, “The Afghan Taliban and Pakistan’s Strategic Depth,” Stanford Review: Bellum
Project, May 17, 2010, http://bellum.stanfordreview.org/?p=2184.
15     Ibid.
16     Pamela Constable, “Mumbai Attacks in 2008 Still Divide India and Pakistan,” The Washington
Post, April 6, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/mumbai-attacks-in-2008-still-divideindia-and-pakistan/2011/04/03/AFJjDUoC_story.html.
17     “Pakistan Army sees ‘Internal Threats’ as Greatest Security Risk,” Dawn.com, Islamabad,
Pakistan, January 2, 2013.
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est threat” to Pakistan’s national security.18 While doctrine is merely
guidance and not an operational order, this chapter may have staked out
common ground for the United States and Pakistan to cooperate more
effectively on counterterrorism. It is premature to declare the chapter as
a game changer, but it does afford an opportunity to broaden bilateral
counterterrorism consultations. At the same time, the concept of “strategic depth” is no longer cited as a basic assumption.

Second Development: The Punjabi Taliban

Concerned by the spread of terrorism from Pakistan’s hinterland,
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif established an anti-terrorism force to
counter emerging terrorist groups in Punjab in October 2013. Sharif
committed to give the Force higher salaries and advanced equipment
but keep it separate from Pakistan police and army units. At the same
time, the Northwest Pakistan provincial government established a
special counterterrorism task force headed by the province’s police
chief. Provincial leaders asked the federal government to return frontier constabulary platoons to the province to be deployed in sensitive
areas.19 Apparently, the possible emergence of a Punjabi Taliban group
that could increasingly link with similar groups to launch coordinated
attacks warrants a new approach and considerably more resources than
have been devoted so far.

Third Development: Pursuing Taliban Peace Talks with a Stick

In October 2013, several Quetta Shura leaders met in Islamabad
at the behest of Prime Minister Sharif to discuss their participation in
future peace talks in the wake of Afghan elections and a US withdrawal.20
Sharif gained an all-party endorsement for peace talks with the Taliban
shortly after he took office in June 2013. He appears to be offering an
olive branch to Pakistani Taliban groups backed up by military force. As
Sharif told Pakistan’s Parliament in January 2014, Taliban groups have
continued killing innocent civilians and soldiers. While “the government is doing what it can to stop drone attacks,” which have bolstered
extremism and anti-Americanism, “we can no longer allow the massacre
of innocent civilians” by terrorists, and “the situation is no longer tolerable.” Sharif emphasized that “the whole nation will stand behind” a
military offensive against the extremists if peace efforts fail.21
Before resorting to military means, Prime Minister Sharif appears
committed to fostering a credible peace process in both Pakistan and
Afghanistan. The former talks face formidable obstacles since the
Tehrik-e-Taliban demand the immediate withdrawal of the Pakistan
Army from tribal areas.22 The latter talks—currently being pursued
18     Ibid.
19     Moshin Ali, “Anti-Terrorist Force for Punjab Approved,” Gulf News, October 18, 2013,
(http://gulfnews.com/news/world/pakistan/anti-terrorist-force-for-punjab-approved-1.1244553)
20     Ron Moreau, “Taliban’s Quetta Shura Meet in Islamabad to Press for Peace,” The Daily Beast,
November 1, 2013.
21     Karen DeYoung and Greg Miller, “U.S. said to curtail drone strikes in Pakistan as officials
there seek peace talks with Taliban,” The Washington Post, February 4, 2014, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-curtails-drone-strikes-in-pakistan-as-officialsthere-seek-peace-talks-with-taliban/2014/02/04/1d63f52a-8dd8-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.
html?wpisrc=emailtoafriend.
22     Mohsin Ali, “Pakistan Taliban Gives ‘Positive” Response to Talks,” Gulf News, February 10,
2014.
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by President Hamid Karzai—face similar hurdles even though the
Coalition is withdrawing from Afghanistan.23 Pakistan’s promotion of
Afghan peace talks appears designed to ensure a future Taliban role in
the Afghan government and to prevent a gradual Afghan tilt towards
India and Iran, two neighboring countries that offer greater aid and
trade potential. However, it is too early to tell if the entire Pakistani
government is convinced of the efficacy of talks or the potential need to
roll up Taliban terrorist groups. In particular, any new decisive Pakistan
Army action appears to require linkage with military assistance to give
them the resources to conduct this new campaign. At the same time,
some quarters of the Pakistan government must be enjoined to give
up their apparent gamble that the current ANSF, mainly led by a nonPashtun officer corps, will fail to stabilize Afghanistan, especially its
South and East.

Fourth Development: Calling for an End to UAV Strikes

Prime Minister Sharif issued a high-profile appeal to President
Obama during his October 2013 visit to end UAV strikes on Pakistani
territory. His request received widespread press attention and dovetails with President Obama’s own policy objective recorded in his May
2013 speech:
In the Afghan war theater, we must support our troops until the transition
is complete at the end of 2014. However, by the end of 2014, we will no
longer have the same need for force protection, and the progress we have
made against core al Qaeda will reduce the need for unmanned strikes…
and I will not sign laws designed to expand this mandate further. Our
systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But
this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. That’s what
our democracy demands.24

These words may apply even more to Pakistan. At present, a majority
of the Pakistani people objects to UAV strikes and believes their leaders
should halt them.25 In the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas alone, an
earlier United Kingdom (UK) poll indicated that negative opinion rose
from 59 percent in 2010 to 63 percent in 2011, peak years for unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes.26 Accordingly, the most compelling reason
for Pakistan’s stronger commitment to counterterrorism and Afghan
stability lies in Pakistan’s own security. The more Pakistan proves unable
to combat internal threats posed by its own terrorist actors, the more
public opinion is likely to gravitate against its elected leaders. At present,
Taliban and other extremist groups in Pakistan threaten internal order
more than they provide security insurance policies against Afghanistan
and India.

23     Azam Ahmed and Matthew Rosenberg, “Karzai Arranged Secret Contacts with the Taliban,”
The New York Times, February 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/world/asia/karzaihas-held-secret-contacts-with-the-taliban.html?hpw&rref=world&_r=0.
24     President Barack Obama, On the Future of the War on Terror (Washington DC: Office of the
Press Secretary, May 23, 2013), 5, 14.
25     “Drones Increasingly Opposed: Poll.” Express Tribune, July 19, 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/
story/579054/drones-increasingly-opposed-poll/.
26     Jamie Doward, “UK Funds Poll in Pakistan on U.S. Drone Attacks,” The Guardian, May 18,
2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/18/poll-drone-attacks-pakistan.
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Rethinking UAV Strikes

UAV strikes remain one of the most scrutinized and controversial
military activities attributed to the United States. Is it conceivable that
such strikes can be reduced without seeing a corresponding increase
in terrorist activities, particularly in areas beyond the rule of law in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere in the world?
A 2010 National Bureau of Economic Research study found that
for every Afghan civilian killed by Coalition forces, anti-Coalition violence increased significantly over the next six months.27 This finding
appears to militate against the use of UAV strikes in the absence of
greater precision.
In 2010, 118 UAV strikes were reportedly launched in Pakistan, of
which 14 were successful.28 (Success may have been too narrowly defined
as a strike in which a militant “leader” was killed.) The bulk of studies, to
date, contradict this finding and detail the erosion of core al Qaeda and
Tehrik-e-Taliban leaders. UAV strikes are designed to deplete or incapacitate enemy ranks and deter future attacks. However, they produce
a “vengeance effect,” where targeted groups are spurred to commit
further acts of violence. In general, at least one study concluded there
is little or no [statistically significant] effect of drone strikes on Taliban
violence in Afghanistan but “only on Taliban violence in Pakistan.”29
However, it may well be the case in Pakistan that UAV strikes are
facing better countermeasures while creating more terrorists than they
have eliminated. In October 2010, Osama bin Laden himself recognized the need for better countermeasures, writing in a memo that
his men should abandon Pakistan’s tribal regions where UAV strikes
were concentrated.30 Concomitantly, Pakistani opinion condemning the
United States for these attacks remains virulent, promoting the perception that the United States is waging a war against Islam and spurring
recruitment into terrorist ranks. When do the advantages of UAV strikes
(mainly, preventing al Qaeda from reconstituting itself in Afghanistan
or Pakistan’s tribal regions) outweigh its costs (such as spurring new
recruitment to related groups)? It is impossible to say with certainty if the
UAV tactic advances the US strategy of combating terrorism, although
it has demonstrably eroded al Qaeda. Just as importantly, the potential
loss of UAV basing rights in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 calls for
reassessing the UAV tactic.

Part Three
Four Steps Forward

The year 2014 is unfolding as one of critical transition for
Afghanistan. Pakistan authorities may be recognizing that a Coalition
27     Luke N. Condra et al., “The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq, “ National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 16152, July 2010, http://www.nber.org/papers/w16152.
28     Christopher Olver, “Are drone strikes effective in Afghanistan and Pakistan? On the dynamics of violence between the United States and the Taliban.” Harvard Kennedy School, Shorenstein
Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy, February 12, 2013.
29     Ibid.
30     Peter Bergen, “Bin Laden’s Final Days: Big Plans, Deep Fears,” CNN Opinion, March
19, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/16/opinion/bergen-bin-laden-final-writings/index.
html?_s=PM:OPINION.
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withdrawal from Afghanistan provides a larger front for the Tehrike-Taliban, the Haqqani Network, the Baluchistan Liberation Army,
and other groups to operate against the Pakistan Army. Accordingly,
the United States and Pakistan—too often characterized as uneasy,
disenchanted, or suspicious allies—appear to have converging national
interests that call for new cooperative measures to combat terrorism and
to define specific terrorist threats. The United States needs to discard its
accusatory belief that Pakistan has prolonged and diverted US military
assistance to counter India. Pakistan also needs to set aside its paranoid
concern that the United States will abandon it over the long haul. In
short, both countries should consider taking four steps that will attract
stronger public support to deal with evolving terrorist threats. This
process will need support from AF-PAK’s neighbors, Coalition states,
other key allies, and international organizations.

Step One: Condition US Military Aid to Rolling Up the Haqqani Network

The Haqqani Network is one of the most lethal and resilient threats
facing ANSF and NATO forces. Reportedly viewed as “good Taliban”
by the Pakistan Army because the group eschews violence against it, the
Network remains an unreconstructed enemy fighting for the NATO
Coalition’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and the imposition of Sharia
Law in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas.31 The United States
continues to offer a $5-million reward for information leading to the
capture of the Network’s operational leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, whose
group was reportedly instrumental in the escape of Osama bin Laden
from Tora Bora, the detention of US Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, the
training of the would-be Times Square bomber, and the September 2011
coordinated attack on the US Embassy in Kabul. Despite the group’s
hostility, Pakistani, Afghan, and US officials have periodically reached
out to the Haqqani group to gauge its interest in renouncing violence in
Afghanistan, to no avail.32
US policymakers should consider linking a major portion of its military assistance and sales to the Pakistan Army’s actions to roll up the
Haqqani Network in Waziristan. Decisive action against the Haqqani
Network, if taken, would constitute a resolute signal that 2014 will close
on a substantially reduced threat from Pakistan’s border areas and send
a strong message to other Taliban groups to begin discussing a cease-fire
or face similar action. Are there any recent signs that Pakistan’s leaders
might agree to take on the Haqqani Network in return for military
aid? Indeed, why would the Pakistan Army renege on any agreement,
however informal, to “live and let live” with the Haqqani Network in
the tribal areas?
The main reason might be that the Army’s strategic costs of tacit
support for the Haqqani Network could quickly outweigh its benefits.
The Pakistan Army must assess the possibility of a nightmare scenario
in which the Haqqani Network and other terrorist groups cooperate more effectively to attack Pakistan’s secular authorities in a joint
31     Bill Roggio, “Good Taliban leader Fazal Saeed Haqqani kills 39 civilians in Kurram suicide attack,” Threat Matrix, A Bog of the Long War Journal, February 17, 2012, 1, http://www.longwarjournal.
org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/02/good_taliban_leader_fazal_saee.php#ixzz2rExQgI8y
32     Patrick Goodenough, “Notorious Haqqani Network to be Represented at Taliban-US Talks,”
CNS News, June 19, 2013.
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effort to impose Sharia Law throughout the tribal areas, Afghanistan,
and Punjab. Such a scenario requires rethinking the assumption that
Pakistan authorities can ride the Haqqani “tiger” without falling off
it. In keeping with such a reexamination, a Pakistani official recently
stated that an upcoming Pakistan Army operation in North Waziristan
would “not discriminate” among militant groups and therefore include
the Haqqani Network as an adversary.33 It is also important to note that
Nasiruddin Haqqani, Siraj’s brother and the reputed fundraiser of the
Network, was gunned down in Islamabad in November 2013. A fine
Arabic speaker, Nasiruddin was a key outreach to Gulf nations and long
sheltered by Pakistani authorities. While his death may reflect an internal
tribal dispute, it could also indicate that his group is no longer perceived
by Pakistani authorities as a reliable chip to be kept on the geopolitical
table vis-a-vis Afghanistan and India.
Depending upon the effectiveness of Pakistan Army action against
the Haqqani Network, US policymakers could subsequently consider
an unannounced halt to UAV strikes in North Waziristan. This move
would be widely welcomed in Pakistan, once publicly recognized, and
give both the Pakistani government and Army a boost in terms of their
commitment to protect their people and their country’s sovereignty.
Such a cessation would be consistent with the Obama administration’s
stated goal of cutting back strikes in the Afghan theater and reducing
our dependence on Afghanistan for basing rights. The UAV capability,
if it remains an option, should be clearly tied to Pakistan’s progress in
combating terrorist groups. In other words, UAV strikes can and should
be replaced by more effective Pakistan Army actions.

Step Two: New Afghan Leaders Should Consider a Cease-Fire after the Haqqani
Roll-Up

Perhaps more is at stake for the Afghan people in rolling up the
Haqqani Network than in Afghanistan’s upcoming spring election or its
signing of a Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States. After
all, if the Haqqani group is seriously degraded and its moral leadership
eliminated with Pakistan’s help, Afghan leaders will finally be able to
negotiate from a position of strength with remaining Taliban groups. In
the absence of such strength, however, it is difficult to believe undecided
Taliban groups would respect the fledgling ANSF or recognize the need
to come to terms with Afghanistan’s elected leaders. In concert with
announcing a cease-fire, new Afghan leaders may also wish to consider
inviting the United Nations to take a lead in organizing a neutral venue
for renewed intra-Afghan peace talks with Taliban parties that observe
the cease fire. The UN role would boost credibility in the peace process
and actively solicit the support of neighboring countries and other international actors.
For its part, Pakistani leadership should welcome the key role it
could play in shaping a more peaceful Afghanistan. Serving as a positive force for peace and stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan could more
effectively approach other issues with its neighbors, including India,
33     Karen DeYoung, “Pakistan plans military operation in North Waziristan, targeting extremist
groups,” The Washington Post, February 25, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pakistanpoised-for-offensive-in-north-waziristan/2014/02/25/10db127c-9e6b-11e3-878c-65222df220eb_
story.html
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rather than struggling with international doubt and suspicion over its
use of terrorist proxies. Indeed, why should Pakistan think it can make
any progress on the Kashmir issue without a clear signal that it has
abandoned the use of terrorism?

Step Three: Designate Afghan Taliban as Foreign Terrorist Organizations

The United States should consider listing Afghan Taliban groups
as Foreign Terrorist Organizations in the event they do not observe the
cease fire and resort to terrorist means. The US designation of certain
Afghan Taliban groups would carry the implicit threat of continued
action against those who use terrorism to help attain political ends.
President Hamid Karzai is currently following up on Prime Minister
Sharif’s efforts to sound out Taliban groups on peace talks, and Sharif’s
initiative reflects the ongoing debate within Afghan Taliban ranks
concerning the need for political accommodation with the Afghan government once Coalition forces withdraw.34 While this third step may
be dismissed by some Taliban, it would have greater credibility if the
United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan created a joint security and
intelligence-sharing organization committed to preempting terrorist
attacks in preparation on their territory. This cooperative and scalable mechanism—a step not taken in the past thirteen years—would
improve unity of effort, demonstrate international resolve, and move
our trilateral relationship forward at key working levels.

Step Four: Establish Trip-Wires

To deal more effectively with the threat posed by the potential
loss of nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, US policymakers should
consider initiating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) security talks
with Pakistan under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Ongoing terrorist attacks against Pakistan Army Headquarters
in Rawalpindi, coupled with the emergence of a Punjabi Taliban, underscore the growing need for better WMD dialogue between our two
countries. While periodically discussing the issue with Pakistan, the
United States, so far, appears unable to exchange detailed information
on WMD security, including the persistent rumor that Pakistan may
have tapped Saudi Arabia as its weapons repository in case of widespread
Pakistani instability.35 The lack of such exchanges hinders potential
dialogue on civilian nuclear cooperation similar to that enacted by the
United States with India in 2008. New talks exploring joint protocols
and assistance to strengthen WMD protection are in the clear interest
of both sides.
The incentive for such talks would be the promise of a multi-year
commitment of military aid and sales to the Pakistan Army subject to
Congressional concurrence. The stick for such talks would be placing
Pakistan on review for possible designation as a State Sponsor of
Terrorism, if Army units were involved in the loss of WMD control or
in nuclear proliferation efforts with North Korea and other rogue states.
Since these talks may admittedly be a long shot for the United States,
we should consider exploring China’s willingness to sponsor talks with
34     Ahmed and Rosenberg, “Karzai Arranged Secret Contacts.”
35     See a full discussion in Bruce Riedel, “Enduring Allies: Pakistan’s Partnership with Saudi
Arabia Runs Deeper,” Force (New Delhi: December 2011).
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Pakistan. Establishing stronger WMD safety protocols appears consistent with China’s own efforts to assist Pakistan’s nuclear development.36
China’s potential leadership in WMD talks also offers the United States
a chance to restart the first and second steps if Pakistan were to rebuff
our initial requests and China were to agree to more decisive Pakistani
action to stabilize Afghanistan.

Diplomatic and Military Partners

The execution of each step outlined above will require a US wholeof-government approach under the leadership of the National Security
Council and Departments of State and Defense. The first step entailing
a request to “roll up” the Haqqani Network will depend on prior Afghan
concurrence and carefully crafted and virtually simultaneous outreach
to three Pakistan counterparts: the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, and the Pakistan Army Chief of Staff’s Office. Once
a policy decision is reached, the International Security Assistance Force
Commander should engage Afghan and Pakistan Army counterparts to
put in place a multinational military operation, relying on land power,
to round up and detain Haqqani Network leaders and fighters located in
some of the most difficult terrain in the world.
Up to now, operational coordination on both sides of the Durand
Line has been hampered by communication breakdowns and insufficient information sharing. The challenge for both the United States and
Pakistan is not only to strengthen battlefield communications but also
to break the mold of past hammer-and-anvil measures by crafting a
“fishnet” series of enveloping maneuvers. These actions would aim to
isolate and capture a highly mobile and dangerous enemy accustomed to
hiding in village society. Relying on both coercion and religious motivation to camouflage itself, the Haqqani group will no longer “fade”
as effectively into the background if villagers are accorded the same
protection from injury and death Americans enjoy at home. A lower
standard will spell failure for this difficult operation designed to create
the conditions for a cease-fire and an end to terrorist attacks. Finally, the
establishment of detention centers for Haqqani fighters should build and
rely on the already in-place prison institutions within Pakistan.

Conclusion

The policy steps proposed above are based not only on our mutual
security interests but also the need for stronger US-Pakistan relations.
Since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has, inter alia, joined with the United
States in opposing the Soviet bloc, helped us to reach rapprochement
with China, and supported Mujahideen forces on the other side of the
Khyber Pass. Such a historically great ally should be recognized as
indispensable in the effort to promote peace and stability in South and
Central Asia. Moreover, if Pakistan can move beyond a mainly transactional relationship with the United States and the West to shoulder
greater regional security responsibilities, it would help unleash the vast
economic potential of Central South Asia and underpin Pakistan’s role
as a major gateway to the region. The alternative is stark: terrorism will
36     Saeed Shah, “Pakistan in Talks to Acquire Three Nuclear Plants from China,” The Wall Street
Journal, January 20, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304757004579
332460821261146.
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continue to drain Pakistan’s resources and keep it mired in relative
poverty. As the long war in Afghanistan enters a new phase in 2014,
the time to engage with Pakistan is upon us. Once engaged, Pakistani
leaders may surprise us with the firmness of their renewed purpose to
face down terrorism and contribute to a safer world; they will also expect
our fairness, transparency, and resolve to stay the course with them.

Challenges for
Pacific Command

China's North Korea Policy:
Rethink or Recharge?
Andrew Scobell and Mark Cozad
Abstract: There has been much speculation lately about a Chinese
“rethink” on North Korea. Beijing has clearly been exasperated with
Pyongyang. What is going on with Beijing’s Pyongyang policy? Has
there actually been a reassessment of the PRC’s policy toward the
DPRK? Is there a military component to this policy, and what do
we know about planning by China’s People’s Liberation Army for a
Korea contingency? This article answers those questions.

T

here has been much speculation lately about a Chinese “rethink”
on North Korea.1 Certainly, Beijing’s exasperation with Pyongyang
has been palpable. The degree of debate evident in the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) over its policy toward the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) in recent years is unprecedented and comes
on the heels of a series of particularly provocative acts by Pyongyang.2
Since 2006 these acts include a series of missile tests and nuclear tests
each conducted apparently without prior notification or consultation
with Beijing. Additionally, strains in bilateral relations were triggered by
provocations such as the torpedoing of a Republic of Korea (ROK)
Navy corvette, the Cheonan, and the shelling of Yeongpyong Island in
2010. Further strains in Beijing-Pyongyang ties followed the death of
Kim Jong Il in December 2011, and the elevation of his son Kim Jong
Un to the position of DPRK supreme leader. Perhaps the most recent
provocation from the PRC perspective was the execution of Kim Jong
Un’s uncle, Jang Sung Taek, in December 2013. Jang appears to have
been China’s key interlocutor with the current North Korean administration and his death came as a great shock to Beijing. Moreover, it raised
new questions about Pyongyang’s policy direction and introduced new
uncertainties into the DPRK’s relationship with the PRC.3
China, of course, experienced its own leadership transition at the
18th Party Congress in November 2012 and the National People’s
Congress in March 2013 with the appointment of a new generation of
leaders. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and PRC
President Xi Jinping, while maintaining general continuity with the policies of his predecessor Hu Jintao, has sought to put his own imprimatur
on the affairs of state, espousing a “China Dream” and proposing a
“new type of great power relationship with the United States.” Do these
changes include a revamped North Korea policy?
1     The research and writing of this article was made possible by funding from the Tang Institute
for U.S.-China Relations.
2     See, for example, Paul Letters, “Beijing Rethinks Its North Korea Policy Priorities,” South China
Morning Post, April 11, 2013; David Mulrooney, “China’s Changing Calculus on North Korea,” Asia
Times Online, April 29, 2013, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KOR-01-290413.html.
3     Andrew Scobell, “A Death in the Family,” U.S. News and World Report, January 21, 2014.
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Chinese officials appear to be changing the term they use to label
the bloody struggle waged on the Korean Peninsula six decades ago.
During Vice President Li Yuanchao’s visit to North Korea in July 2013
to commemorate the crucible of the China-North Korea alliance, Li
purposely used the simple phrase “Korean War” rather than the title
that has been used for five decades, the “War to Resist America and Aid
Korea.” 4 This semantic change may be as much about a public relations
effort to improve relations with the United States as it is about signaling a change in the PRC’s perceptions of Pyongyang or policy toward
North Korea. Beijing appears eager not to antagonize the United States
unnecessarily. But China may also intend to signal to North Korea not
to take its longtime ally for granted.
In any event, a high level of frustration with North Korea endures
and this has manifested itself in a remarkable public airing of anger
and outrage by Chinese scholars, analysts, and members of the public.
One episode in May 2012 triggered a particularly vitriolic reaction from
Chinese “netizens”: the kidnapping of twenty-eight Chinese fishermen by North Korean naval vessels. The story unleashed a torrent of
anti-DPRK sentiment becoming “one of the hottest trending topics in
China’s microblogging sites.”5 Although these open displays of deep disaffection with North Korea are genuine, they do not appear to signify a
policy shift by Beijing toward Pyongyang.
Indeed, the public airing of ire about China’s North Korea problem
has yet to translate into a sea change in Beijing’s policy towards
Pyongyang. Much speculation about Chinese thinking on North Korea
is discerned from interviews and conversations with Chinese civilian
and military analysts and academics, including Track II dialogues.6
However, more concrete evidence is not easy to obtain.
What is going on with Beijing’s Pyongyang policy? What are China’s
goals where North Korea is concerned? Has there actually been a reassessment of the PRC’s policy toward the DPRK? Is there a military
component to this policy, and what we do we know about planning by
the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for a Korea contingency?
We contend that Beijing conducted a thorough policy reassessment
toward North Korea a decade ago when faced with the 2002-03 nuclear
crisis and China has since redoubled its efforts and pursued a course
consistent with previous policy.7 Beijing’s reassessment reaffirmed that
critical Chinese interests and goals vis-à-vis North Korea remained
unchanged. An examination of the full scope of initiatives China has
4     Xu Fangqing and Yu Xiaodong, “North Korea: The New Normal,” News China, October
2013, http://www.newschinamag.com/magazine/the-new-normal; “Kim Jong Un Meets with Vice
President Li Yuanchao,” PRC Foreign Ministry Press Release, July 26, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
eng/zxxx/t1062374.shtml.
5     Keith B. Richburg, “Chinese Public Vents Fury at North Korea Over Seizure of Boats,” The
Washington Post, May 24, 2012, 8.
6     See, for example, Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder, and John Park, Keeping an Eye on an Unruly
Neighbor: Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic & International Studies/United States Institute of Peace, January 3, 2008); and International
Crisis Group, Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea (Asia Report No. 179, November 2, 2009).
7     This is the consensus of a number of respected analysts, but perhaps the best evidence that
such a decision was made is the concerted array of initiatives launched by Beijing since that time
described by the authors. See, for example, Andrew Scobell, “The View from China,” in Asia at
a Tipping Point: Korea, the Rise of China, and the Impact of Leadership Transitions, ed. Gilbert Rozman
(Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2012), 69-81.
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pursued since the early 2000s underscores the extreme seriousness with
which Beijing views the Pyongyang situation and highlights the extensive array of resources Chinese leaders allocated to address it. Below
we provide context, outline the policy, and then identify the array of
components in China’s recharged policy initiative with particular attention to military preparation and planning.

Beijing’s Greatest Challenge

Perhaps no foreign policy issue poses a greater challenge for China
in the 21st century than North Korea.8 Relationships with the United
States and Japan have each proved to be major tests for China but arguably neither has provided the sustained policy challenge to the same
extent as North Korea. The DPRK has proved to be a near constant
headache for the PRC since the early 1990s. Unlike relations across the
Taiwan Strait with Taipei, which have ameliorated appreciably since
2008, and relations with Washington and Tokyo, the climate of which
has tended to fluctuate considerably over time, Beijing’s Pyongyang
problem has not abated and appears to be chronic.9 China’s unruly
neighbor has conducted a series of nuclear tests (October 2006, May
2009, and February 2012) and missile launches (notably July 2006, July
2009, April 2012, and May 2013). Pyongyang’s provocations include, the
two aforementioned incidents in 2010 (which killed a total of 48 ROK
military personnel and 2 civilians), a declaration that Pyongyang would
no longer abide by the 1953 armistice agreement and the severing of its
hotline to Seoul (March 2013), and blocking South Korean access to
Kaesong Industrial Zone (April 2013). For the PRC there has been no
respite where the DPRK is concerned.
Like a variety of foreign policy issues in recent years, North Korea
threatens to besmirch China’s prestige. Beijing has been accused of
consorting with unsavory regimes around the world. For example, in
the lead up to the 2008 Olympics, China found itself tarred as the bad
guy in a humanitarian tragedy in Darfur because of Beijing’s association with a Khartoum regime accused of perpetrating atrocities. China
craves the reputation of a responsible global citizen and a force for good
in the world.10 However, Pyongyang is not akin to Khartoum in Beijing’s
eyes. After all, North Korea is not some far off Third World state like
Sudan. Rather, it is a radioactive Darfur on the doorstep—a humanitarian disaster and the subject of enormous international attention with
a repressive, distasteful dictatorship made all the more complicated
because North Korea is a hyper-militarized state armed with ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Instability immediately across the Yalu River directly threatens domestic stability in
China’s heartland because of the specter of many hundreds of thousands

8     Scobell, “The View from China,” 79.
9     Ibid.
10     See, for example, Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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of refugees flooding into Northeast China. As a result, Beijing is ultrasensitive to any hint of turmoil on the Korean Peninsula.11

Go Big and Go Strong

China, the available evidence suggests, has not undertaken a serious
reexamination of its relationship with North Korea in recent months or
years. Rather, Beijing’s rethink on Pyongyang appears to have happened
much earlier—a decade ago. While the public debate has been—and
continues to be—contentious, senior Chinese leaders remain unshaken
over the basic thrust and contours of this policy.
Officially, China pursues a policy of peace, stability, and denuclearization. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Hong Lei told
assembled reporters on 8 April 2013 that China remained focused on
“unremitting efforts to safeguard peace and stability on the peninsula,”
and China seeks to “push forward the denuclearization process.”12 While
Beijing is undoubtedly sincere about desiring a non-nuclear Korean
Peninsula, the reality is that denuclearization is a much lower priority
than maintaining peace and stability on China’s doorstep.
Indeed, the Chinese public discourse on North Korea of recent
years appears to be the manifestation of more relaxed censorship rather
than any indicator of policy change. And Beijing’s earlier reassessment
on Pyongyang did not result in a decision to abandon its most truculent
and troublesome neighbor. On the contrary, the reassessment concluded
that the PRC had no choice but to redouble its efforts to bolster its
DPRK buffer. In short, ten years ago, China decided that North Korea
could not be allowed to fail. The decision has meant Beijing has decided
to go big and go strong in an all-embracing approach toward Pyongyang
to strengthen the regime on its doorstep. This initiative includes diplomatic, economic, and security dimensions.
Diplomacy. During the past ten years, North Korea has received two
types of diplomatic support from Beijing. First, the PRC has not publicly
condemned the DPRK (although there have been some mild tongue
lashings) and Beijing has watered down United Nations Security Council
resolutions. Second, China has established a multilateral forum with six
participants—North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and
the United States—to manage the North Korea nuclear issue. In 2003,
China launched the Six Party Talks and since then has toiled doggedly to
keep them alive. While the talks have been on hiatus since 2007, Beijing
has worked tirelessly to resuscitate the dormant multilateral forum and
prevent it from collapsing completely. Efforts are currently underway
to reconvene a session in the near future. In May 2013, senior North
Korean leader Vice Marshal Choe Ryong Hae visited Beijing in what
appeared to be an effort to improve China-North Korea relations and
signal Pyongyang’s readiness to curb its bad behavior. The following
11     Chinese leaders are most alarmed by the prospect of domestic instability. Beijing also worries
about upheaval at its borders which threatens to spill over into China. See Andrew J. Nathan and
Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 3-7 (on
Beijing’s perspectives on security vulnerabilities) and 126-137 (on China’s strategy on the Korean
Peninsula).
12     Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on April 9, 2013,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/
s2510/t1030030.shtml.
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month, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Guan—Pyongyang’s
point man on the Six Party Talks—traveled to Beijing apparently to
signal North Korea’s willingness to reengage in the multilateral forum.
A Chinese initiative to restart the Six Party Talks was clearly underway
with a visit by PRC Vice President Li Yuanchao to Pyongyang in July and
a follow-up trip by Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei—Beijing’s point
man on the Six Party Talks—to the DPRK in August.
Economic. In the early 2000s, China launched a comprehensive effort
to bolster North Korea’s economic fundamentals. Repeated attempts to
convince the late Kim Jong Il of the benefits of Pyongyang implementing
a “reform and opening” policy during his seven visits to China (between
May 2000 and May 2011) came to naught. Nevertheless, Beijing has
undertaken concerted endeavors to get North Korea’s economy off life
support and revitalize a range of economic sectors through a substantial
injection of trade, aid, and investment. But China’s frustration at its lack
of success in persuading Pyongyang to adopt Chinese-style economic
reforms did not deter Beijing.
China has been North Korea’s top trading partner since the collapse
of the Soviet Union. The Soviet demise ended the significant subsidies
from Moscow and triggered a systemic crisis and economic tailspin in
North Korea. During the 1990s, China accounted for approximately
a quarter of North Korea’s total trade, but China’s percentage rose to
one third by 2003 and climbed even higher thereafter.13 Today, China
accounts for well over half of North Korea’s two-way trade. In both
decades North Korea has run a huge trade deficit, and Chinese exports
to North Korea have risen at a more rapid rate than North Korea’s
exports to China. North Korea’s exports have been overwhelmingly
resources such as minerals and marine life.14 Of course these are only
South Korean estimates because actual data is unavailable and smuggling and barter trade along the border is difficult to quantify.
Since the early 2000s, Chinese firms—mainly from neighboring Jilin
and Liaoning provinces have invested in North Korea infrastructure,
agriculture, mining, and retail sectors. Many of these investments have
been encouraged and insured by provincial and national authorities. This
trend represents a significant shift from China’s previous focus on solely
providing economic assistance. Beijing recognized that Pyongyang will
almost certainly never repay loans and that outright aid offers limited
leverage and negligible return. Investing in North Korea allows China
to benefit from economic opportunities—albeit risky ones. Between
2003 and 2009, Chinese companies reportedly invested a total of US
$98.3 million. This sum is much less than Chinese entrepreneurs invest
in other countries on China’s periphery, such as Mongolia, Myanmar,
and Vietnam, but it still makes China the second largest investor in
North Korea. While South Korea may qualify as the top investor, these
funds are solely located in the troubled Kaesong Industrial Complex. In
contrast, investments by Chinese companies are spread across North
Korea in a range of sectors albeit mostly in extractive (41 percent) and
13     Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2009), Table 5.2, 112.
14     Balázs Szalontai and Changyong Choi, “China’s Controversial Role in North Korea’s
Economic Transformation: The Dilemmas of Dependency,” Asian Survey 53, no. 2 (March/April
2013): 269-291.
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light industry (38 percent) according to one study.15 China continues
to channel investment into North Korea: in August 2012, for example,
Beijing announced the establishment of a fund worth almost US $500
million for Chinese investments south of the Yalu.16
Beijing, moreover, has also provided hundreds of millions of US
dollars in foreign aid much of it in the form of food grains and petroleum.
The size of these shipments increased considerably in 2003, 2004, and
2005 according to available estimates. This aid is reportedly the largest
amount China disseminates to any country in the world and is allocated
at the highest echelons in Beijing rather than through the normal channels for dispersing development aid in the Ministry of Commerce.17
Military. China has not disowned or distanced itself from North
Korea in the security sphere. The PRC’s only formal military alliance is
with the DPRK, the “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual
Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea” signed in July 1961. The document commits
one country to come to the aid of the other if attacked.18 However,
there does not appear to be any real defense coordination mechanism
nor do the terms of the treaty ever seem to have been invoked. While
Chinese leaders have on multiple occasions stated publicly and privately
that Pyongyang cannot assume that Beijing will come to the rescue, the
treaty can provide the justification for an intervention if Chinese leaders
consider such a step to be necessary. Thus, the security relationship is
perhaps best viewed as a “virtual alliance” with considerable ambiguity
as to if and when it might be invoked by Beijing.19
The alliance may be a virtual one but this does not mean that Beijing
does not take it seriously or that the PLA doesn’t see it as real. For Chinese
civilian and military leaders, this alliance remains relevant and personal.
The alliance was sealed in blood during the early 1950s when the socalled Chinese People’s Volunteers fought side by side with the Korean
People’s Army (KPA). Hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers gave
their lives in the conflict, and Chinese troops remained in North Korea
until 1958.20 The fact that, despite the sacrifice of blood and treasure
by Beijing many decades ago, Pyongyang continues to absorb China’s
attention, consume Chinese resources, and remain a focal point for PLA
contingency planning (see below)—including the prospect of a second
military intervention—is galling to China’s leaders. But all this pushes
Beijing to redouble its efforts. Indeed, it is clear the PLA is increasingly
concerned about the prospect of instability on China’s periphery and on
the Korean Peninsula in particular.
15     For analysis of the investment switch, see Jaewoo Choo, “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing
Economic Dependence on China: Political Ramification,” Asian Survey 48, no. 2 (March/April 2008):
364. For details and analysis of the investments themselves, see Drew Thompson, Silent Partners:
Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea (Washington, DC: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2011).
16     Jeremy Page, “China Builds Up Its Links to North Korea,” The Wall Street Journal, June 7,
2012, 8.
17     Snyder, China’s Rise, 113-117.
18     The text of the treaty can be found in Peking Review 4, no. 28 (1961): 5.
19     Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: From Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arm’s Length (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 19-20.
20     See, for example, Zhang Aiping, chief compiler, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun [China’s People’s
Liberation Army] vol. 1 (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1994), 137. According to this
authoritative source, the CPV suffered more than 360,000 combat casualties (including 130,000
wounded), as well as “380,000 noncombat casualties.”
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Power Projection . . . around the Periphery

What is unmistakably implicit in the PLA’s warfighting scenarios
and campaign planning is that if conflict occurs it is expected to flare
up close to home.21 What PLA doctrinal writings call “local wars in
conditions of informatization” are anticipated at or just beyond China’s
borders. Of course, China’s armed forces have limited power projection capabilities and it is still unusual for air, naval, or ground units
to deploy or be employed out of area. When units do venture farther
afield—outside of China’s immediate neighborhood or the Asia-Pacific
region—the events are marked with great fanfare. The participation of
Chinese forces in United Nations peacekeeping missions around the
globe (since 1990) and the anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden
(since 2008) are cases in point. But a careful examination of recent
PLA official publications and exercises reveals a focus on mastering the
relatively modest capability to project power within China from one
military region to another.22
Indeed, Chinese leaders appear to think of national security in terms
of four concentric circles: the first is a domestic ring, the second consists
of a ring proximate to Chinese territory, the third ring is more expansive
encompassing China’s wider Asia-Pacific neighborhood, and the fourth
ring encompasses the rest of the globe.23 The first two rings are most
delicate and tend to consume the majority of CCP leaders’ time. The first
ring equates to internal security—the territory that Beijing currently
administers or claims sovereignty over. Thus, this ring includes not just
the restive, sparsely populated western regions of Tibet and Xinjiang
but also the densely populated ethnic Han heartland of eastern China,
and frontier areas along the border with North Korea which includes an
ethnic Korean minority population of more than two million. Beijing
is most sensitive in this first ring because it contains its core national
security interests.24 Since at least the mid-2000s, the PLA has worked
with local and provincial authorities in frontier areas of the Shenyang
Military Region (which encompasses Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning
Provinces) on so-called “border defense building” activities including
involved efforts to establish close ties between local communities and
military units stationed nearby.25 The goal is to develop a stable, layered,
and tightly organized system of border control and protection all the
way down to the grass roots level.
21     For example, see M. Taylor Fravel, “Securing Borders: China’s Doctrine and Force Structure
for Frontier Defense,” Journal of Strategic Studies 130, nos. 4-5 (August-October 2007): 705-737.
22     The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: Information Office of the State
Council, April 2013), section on “Carrying out scenario-based exercises and drills”; Dennis J. Blasko,
The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge,
2012), 197-199.
23     The rings conception of Chinese security is drawn from Nathan and Scobell, China’s Search
for Security.
24     Other areas include the islands Beijing does not control in the East and South China Seas,
including Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyutais, and the Spratlys/Nanshas, which are currently objects
of dispute with other claimants. While China has explicitly listed Taiwan as a core interest, Beijing
has demurred from officially placing these other islands in the same category.
25     For a fascinating account of this initiative penned by the commander of the Shenyang MR for
three years (2004-2007), see Chang Wanquan, “Huimou canyu Dongbe bianfang jianshe de sannian
[A Retrospective of three years participating in Northeast border defense building],” Jiefangjunbao,
January 7, 2009, 8. Of course, General Chang is currently the PRC’s Minister of National Defense
and concurrently a member of the Central Military Commission.
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A second ring of insecurity extends beyond China’s actual borders
and comprises adjacent peripheral areas to include all neighboring
countries and regions—continental or maritime. This area constitutes
a band or buffer within which Beijing seeks to maintain stable and
sympathetic—or at least neutral—regimes and deny presence or access
to the military forces of external powers. North Korea is perhaps the
most important of these regimes because of the extreme sensitivity
of the Korean Peninsula—its close proximity to China’s political and
economic heartland and Pyongyang’s status as barrier between Beijing
and Washington’s ally, Seoul, and the ROK-US allied forces south of
the Demilitarized Zone. According to General Wang Haidong of the
PLA’s China Institute for International Strategic Studies, while North
Korea’s value to China’s security is “very different to what it was during
the Korean War,” the country still has “special importance to China’s
national security and must be restored to its status as a strategic buffer.”26
In the mid-2000s, the PLA took over primary responsibility for border
defense duties along the boundary with North Korea. Starting in
February 2004, the PLA and KPA reportedly instituted regular border
defense conferences with their North Korean counterparts.27
Perhaps the most important point to make here is that, from Beijing’s
perspective, alarm over a North Korean contingency is fueled in large
part by fear of what US response this eventuality might produce or what
US action might precipitate.28 Since North Korea literally is situated
on China’s doorstep, not only could instability south of the Yalu River
radiate northward but also any military actions by the United States and
its ROK ally would send major shockwaves reverberating across China’s
threshold. This sensitive location is directly adjacent to China’s political and economic heartland. Indeed, the Chinese have long referred to
the relationship between Korea and China as “lips and teeth”—if the
Korean “lips” are removed then China’s “teeth” get cold and exposed
to the harsh elements.
In Beijing’s mind the prospect of instability in North Korea means
the disintegration of the barrier (i.e., the “lips”) and raises the specter
of US and ROK forces operating north of the DMZ. Also alarming
for Chinese leaders is the potential for a conflagration on the Korean
Peninsula which might escalate horizontally or vertically. Because of
these fears, one can logically infer that the PLA is planning for a North
Korean contingency. In fact, this planning focus has been the clear
message communicated by PLA analysts to the authors in recent years.
But which type of contingency is the PLA planning for?

Korean Contingencies PLA Style

As might be expected, PLA operational plans are not readily accessible. But we can draw on a selection of authoritative writings and
commentaries by Chinese military specialists on operational matters.
These sources can provide important insights about where, how, and
against whom the PLA expects to operate. Any PLA operations south
26     Wang Haidong, “Zhongguo you biyao jian zhanlue wending dai” [China must build strategic
buffers], Huanqiu Shibao on line, August 27, 2013.
27     Chang Wanquan, “Huimou canyu Dongbe bianfang jianshe de sannian [A Retrospective of
three years participating in Northeast border defense building],” Jiefangjunbao, January 7, 2009, 8.
28     Scobell, “The View from China,” 72.
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of the Yalu River will likely happen suddenly, almost certainly be unilateral, encompass a broad spectrum of missions, and anticipate the real
possibility of confrontation with the US military.

Suddenly Confronting a More Powerful Adversary

The precedent of China’s decision to intervene in the Korean
War in October 1950 remains indelibly etched in many Beijing minds.
Furthermore, the calculus behind the move—to prevent US forces from
stripping away the “lips”—still resonates six decades later. According to
authoritative Chinese military writings, the 21st Century PLA is preparing to face a more powerful adversary with overwhelming air superiority
and a size, configuration, and mix of capabilities that could only be the
armed forces of one country: the United States. Moreover, the location
could only be the Korean Peninsula. In 2005, for example, an article
appeared in a technical military journal written by four analysts from the
Zhengzhou Air Defense Academy. The team, based in the Jinan Military
Region (MR), analyzed the daunting “air threat” posed to a PLA group
army from an unidentified adversary in a notional “limited war” fought
“along our country’s land border.”29
Given Beijing’s heightened sensitivity to instability across the Yalu
and fear of spillover into the Shenyang MR, Chinese intervention could
come quickly (and quite possibly faster than any ROK/US intervention).
Thus, if North Korea implodes or erupts in civil war, Beijing will probably intervene earlier than either Seoul or Washington.
China will likely have at least some units of its armed forces poised
nearby and ready to go promptly. In the mid-1990s, the focus of maneuver exercises in the Shenyang MR shifted from hostilities with Russia
to “possible emergencies on the Korean Peninsula,” and training for a
North Korean contingency appears to have intensified since the mid2000s.30 Then, in December 2013 and January 2014, a series of major
exercises occurred in the Shenyang MR in the vicinity of China’s border
with North Korea, including one in which the number of participating
PLA personnel were reported to be as many as 100,000. While the PRC
Ministry of National Defense insisted that these were “normal training”
events, winter-time drills of this size and scope are highly unusual.31
One of the first units to intervene in a North Korean contingency
would likely be a light mechanized brigade from the 39th Group Army
equipped with wheeled fighting vehicles, but rapid reaction components,
including PLA Special Forces, helicopter units, and the PLA Air Force’s
15th Airborne Corps (located near Wuhan in the Guangzhou Military
Region) would be one of the first formations to arrive.32 However, full
29     Hao Qiang, Feng Lidong, Gong Xu, Yu Junsha, “Jituanjun fankong xi zhan yi kong zhong
weixie pinggu [Evaluation of air threat on group army’s anti-air raid campaign], Xiandai fangyu jishu
[Modern Defense Technology], 33, no. 1 (February 2005): 10-14, 18.
30     “Chinese Armed Forces Responding to Tensions on Korean Peninsula,” Kanwa Defense Review
no. 106 (August 1, 2013): 34-36.
31     “PLA mobilizes 100,000 troops for N Korean border exercise,” Want China Times, January 15,
2014, http://www/wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140115000029&cid=1101;
“Shenyang Drills were ‘Regular Training’ MOD,” Global Times January 21, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/838579.shtml.
32     Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 84, 104. Each military region has rapid reaction units (RRUs).
It is likely that RRUs from other MRs will participate in any North Korean intervention.
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mobilization of all the units in the Shenyang MR would probably take
weeks and deployment of units from other MRs would take even longer.
Beijing will want to prevent a flood of North Korean refugees
into China and seek to cordon off an area south of the Yalu River, and
perhaps even establish refugee camps. Beijing will likely also feel a sense
of urgency to seize control of North Korean nuclear and chemical sites,
especially those in close proximity to the Chinese border. These missions have all been identified as those types China’s armed forces should
be prepared to execute.33
Moreover, the PLA continues to maintain chemical defense units
both in active duty and reserve components. Shenyang is noteworthy as
the only one of seven military regions in China to possess both an active
duty chemical defense regiment and a reserve one.34 This dual capacity
is probably because of the MR’s proximity to North Korea—the most
likely location where the PLA will confront chemical weapons.
Chinese urgency will be driven in part by worries over “loose nukes”
and in part by a desire to preempt US action. China will assume the United
States would be extremely alarmed at the prospect of multiple unsecured
suspected weapons of mass destruction sites in North Korea, some quite
close to China’s border. Beijing’s logic is that a nuclear-armed North
Korea has prompted enormous US attention so it is highly likely that
the real prospect of unsecured WMD will trigger a swift US response.
The specter of US troops—even in relatively small numbers—anywhere
near the Yalu will be extremely disturbing to Beijing.35 While there is a
very good chance that China will seek a United Nations imprimatur on
any intervention in North Korea, this authorization is more likely to be
sought after the fact than beforehand.

Going It Alone

Despite this history of comradeship-in-arms, in the 21st century the
KPA and the PLA seem to act like allies at arm’s length.36 That is, there is
limited interaction and cooperation combined with a significant amount
of mutual suspicion and aloofness. There is a military-to-military relationship but this appears to be extremely modest. The manifestations
of the relationship appear largely ceremonial and superficial exchanges
of high-level delegations and a small number of KPA officers attending selected PLA professional military education institutions. However,
there do not appear to be any field or command post exercises between
the militaries of the kind one might expect between real or even nominal

33     Liu Xiangyang, Xu Sheng, Xiong Kaiping, and Zhong Chunyu, “Feizhanzheng junshi xingdong tanyao [An examination of MOOTW], Zhongguo junshi kexue (China Military Science), no. 3
(2008).
34     Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 89-90.
35     Regular author conversations since 2002 with multiple military and civilian analysts in Beijing
and Shanghai.
36     Scobell, China and North Korea.
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alliances.37 The most routinized and on-going series of bilateral or multilateral field exercises that the PLA conducts are under the auspices of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with armed forces of member
states.38 By contrast, China’s security relationship with North Korea
seems strangely dormant.
Because of this condition, it is likely that any intervention by the
PLA in North Korea will be unilateral. There may be a veneer of cooperation with the KPA, but there will be nothing approaching the degree
of integrated command and control or level of interoperability that exists
between US Forces Korea and the Republic of Korea’s armed forces.
Moreover, one cannot assume there will be any level of cooperation with
the KPA in a PLA operation in North Korea. Indeed, it is conceivable
that the KPA might oppose Chinese intervention.

Combat and Noncombat Operations

The range of military operations the PLA will expect to conduct
span a wide spectrum from low-intensity combat, high-intensity kinetics
to noncombat operations dealing with nontraditional security threats.
For the past decade, the PLA has emphasized an expansive set of
noncombat, peacetime operations labeled “military operations other
than war” or “MOOTW” [ feizhanzheng junshi xingdong].39 Chinese military
doctrine has emphasized a set of four undertakings articulated by then
CMC Chair Hu Jintao in December 2004. He outlined four so-called
New Historic Missions which highlight a wide range of responsibilities
for the PLA: defending CCP rule, safeguarding economic development,
protecting national interests, and upholding world peace.
The PLA, of course, has not engaged in any significant combat
operations since the 1979 border war with Vietnam. Moreover, since
the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou as president of Taiwan, the likelihood
of crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait has been extremely low. With
high-intensity, large-scale combat a more distant proposition, in recent
years the PLA has turned more attention to dealing with an array of
nontraditional security threats confronting China. Outside of China, the
PLA sent more than 20,000 troops to participate in more than 20 United
Nations Peacekeeping or observer missions; dispatched more than 13
rotations of the three ship anti-piracy task force in the Gulf of Aden;
and in early 2011 elements of the PLA assisted in extricating more than
35,000 Chinese civilians from Libya in what China’s 2012 Defense White
Paper called “the largest overseas evacuation” in the history of the PRC.
37     On China-North Korea mil-mil relations, see Scobell, China and North Korea, 8-9. More recent scholarship on the PLA exchanges underscores the absence of robust mil-mil ties between
China and North Korea. See Heidi Holz and Kenneth Allen, “Military Exchanges with Chinese
Characteristics: The People’s Liberation Army Experience with Military Relations,” in The PLA at
Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, eds. Roy Kamphausen, David
Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,
2010), 429-473. A recent analysis of the PLA multilateral exercises reveals no exercises with the
KPA; Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 206-209.
38     Since 2002, China has conducted almost annual military field exercises with assorted SCO
member states. These have included not just the PLA and their counterpart armed forces but also
the People’s Armed Police and their foreign counterparts.
39     See, for example, Andrew Scobell, “Discourse in 3-D: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine, Circa
2009,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, eds.
Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 99-134.
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In addition, PLA and People’s Armed Police formations regularly participate in counterterrorism exercises with a variety of countries, notably
with the member militaries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Inside China, the PLA has engaged in humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, including responding to the Sichuan earthquake in 2008,
snowstorms and other natural disasters. According to the 2012 White
Paper, hundreds of thousands of uniformed personnel were employed
in “emergency rescue and disaster relief activities” during 2008 alone.
The PLA seems to be planning for a range of nonwarfighting contingencies around its periphery. These include protecting the border,
stabilizing operations, dealing with refugees, controlling WMD
problems, protecting PRC citizens and property, and evacuating noncombatants. Indeed, according to an article coauthored by four officers
posted to the headquarters of the Shenyang MR that appeared in a 2008
issue of a prominent PLA journal, military operations other than war
include the following: “The defense of land, maritime, and air frontiers,
establishing restricted areas, soft battle strikes, military trade and aid,
peacekeeping operations, . . . controlling and managing refugees, . . .
[dealing with] nuclear, biological, and chemical agents, military control,
civil assistance, protecting and evacuating nationals in foreign trouble
spots . . . .”40
Beijing will almost certainly feel pressure to protect Chinese citizens
and economic interests in North Korea in the event of a crisis. Chinese
businesses now have significant economic investments in North Korea
and there are at least thousands of PRC citizens inside the country at
any given time.41
Despite attention to MOOTW, the PLA has not neglected combat
readiness and is also training for combat. In recent years, senior leaders
have been at pains to stress that while the PLA can perform a wide
range of “diversified military tasks,” its core mission remains preparing
to fight “local wars under conditions of informatization.” This focus
is what former commander-in-chief Hu Jintao and others have urged.
The implicit assumption is that such a war would be most likely to occur
at points around China’s periphery. Almost immediately after being
appointed to succeed Hu as chair of the CMC, Xi Jinping has stressed that
the PLA’s top priority should be “preparing for military struggle.”42 Some
have interpreted this statement to mean Xi was deliberately adopting a
bellicose stance and chalked this up as yet another indication of a more
assertive China. However, this rhetoric actually appears aimed at bolstering support within the military for its new commander-in-chief and
ensuring the PLA is prepared to execute its mission in Korea or elsewhere.

Conclusion

China’s previous rethink on North Korea policy occurred ten years
ago and turned out to be a recharge. The decision was determined by
Beijing’s vital interests: preventing domestic insecurity and maintaining
40     Liu Xiangyang et al., “Feizhanzheng junshi xingdong tanyao [An examination of MOOTW],
Zhongguo junshi kexue (China Military Science), no. 3 (2008), 4.
41     According to statistics from the PRC Ministry of Commerce, there are at least 5,000 Chinese
contract workers based in North Korea.
42     For example, see Cary Huang, “Xi Shaping up to be an influential PLA Commander,” South
China Morning Post, August 1, 2013.
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a stable buffer at the gateway to China’s political and economic heartland. Future Pyongyang provocations are unlikely to change Beijing’s
buffer strategy. China appears prepared to bolster the North Korean
buffer at all costs using every instrument at its disposal—economic
(aid, trade, and investment), political (tacitly supporting hereditary succession), diplomatic (refusing to condemn the North publicly for its
intransigence or transgressions and pursuing the Six Party Talks), and, if
necessary, military (including limited or wholesale intervention to prop
up the regime).
Indeed, all indications are that the PLA has been actively planning
for a variety of Korean contingencies. While China’s armed forces are
fully prepared to execute if so ordered, no one in Beijing is eager to
send Chinese forces across the Yalu for the second time in sixty years.
Unlike 1950, today Beijing has a sizeable tool kit of nonmilitary options
at its disposal where Pyongyang is concerned. Chinese leaders would
much prefer to manage the problem diplomatically and economically.
But this preference does not mean Beijing would hesitate to act militarily
if China’s vital national security interests were determined to be on the
line across the Yalu River.
For successive US administrations, cooperation and coordination
with China has been the cornerstone of their initiatives vis-à-vis North
Korea. But the above analysis suggests that Washington should alter its
expectations of what Beijing would be willing to do. Real, albeit modest,
diplomatic and economic coordination has occurred and may continue.
But military cooperation or coordination is another story. There has
been informal Track II discussion about possible coordination between
the US and PRC defense establishments concerning North Korea but
the topic is far too sensitive in China to move much beyond the realm of
the hypothetical. Despite this reality, persistent volatility on the Korean
Peninsula and high costs of miscommunication in a future North Korean
crisis require the United States to persevere in a dialog with China.
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Abstract: This article assesses how we think about future war,
drawing attention to its associated caveats, obstacles, and intellectual problems. It is divided into three sections: the first acknowledges that predicting the future is immensely problematic, but suggests
history can be a critical guide. The second assesses the present and
why it is difficult to conceive of accelerating change. The third examines the trends of future war. The article concludes with implications for US forces.

Predicting the Future Operating Environment

T

hroughout history, changes in the character of war have been
difficult for contemporaries to identify, particularly during long
periods of peace. While there may be trends and enduring
principles of strategy and international relations, it is the variability of
conditions, changes in the application of technology, adaptation, and
the dynamics of conflict that make prediction, and consequently planning, very challenging. The problem of prediction has not prevented
bold assertions, and some dystopian visions of the future have been
propagated through sensationalist tracts and even, apparently, in serious
scholarship. The modern prophets of doom who foresee a Hobbesian
anarchy include such distinguished names as Robert Kaplan, Francis
Fukuyama, Samuel B. Huntington and, albeit to a less apocalyptic extent,
David Kilcullen.1 Martin van Creveld and Philip Bobbitt suggest the state
is in terminal decline in international affairs, opening the way for chaos
and warfare.2 Others claimed that war would be conducted “amongst
the people” with dire results in terms of civilian casualties, and the
official United Kingdom military doctrine of 2009 on future character
of conflict referred, in solely negative terms, to a “hybrid” battlefield
that would be inevitably “contested, congested, cluttered, connected and
constrained.”3 Works on global strategic trends predict a violent future
amidst diminishing natural resources, climatic pressures, and global
population growth. Nevertheless, such projections are starkly at odds
with the conclusions of Steve Pinker, Andrew Mack, and Håvard Hegre,
specifically that war, both minor and major, is in decline.4 Statistical work
1     Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic, February 1994, http://www.theatlantic.com/ideastour/archive/kaplan.mhtml; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man
(New York: Free Press, 1992); Samuel B. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the
World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains (London:
Hurst & Co., 2013).
2     Martin van Creveld, “The Fate of the State,” Parameters 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 4-18; Philip
Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles (New York: Penguin, 2003)
3     Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (London: Allen Lane, 2005); Ministry of Defence, The Future
Character of Conflict (MOD, DCDC Strategic Trends Programme, February 2, 2010).
4     Steve Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking
Books, 2011); Andrew Mack, “More Secure World” lecture at ANU, February 2011; Håvard Hegre
et al, “Predicting Armed Conflict, 2010-2050,” International Studies Quarterly 55(2) (2013): 1-21.
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at Uppsala University, incorporating all the standard drivers of conflict
since 1945, forecast a reduction in the number of wars and in the overall
casualty toll in the next fifty years.
In the past, attempts to predict the future of war were just as contradictory. It was always tempting for contemporaries to hold on to
strongly-held values and force structures and to downplay unpalatable
truths. The selection of preferred assumptions, rather than absolute
truths, was a common problem. Nevertheless, some projections, dismissed as absurd by contemporaries, proved accurate in time. Selection,
exaggeration, absurdity, contemporary fears and preferences, misunderstanding, and misplaced long-range forecasts were the characteristics
of predicting future war in the past, and all these traits still dominate
the present.5
There are many reasons why prediction is so difficult, even when
there are apparently obvious positivist “trends” to guide us. It is tempting to make projections in the present based on the types of wars that
seem the most prevalent today and to assume that, for the foreseeable
future, all wars will fall into this pattern. Military analysts want to
identify the characteristics of future war with some accuracy, not least
because expensive technological development programs depend on
their judgments, training of specialists is long term, and governments
require success with the greatest efficiency. The difficulty is that success
is contingent on context. Clarity in what the objective is must be essential, but the dynamics of war frequently change the conditions under
which the conflict was entered. Aims, therefore, evolve just as rapidly
and comprehensively as the conflict itself. Trends of the recent past give
strong indications about war in the near future but still require caution.
Failing states, international terrorism driven by radical ideologies, and
a diminishing power of Western states to influence events or populations may characterise the immediate future. However, the true value of
history is not to invoke direct analogies, nor does the answer lie in trying
to extract selections to suit a particular agenda, as so often occurs. The
value of history is rather in encouraging critical reflection, to ask questions, and to challenge the positivist assumptions that crowd our field of
view. We are subject to the flux of history, and we cannot entirely escape
our present, but we should seek to break free of unreasoned supposition
about the future through critical thinking.

War and Accelerating Change

Recent assessments of the future operating environment have
laid emphasis on trends visible in the present. The relative economic
decline of the West in relation to the rise of Chinese manufacturing, a
phenomenon not necessarily inevitable in the future, has given rise to
the assumption that the world will become more multipolar. Given the
brevity of the American unipolar moment after the Cold War, multipolarity is hardly surprising, but its association with the relative economic
decline of the West is illogical: it is not automatic. Indeed, the rising military potential of China and ambiguity over Beijing’s long-term plans,
referred to with such regularity and suspicion that confrontation now
5     See Antulio J. Echevarria II, Imagining Future War: The West’s Technological Revolution and Visions
of Wars to Come 1880–1914 (New York: Praeger, 2007).
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amounts to an accepted, inevitable condition, may never occur at all,
even in the Pacific.6 China provides peacekeeping forces to the United
Nations and is primarily focused on its domestic security. Fears of its
cyberwarfare potential often fail to take any account of the Chinese government’s desire to monitor domestic sedition. The People’s Republic of
China is particularly sensitive about its border integrity, not an unreasonable attitude given threats to its frontiers in 1950, 1960, 1962, and
1979. Most important of all, China is restrained in its ambition by its
interdependence with the West and the global economy. It is reliant on
markets, as well as the quiescence of its domestic population. A second
assertion is that legal frameworks for Western operations will become
less flexible and military officers express a fear they will be too constrained to maneuver at all in the future.7 Legal advisors are vital in
low-intensity operations among the people and in counterterrorism but
would have less bearing on high-intensity campaigns. Indeed, it should
be noted that legal advice in Western countries has tended to facilitate
rather than obstruct operations. The real obstacle is risk-aversion and
fear of juridification of operations at the strategic and policymaking
level. Concerns are expressed, for example, about psyops, surveillance,
and targeting even though these are intrinsic to counterterrorism.
A third assertion is that future operating environments are forecast
as urban, with rapid population growth exerting impossible strain on
infrastructure and resources. A further complication is that climatic
change is regarded as the catalyst for a greater incidence of natural
disasters, particularly affecting coastal cities, and Western forces could
find themselves in devastated regions. Resource crises, an assumed
trigger for war, are foreseen as reaching an acute stage when energy
demands begin to exceed supply or available reserves, and the first to
be affected, it is thought, would be cities teeming with impoverished
populations. Significant adjustments are indeed likely, but, in fact, these
will be driven by the market: as costs become too great, consumers and
states will be forced to switch to alternatives, and war may not always
be the result. Mapping the choke points of demand and supply, and the
relative power of cities, states, and nonstate actors, might produce some
correlation with future conflict; however, these correlations cannot be
regarded as deterministic.
The most accurate assessments of war in the near future are
informed by the present. These foresee large insurgent movements,
operating across rural and urban areas, deeply enmeshed in local politics, and enjoying the sympathy if not the support of their populations.
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia have been characterized as large-scale
Western military intervention that antagonized local people, threatened
vested interests, and were marked by hasty or badly aligned ends, ways,
and means. Even if deliberate intervention is not the intention, it is possible that, in the near term, attempts to bring humanitarian relief to a
population in the midst of civil war, or a peacekeeping mission gone
awry, could produce similar complications and obligations.
6     For an alternative view, see Christopher Coker, The Improbable War: China, the United States and
the Logic of Great Power Conflict (London: Hurst, 2014).
7     Akbar Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal
Islam (New York: Brookings, 2013).
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Since American conventional capability is so overwhelming, and a
nuclear exchange is so unthinkable, many believe all future adversaries
of the West will wage irregular or unconventional warfare. Some assert
that proxy warfare will be more common.8 Some proxies might not be
conventional military forces, but may range from private military companies to transnational corporations and financial institutions.
The terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 in the United States suggests that future attacks will be directed at specific weak points of the
West. Their targets, such as civilian populations, embassies, and infrastructure, are invariably nonmilitary, but, in fact, these vulnerabilities
are exactly what Western armed forces need to address not least because
civilian agencies lack the capability to protect them. In tackling these
weaknesses, a radical reappraisal of the role and function of armies is
probably required, along with a new appreciation that the future operating environment is as likely to be in the domestic sphere as overseas.9
Anxiety about Western vulnerabilities has produced a great deal of
speculation about e-warfare, counterterrorism scenarios, interrobotic
battles, and the future of unmanned air power to conduct standoff
attacks. The problem is these may not characterize future war, even if
they are reassuringly predictable for their advocates and critics. Western
military analysts are eager to identify the patterns with which they are
familiar, even where they tend to select and exaggerate the threats and
ignore future opportunities. Much of this is cultural. Clausewitzian
notions of decisiveness, the politics of decision, and rapid results are
deeply attractive, even though war can be, in essence, indecisive, protracted, dynamic, and unpredictable.
One current characterization of war, we observe, is of increasing
digitization, with an emphasis on the metrics of targeting, firing, surveillance, and effects. The steady evolution of this phenomenon has
been overshadowed by recent debates about counterinsurgency techniques. Nevertheless, the issues are closely related, for, at the tactical
level, insurgents endeavor to overload these superior systems by multiple
firing points or various forms of attack, including suicide bombers.
Special Forces teams are still required to carry out close surveillance
to enable the computerized weapons to engage and they often need to
be concealed inside populations or recruit local auxiliaries, employing
men using a high degree of empathy and understanding of the needs of
nonstate actors and their agendas.10 Despite attempts to eliminate friction with new technologies countering terrorism and insurgency, human
personnel and their high-tech systems are still vulnerable to exhaustion,
technical failure, and to erroneous decisions taken by tired, stressed, and
scrutinized commanders. Information fog may be less of an obstacle in
conventional warfare, but insurgents try to subvert Western information
systems, confuse, obscure, and remain concealed. The high-tempo of
8    Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).
9     The implications are that police forces may be compelled to develop more paramilitary
capabilities, or, perhaps, that military forces will be forced to confront duties of Military Aid to the
Civil Power more frequently, and perhaps blend with policing tasks.
10     Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira, eds., Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics
and State Formation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 149-177; Austin Long, “Going
old school; US Army Special Forces Return to the Villages,” Foreign Policy, July 21, 2010, http://
afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/21/going_old_school_us_army_special_forces_return_
to_the_villages; Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19.
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conventional war suits the technological systems of Western forces, but
periods of protracted warfare among populations do not, because here
friction reasserts itself more powerfully.
The assumption, much repeated, is that Western operations in the
future will be expeditionary since there is no existential state threat to
the United States or the European continent. Those who wish to avoid
the protracted character of land warfare, like that in Afghanistan, speak
of the need for air and sea operations, or, at the very most, a light force
structure. Advocates of such a posture rarely acknowledge the limitations of air power that were exposed as recently as operations in Kosovo.
Navalists, eager to emphasize the way governments could maintain their
freedom of action but not become embroiled in land campaigns, give
less attention to the vulnerabilities of sea power in congested littorals or
the fact that decision in war in the past occurred on land just as much
as at sea. Those who envisaged light forces engaging in peacekeeping
seemed not to have considered the consequences of these missions going
wrong, resulting in severe fighting and the risk of catastrophic defeat.
The logic of a light footprint in Western expeditionary warfare in
2001-03 was to remain agile, minimize the burden of logistics, and avoid
the antagonism of local people with any overt and large-scale military
presence. The United States sought specifically to avoid any idea of occupation in Afghanistan to prevent a repetition of the Soviet mistakes in
1979. In 2001, there was considerable faith in the ability of air power to
deliver solutions without a substantial ground commitment.11 In fact,
the logic of smaller ground forces means greater vulnerability and less
intelligence which can only be compensated by a greater reliance on air
power. Yet, despite the advent of precision strike and enhanced targeting, reliance on air power has caused higher civilian casualties. This
approach proved counterproductive in the militarized policing operations Western forces subsequently found themselves. Air power alone
could not provide security for the establishment of a new government.
Since operations against Libya (2011), there has again been enthusiasm
for air operations that avoid a ground commitment, and limited missile
strikes were advocated against the Syrian regime in 2013. It has taken
some time for Western powers to realize that not only their methods
of war fighting and stabilization, but also their campaign design and
doctrines, cannot be treated as immutably superior, and they have been
forced to change constantly as operations unfolded.
New technologies, from unmanned aerial vehicles to robotics,
and new methods such as cyber denial of service or disruption, do no
more to guarantee victory than did the faith in air and sea power in the
early twentieth century. The novelty of a technology has never ensured
success in its own right—it is the integration of innovation into effective
methods and means that gives a strategic or tactical edge. This has been
the case particularly with unmanned aircraft with the ability to strike
with missiles. Debate has raged on the character, legal and ethical, of
targeted killing within states not at war with the West, such as Yemen or
Pakistan, of temporarily removing insurgent fighters from the battlefield
by extra-legal incarceration, and extraordinary rendition of suspected
11     D. M. Drew, “US Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to
Confusion,” Journal of Military History, 62 (1998): 809-32.
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fighters.12 The fact remains that the enemies of the West subvert Western
laws of armed conflict; they attack while concealed by the local civilian
population, do not adhere to the truth in their information operations,
and declare their intention is to inflict mass casualties on those who do
not conform to their ideas. The Western concern to protect populations, deeply internalized from the advent of massed air bombardment
in the world wars, is not the priority for many non-Western belligerents.
Disturbing and unpalatable though it may be for the West, the fact is that
intimidation, fear of reprisals, and overwhelming military power have all
too often swayed a population into compliance, rather than the selective
ethical targeting so treasured by Westerners.13 Nevertheless, inconsistencies can also be exploited. Drone strikes without a clear framework
of the rules of engagement erode the boundaries between war and peace
still further and make it easier for nonstate groups to assert that they,
too, possess the right to strike back in an international setting.
Urban and marginal environments where government control is
not assured clearly present the greatest problems for security forces,
and at times, the military may assume a temporary role as governing
authority with legal powers. Western armies find the thought of internal security less attractive than conducting war beyond their national
borders. Domestic security is regarded as a form of policing, rather
than a military activity. The unhappy history of internal security and
coercing of populations, while the traditional role of armies before the
nineteenth century, can seem anathema to military professionals. Yet,
more emphasis needs to be placed on the objective of getting adversaries
to the negotiating table as the parameter of success, seeing negotiation
as normative, rather than the exceptional total war concept of military
victory through the destruction of the means to resist.14 Treating war
as an extension of politics means that victory is the correlation of ends,
ways, and means, and it is a continuous process, not an end-state.
Above all, the inability to predict the future confidently might
help explain the current desire to seek out the new while retaining the
familiar in future war planning. Nevertheless, in the future operating
environment, both old and new concepts of war will coexist. While some
adversaries will use new weapon systems and information operations,
some will attack infrastructures and attempt to mobilize populations
using ideological grievances, but others will physically dig trenches and
fight at close quarters. There will be no template for prediction, for every
conflict will have its own context.
Finding patterns is common in future war discourse, and the anxieties of the present are usually projected onto the future in exaggerated

12     Kenneth Roth, “What Rules Should Govern US Drone Attacks?” The New York Review, March
25, 2013, 16-18.
13     The best documented and most comprehensive use of terror against insurgency include
Bolshevik annihilation of white resistance in the Russian Civil War and the Nazi destruction of
French resistance activities in central and southern France during the Second World War.
14     Richard Hobbs, The Myth of Victory: What is Victory in War? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979).
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terms.15 Less sensational assessments are not so appealing, attract less
attention and, if unfulfilled, are held up as exemplars of complacency.
Longer term historical trends are difficult to identify: one cannot be
quite sure if the trend identified is the correct one. Moreover, it is impossible to ignore the type of wars in the present. It appears that the world
is, for now, in a period of unconventional conflict. Projections are made
against this established pattern, which explains why those seeking to
demonstrate through statistics a decline in war in the future feel as confident as the doomsayers.
The inherent contradictions of these analyses suggest that, in fact,
there is no guarantee that patterns and trajectories are reliable. It is
not inevitable that the low intensity, unconventional warfare of today
will continue even into the near future. It is possible that episodes of
intense and highly destructive interstate war, perhaps including a limited
exchange of tactical nuclear weapons, will occur.
Moreover, as David Kilcullen points out in his recent Out of the
Mountains: the Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, it is not so much that the
trends of change are unfamiliar and unpredictable as the rate of those
changes.16 He argues that existing institutions, states, governments, and
military forces will be overwhelmed by the scale of unrest in new megacities and the tempo of new connectivity. In particular, he argues the
future operating environment will be cities rather than states, with future
conflicts likely centered on the periphery of sprawling coastal conurbations in the developing world where nonstate armed groups such as drug
cartels, street gangs, and warlords compete for resources and influence.
Failing states would be the dominant feature of the future, and Kilcullen
develops the idea to suggest that states will struggle to govern megacities. Furthermore, Kilcullen illustrates how modern connectivity, such
as the internet, mobile phones, satellite technology, Google Earth, and
social networks, present both challenges and opportunities in this new
operating environment. These tools can mobilize demonstrators as in
the Arab Spring, maintain an unofficial economy in Mogadishu, train
unskilled soldiers and armorers, and be employed by school children to
identify the position of regime snipers in Libya. This connectivity comes
into play at both local and global levels and will overload conventional
military forces and government institutions.
By advancing a theory of what will be new in the operating environment, one can lose sight of continuities. While cities will potentially be the
seedbed of popular unrest, it is also the case that urban areas are dependent on their hinterlands. The point is that cities can be bypassed and
contained as well as being a battle space. They are interdependent on other
cities, ports, transport infrastructure, and their environs, and that means
the city system, as Kilcullen describes it, consists not only of the built-up
environment, but of the supporting networks that serve it. Moreover,
15     Change in human history has been, hitherto, incremental with periodic and episodic “shear
events” that are subsequently interpreted as turning points. For Clausewitz and Jomini, the great
turning point of their age was the French Revolution, but for many in military history, these moments were identified either as decisive battles, as technological breakthroughs, or the achievements
of particular commanders. Such determinisms were challenged in mainstream history and social science but seemed to enjoy a greater longevity in military studies. See Jeremy Black, Rethinking Military
History (London: Routledge, 2004).
16     David Kilcullen Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013).
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one needs to acknowledge the importance of ideologies and legal aspects
of the operating environment, since constraints on security forces are
highly likely if they are to confront a Mumbai-style terrorist swarm attack,
mass contamination, or low-intensity operations against an aggrieved,
poor population taking violent action against their deprivation.
Kilcullen reiterates historic anxieties about resources, threats, and
reputations that are unlikely to disappear as causes of war. It is likely
that the ends of war will remain predictable, while ways and means will
be transformed significantly. Yet, alongside these changes, traditional
modes of war will remain. The use of force as an instrument of policy,
which seems inevitable, can still be stratified into limited war, the threat of
guerre a l’outrance (in terms of Weapons of Mass Destruction) and attempts
to neutralize an enemy by the defeat of his strategy. Nevertheless, new
means during the century may open up new possibilities, or new ways
of achieving strategic ends.
Rather than a singular global crisis in the future, clashes of resources
and population pressures will vary by region.17 Some crises, through
their sheer scale, may accelerate rapidly. The limited supply, exhaustion,
or increased costs of extraction of resources such as energy, water, and
food will also vary and affect the developing world more adversely than
the developed. The Global Environment Outlook of 1999 predicted conflict
over water in North Africa and the Middle East between 2000 and 2025,
though ideological and governance issues still predominated in those
regions midway through that forecasted period.18 Financial pressures
have also proved far from isotropic: the lack of credit in less developed
countries leaves them vulnerable to popular unrest. Inequality and youth
unemployment are widely predicted to rise over the next thirty years,
and there may be a corresponding rise in disaffected groups willing to
take violent action.
Nevertheless, there is a risk of exaggeration: terrorist attacks on
infrastructures are short-lived and are unable to destroy entire systems.
The true vulnerability of the West would be exposed by the economic
collapse of China through some mass social unrest and a global stagnation in trade and financial exchange. Nevertheless, the digital revolution
promises to increase global GDP far faster and more extensively than the
industrial revolution. The acceleration of technological change is likely to
produce significant benefits as well as detrimental outcomes. If sequencing a human genome in 2000 took several years and $50 million, today it
can be achieved in a day at a cost of less than a $1,000.19 This advanced
medical research provides the United States with a significant strategic
edge in global relations. The same is true of the ongoing information
revolution. More information is generated every two days than the last

17     In recent work by McKinsey and Company, demographic shifts and the rise of emerging
markets will, they argue, place strain on global resources to an unprecedented level. Food prices
will increase by 40 percent by 2030 and there will be a 30 percent gap in energy supply and demand for oil and gas. There is likely to be a gap of some 40 percent between supply and demand
for water. Global meat intake will increase, placing pressure on available land.
18     Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan
Owl, 2001). The states that are most vulnerable to conflict are Somalia, DR Congo, Sudan, and
South Sudan. Areas that are at significant risk are Chad, Yemen, Afghanistan, Haiti, Central African
Republic, Zimbabwe, Iraq, Cote d’Ivoire, Pakistan, Guinea, Guinea Bassau, and Nigeria.
19     McKinzey’s presentation at Oxford University, November 28, 2013.
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2000 years combined.20 The implication is that grievances will be amplified faster and to a larger audience than before, but solutions may also be
faster to acquire. This possibility suggests there will be greater volatility
across informational, physical, infrastructural, and ideational domains.

Trends of Future War

The character of war in the future will change as frequently as it
has in the past, but there will be many striking continuities, including
terrorism and violent mass protest movements. There will almost certainly be a significant increase in irregular warfare in cities and systemic
warfare. There are ten trends of future war: irregular warfare in urban
areas exploiting infrastructural vulnerability; porosity; dispersal; depth;
stealth; miniaturization of combat power; privatization of violence;
devolution; nodal systemic operations, and precision.
In large cities, low intensity terrorism could be much more likely.
Protracted conflicts require significant military and police manpower
and surveillance commitments, and managed media operations. In
future war, urban militias may be able to access more lethal weapons
including surface-to-air missiles, anti-armor weapons, and contaminating chemical or biological weapons. In urban warfare, military forces
would find civil authority collapsing, multiple agencies working in the
same spaces with their own agendas, and a vulnerable civilian population expecting relief.
Systemic warfare is just as unconventional, involving attacks on
financial systems, the deliberate hollowing out of local economies to
create dependent regions and peoples, diffused and mass participation in
antistate, antigovernment activity, information operations, cybercrime,
cyber blockades, disruptive electronic warfare, selective bio-attacks on
sections of society, outages in energy generation and supply, or contamination of food and water. Each type of assault is characterized by an
emphasis on the systemic nature of the consequences: they are designed
to disrupt, degrade, discredit, or destroy systems on which a state or a
people depend.
The process of diffusion has affected the battlefield since the beginning of the industrial age as more lethal weapons of greater precision
and range have extended it in-depth. Where Gettysburg was fought
within the compass of a few miles in 1863, the Second World War was
characterized as a conflict extending across a variety of theaters around
the globe, requiring the mobilization of domestic economies and their
populations. Since 1945, unconventional wars as well as overt, conventional wars, have affected the entire globe. The interconnected nature of
the world economy and communications systems means that even the
smallest terrorist act is broadcast to all the world’s population.
Closely linked to the idea of dispersal is concealment or stealth,
with small organizations operating out of sight, or attempting to remain
concealed within populations or remote terrain. Interestingly, despite
assertions that clandestine organizations are particularly threatening to
the West, digital signatures are increasingly difficult to conceal. Modern

20     Ibid.
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state forces are even more exposed and vulnerable, and in the future
camouflage in conflicts among the people will require complete blending.
Since the industrial revolution, precision engineering has facilitated
smaller and more effective weapons systems, while advances in physics
and chemistry have increased their explosive power. Concurrently, it has
been possible to manufacture platforms that are smaller yet deliver the
same or greater combat power. Machine guns, once large and cumbersome, became hand-held. After the first atomic bombs, new generations
of nuclear weapons were designed until it became possible to manufacture a device as small as a nuclear artillery shell. In the near future, it is
possible to envisage weapon systems of significant magnitude that can
be carried by individuals. The deduction of this trend is that every city,
port, and province is a potential battle space.
Warfare is likely to be individualized further in the near future as
smaller and smaller groups assert the right to wage war, equipped with
significant combat power. The increasing numbers of private security
contractors and private military companies, in both domestic and overseas security tasks, is a trend likely to continue. Such a phenomenon makes
the conduct of proxy warfare easier, with deniable groups and individuals trained and equipped by both states and nonstate actors. Assamese
irregulars, Mexican drug cartels, Somali pirates, and fighters from the
Nigerian delta have mounted sustained campaigns against governments,
international interests, and large companies on their own terms.
The diffusion of power and communications since the late nineteenth century in the West, and which have now straddled the globe, are
reflected in new modes of making war. The development of technology
and communications, which was also once the preserve of the elite and
the state, has passed into the hands of the population and has become
a key enabler for irregular movements. Devolution has also empowered
state forces: handheld radio and mobile communications enable small
teams and even individuals to enjoy enhanced situational awareness, to
locate targets and to maneuver. Increasing specialization means greater
connectivity; interoperability and devolution are essential for efficient
delivery of effect.
Technological developments continue to enhance precision and
the overwhelming power with which to conduct stand-off attacks with
considerable effect. More precise means of war in the future will nevertheless require more technician-warriors, able to wield these devices
both in defense and offense, such as new generations of antimissile technology and semi-autonomous vehicles. There will need to be multiuse
platforms, able to operate on land, sea, and air, and electronically, and
there are likely to be smaller numbers of highly trained, well-equipped,
and versatile Special Forces, whose vulnerability will be compensated
by a range of support options (in transport, intelligence, fires, expertise, and logistics), but in all these state operations, the emphasis will
be on greater precision alongside concealment, dispersion, and adaptation to the threats of clandestine attack posed by nonstate or proxy
forces. New systems will necessarily be needed to operate with precision
underground, in urban spaces, in high-rise buildings, underwater, and in
space. For the future, forces will need even greater accuracy, and, more
importantly, greater speed of target acquisition than at present, if it is to be
able to destroy terror forces located or operational within populations.
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The ability to inflict nodal or systemic degradation of an enemy’s
capacity to resist, command, or communicate will be a feature of future
war, involving the paralysis of communications, greater emphasis on
informational-psychological, cyber, or, in the future, even neurological
warfare. It will represent a form of stealthy, deniable e-envelopment.
These modes will be part of a wider array of operations against the
principal threats of enemies situated within domestic populations.

Implications for Contemporary Armed Forces

Deductions are difficult, and, in a short article, necessarily selective. Nevertheless, brevity and trenchant assertions can provoke critical
thought, and it is through informed exchanges that we may challenge
assumptions, refine our conclusions and remain alert to misconceptions.
In this spirit, the following concluding thoughts are offered.
Future forces will make use of stealth, systemically operating
through communications networks and through the exploitation of the
vulnerabilities of society. They will use information warfare to spread
fear and panic, but also wage kinetic warfare on and among civilian
populations. Their aim will be to destroy financial systems, infrastructure, and the willingness to sustain resistance. This unconventional
warfare will be more frequent than the sustained, high-intensity wars
of the past, although these, too, may still occur. The weaponization of
space appears to be imminent.
To meet these threats, states have to identify their own vulnerabilities, and take steps to address them, even if this means the reorganization
of their armed forces. Preparation for this diffused, dispersed, devolved
warfare of the future will also mean new civil defense measures. In the
future anti-terror conflict, information and psychological warfare will
be essential. Peacetime preparation is likely to blur with protracted,
sometimes domestic, internal security operations, peacekeeping, and
counterinsurgency or counterterror missions. Armed forces will probably
be deployed on the receipt of specific intelligence in highly mobile and
exceptionally rapid operations. Attacks will resemble raids. Intelligence
will be the mainstay of operations, but targets of opportunity will also
become available fleetingly and will need a fast and precise response to
exploit. Intelligent application of tactical concepts will be vital, but so
will closer liaison with a variety of civilian agencies.
The current trends of war are an incomplete guide to the future
operating environment, but they give some shape to its likely direction.
The themes of porosity; dispersal; depth; stealth; miniaturization of
combat power; privatization of violence; devolution; precision; nodal
systemic operations, and infrastructural vulnerability will occur in a
variety of domains—physical, infrastructural, ideational, and informational, especially with regard to cities and systems. The grammar of
war, in these areas, has changed. Understanding cities and their hinterlands, their morphology, connections, and vulnerabilities gives the
future commander an important advantage whether they are directing
regular, irregular, or proxy forces. Understanding the new connectivity
of systems, be they electronic, urban, resource-based, or informational,
will determine military literacy in the future. Military forces will be
forced to adapt to the new environment or face defeat. One way to
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improve the ability to adapt is to emphasize the importance of innovation, improvisation and adaptation, and use the past as a critical guide
for educational development and institutional change.
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Abstract: For defense departments and professional militaries of
advanced liberal democracies, judgments concerning future armed
conflict are necessary to guide force preparation, personnel readiness, and equipment procurement. When such judgments are made
in times of economic austerity and geopolitical uncertainty, the need
for clarity of thought on the future of war becomes imperative in
determining priorities.
It is not primarily in the present, nor in the past that we live. Our life is an
activity directed towards what is to come. The significance of the present
and the past only becomes clear afterwards in relation to the future.
José Ortega y Gassett

W

hile all advanced military establishments engage in intellectual
examinations about the future of armed conflict, it is often
unclear which intellectual methods actually represent best
futures practice. In any Western officer corps one can find contending
advocates for how best to interpret the future of war. Some argue that
the lens of human experience—filtered through a Clausewitzian-style of
military history as Kritik—is the most sensible way forward; others prefer
the geometrical tradition of Jomini and seek to gain better understanding through science in the form of operations research and technical
experimentation; still others prefer to look to the interdisciplinary subject
of strategic studies as a means of revealing holistic insights on armed
conflict. Further diversity in professional outlook is often imposed by
imperatives of service affiliation and specialized training for the separate
domains of land, sea, and aerospace warfare. Speculation on the future
of war may also be affected by the demands of hierarchical military
culture ranging from idiosyncratic command preferences to the imposition of short-term strategic and operational goals. Not surprisingly, ad hoc
intellectual endeavors can easily dominate military institutions—driven
as much by the interaction of budgets, personalities, and internal compromises—as by objective mental rigor. Such pressures led American
philosopher Lewis Mumford to conclude that military establishments
represent “the refuge of third-rate minds” in which institutional thinking
can be conformist, sometimes dogmatic, and frequently anti-intellectual.1
This article probes the generic intellectual requirements involved in
preparing to consider the problems of future war. Two caveats are immediately required. First, the author makes no claims to having uncovered
any magic formulae for predictive accuracy about future conflicts.
Second, this essay is not a meditation on the full sweep of potential future
military operations from computers through cyberwarfare to climate
change. Rather, it is a reflection on the conceptual demands of dealing
1     Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc, 1934), 95.
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with future armed conflict—what Peter Paret calls the “cognitive challenge of war”—the “how to think” dimension which is the most serious
problem facing any military organization.2 The author believes that, for
armed forces establishments, futures studies, if properly conceived and
conducted, are likely to be particularly valuable over the next decade.
When militaries are faced with an end to a long period of hostilities—
as is the case with the United States and its allies in 2014—they must
embark on rigorous contemplation of the shape of future war. The task
is “to look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the
operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far
enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline
what should be done to meet or anticipate them.”3
With these issues in mind, three areas are analyzed. First, to provide
philosophical and methodological context, the development of modern
futures studies is explored and its intellectual connections to the field of
strategic studies are highlighted. In the second section, the role history
can play in military futures studies is explored. Finally, some speculations on future war are advanced drawing on insights and methods
derived from an appreciation of the interplay between futures studies,
strategic studies, and historical analysis.

Parallel Lives: Futures Studies and Strategic Studies

As a field of scholarly endeavor, futures studies emerged in the 1950s
and coincided with the flowering of the behavioral revolution in the
policy sciences and the creation of research institutions that followed the
invention of nuclear weapons and the evolution of the Cold War. “The
purposes of futures studies,” writes leading Yale sociologist Wendell
Bell, “are to discover or invent, examine and evaluate, and propose possible, probable and preferable futures. The futures field is an integrative science
of reasoning, choosing and acting.”4 The pioneers of futures studies include
such figures as Harold Lasswell, Daniel Bell, and Herman Kahn. The
collective work of these pioneers was concerned with developing the
policy sciences into an interdisciplinary pool of problem-solving methodologies to serve as a guide to future decisionmaking.5 For example,
Lasswell believed the aim of research was to explain past and present
conditions, identify emerging trends, and then to project notions of
alternative possible and probable futures for use by policymakers.6
From Lasswell onward, futures studies became less about attempting a prediction of events and more about forecasting probabilities and
developing educated foresight. Whereas a prediction may be defined as
human anticipation of an occurrence, futures studies are concerned with
defining expectations through the construction of a range of alternative
2     Peter Paret, The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806 (Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2009), 1-3..
3     Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 214.
4     Wendell Bell, Foundations of Futures Studies: History, Purposes, and Knowledge: Human Science for a
New Era, Vol.1 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 51; 53-54. Emphasis added.
5     Ibid, chapters 1-3. For further background on the evolution of the field of futures studies,
see Edward Cornish, Futuring: The Exploration of the Future (Bethseda, MD: World Future Society,
2004); and James A. Dator, ed., Advancing Futures: Futures Studies in Higher Education (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2002).
6     Harold D. Lasswell, “The Policy Orientation,” in The Policy Sciences, eds. D. Lerner and and H.
D. Laswell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1951), 3-15.
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scenarios. In futures studies, the aim is to isolate a preferred path
forward by analyzing the interactions of past experiences and present
realities with likely trends and future goals.7 In the military sphere, and
to paraphrase Gregory Foster, if politics is the art of the possible, then
war must be considered “the science of the preferable.”8
Following in the steps of Lasswell, Herman Kahn, the futurist and nuclear strategist, invented the modern scenario method—a
narrative considering the future drawn from past and present about
alternative possibilities under variable conditions. In Kahn’s words, “a
scenario results from an attempt to describe in more or less detail some
hypothetical sequence of events by imaginative and creative thinking.
Scenarios can emphasize different aspects of future history.9 Kahn’s
intellectual significance was that he helped introduce a logical methodology that made futures thinking imaginable without assuming the
burden of predictability. He recognized that in meeting the challenge
of foresight, scenarios are not predictors but indicators of how different driving forces can manipulate the future in different directions. By
the end of the 1970s, variants of Kahn’s scenario approach had been
adopted for corporate strategy development in leading businesses. As
Peter Schwartz has explained, a scenario is “a tool for ordering one’s
perceptions about alternative future environments in which one’s decisions might be played out.”10
Since the 1970s, forms of futures studies have become a staple of
large organizations in both the public and private sectors and methodologies have proliferated. John Naisbitt developed the concept of
identifying megatrends; in the Pentagon, Andrew Marshall evolved the
practice of net assessment to identify patterns in long-term strategic competition; in the RAND Corporation, researchers developed approaches
ranging from the Delphi survey technique to assumption-based planning.11 More recently, complexity science and nonlinear chaos theory
dealing with stochastic behavior in systems have emerged as factors in
futures studies.12 In 2003, the United Nations University published a
comprehensive handbook, Futures Research Methodolog y, highlighting the
most common techniques in use.13 University teaching in the field tends
7     Cornish, Futuring: The Exploration of the Future, 1-8; 78-79; 213; Stephen M. Millett, Managing
the Future: A Guide to Forecasting and Strategic Planning in the 21st Century (Devon: Triarchy Press, 2011),
29-30; 268-69.
8     Gregory D. Foster, “The Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy,” The Washington
Quarterly (Winter 1990): 1, 54.
9     Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962), 150,
152.
10     Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World (New York:
Currency/Doubleday, 1991), 4; Peter C. Bishop and Andy Hines, Teaching about the Future (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), passim.
11     John Naisbitt, Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives (New York: Warner, 1982);
Stephen Peter Rosen, “Net Assessment as an Analytical Concept,” in Andrew W. Marshall, J. J.
Martin and Henry S. Rowen, eds., On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in
Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 283-301; Thomas R.
Stewart, “The Delphi Technique and Judgmental Forecasting,” in K. C. Land and S. H. Schneider,
eds., Forecasting in the Social Sciences (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1987), 97-113; James A. Dewar,
Assumption-Based Planning: A Tool for Reducing Avoidable Surprises (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998).
12     Antoine J. Bouquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), chapters 5-7.
13     Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. Gordon, Futures Research Methodology (Washington, DC:
American Council for the United Nations University, 2003).
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to encompass such skills as trend analysis; the uses of forecasting and
backcasting; causal layered analysis; the employment of survey research;
simulation and computer modeling; gaming; and the construction of
robust and optimal scenarios.14
However, despite a global proliferation of techniques, futures studies
continue to invoke skepticism from many scholars for three reasons.
First, there is the problem of prediction. For many critics attempts at
forecasting are seen as futile. As Arthur C. Clark once put it, “it is impossible to predict the future and all attempts to do so in any detail appear
ludicrous within a few years.”15 A cursory glance at military history
demonstrates this reality. No Western strategist foresaw the crises of
9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, or the unfolding drama of the Arab Spring. “It
is simply not possible,” wrote two writers on military affairs, “to rule out
certain kinds of conflict in advance, no matter how unlikely they may
seem at any given moment.”16 Yet, even if accurate prediction is nigh
impossible, governments and organizations still require what Nicholas
Rescher calls a “philosophical anthropology of forecasting.”17 Although
the future may be observationally inaccessible, it is, in part, cognitively
accessible because trends can be identified and extrapolated from the
present. Yet such cognitive accessibility is no guarantee that trend analysis will produce accurate projections.18 This dilemma is well illustrated
by the problems experienced in Western intelligence analysis after 1989:
The major intelligence failure since the end of the Cold War was not 9/11
or the wayward estimates of Iraqi WMD. . . . Instead it was the startling lack
of attention given to the rise of irregular warfare—including insurgency,
warlordism and the ‘new terrorism’. Transnational violence by non-state
groups was the emerging future challenge of the 1990s.19

Despite the risk of misjudgments, Western governments have no
choice but to rely upon methods of strategic forecasting to inform
policymaking. Inaccuracy can often be attributed to human error, institutional torpor, and flawed organizational learning. Many intellectual
problems in forecasting arise “not from failure to predict events per se
but rather the failure to realize the significance—the predictive value—of
antecedents or triggers.”20
The second reason for skepticism about futures studies concerns
the problem that as a field they appear to lack any proper foundation in
espistemology—that is a theory of knowledge.21 Here Bertrand Russell’s
1924 version of Occam’s razor comes into play, “whenever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown
14     Andy Hines and Peter Bishop, eds., Thinking about the Future: Guidelines for Strategic Foresight
(Washington, DC: Social Technologies, LLC, 2006).
15     Arthur C. Clarke, quoted in Nick Deshpande, “Seven Sinister Strategic Trends: A Brief
Examination of Events to Come,” Canadian Military Journal 11, no. 4 (Autumn 2011): 4, 15.
16     Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan, Ground Truth: The Future of US Land Power
(Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2009), 37.
17     Nicholas Rescher, Predicting the Future: An Introduction to the Art of Forecasting, (Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1998), 11.
18     Ibid., 53-55; 70; 86.
19     Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark, “Preface: Intelligence, History
and Policy,” in Andrew, Aldrich and Work, eds, Secret Intelligence: a Reader (New York: Routledge,
2009), xv.
20     Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 140. Emphasis added.
21     Bell, Foundations of Futures Studies, Vol 1, 166-67; 191-238.
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entities.”22 For skeptics, the very idea of gaining knowledge of the future
from the unknown seems counterintuitive. After all, beyond death,
taxes, and Hollywood movies, the future is simply nonevidential. Only
in a Hollywood version of The Three Musketeers can a courtier possess the
prescience to change seventeenth century history by informing Cardinal
Richelieu: “Your Eminence, the Thirty Years War has just begun.”23 In
futures studies there are no facts, no archives to examine, no participants to interrogate. Those who speculate on what might occur must
face the paradox that they must draw on past and present evidence to
develop “surrogate knowledge” about the future—a knowledge based
as much on intuition and speculation as logic drawn from an evidentiary
base.24 Such concerns relate directly to the third reason for scholarly
unease about futures studies—namely that the field lacks proper academic quality control and contains too many eccentric manifestations of
intellectual behavior. From Nostradamus to Nancy Reagan’s astrologers,
assorted seers and media gurus have proliferated. As Herman Kahn recognized in the mid-1970s, popular futurology by attracting “fashionable,
banal, polemical and sometimes even charlatanical elements” threatens
the credibility of futures studies.25
The above objections notwithstanding, a solid case can be made that
serious futures studies—as conducted by universities and governmental
institutions—remain essential for progress. Without a perspective on the
future, forward-looking policy and resource allocation simply cannot be
determined. However, futures studies must be based on intellectual rigor
and plausibility. They must involve the identification and extension of
predesigned factors—factors that exist in present structures and whose
rapid development in the future is both plausible and imaginable.26 For
example, from the Greek fable of Icarus in the ancient world to the
balloons of the Montgolfiers in the Enlightenment, humans dreamed of
conquering the air. Yet it was only with the Wright brothers’ aircraft in
1903 that development of manned flight became a feasible proposition.
Conducted with mental rigor and with a keen eye for context,
conjectures about the future often represent a form of presumptive
truth—truth which is accepted at a given time as guidance but whose
logic cannot be completely verified as accurate using available facts.27
In formulating presumptive truth about the future, policymakers are
not entirely without skills and resources. The future is not completely
unknown; there are constants at work in the present that can act as
guides through the mists of the unknown. What French philosopher
and strategic thinker Raymond Aron once called “the intelligibility of
probabilistic determinism”—in the form of patterns of social order,
value systems, and cultural behavior derived from the past and operative
in the present—can provide conditional expectations about the shape of
22     Bertrand Russell, “Logical Atomism,” in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, D. F. Pears, ed,
(Chicago: Open Court, 1985), 160.
23     Colin S. Gray, “Coping With Uncertainty: Dilemmas of Defence Planning,” British Army
Review (Autumn 2007), no. 143, 36. Like “play it again Sam” in Casablanca, this line from the 1948
film, The Three Musketeers seems to be apocryphal but it captures the point.
24     Bell, Foundations of Futures Studies, Vol.1, 236-38.
25     Herman Kahn, “On Studying the Future,” in Handbook of Political Science: Vol 7, Strategies of
Inquiry, eds. F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 405-06.
26     Rescher, Predicting the Future, 69-70.
27     Bell, Foundations of Futures Studies, Vol. 1, 149-50; 112.
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the future.28 Imagining the future in this way is feasible because human
society is, in turn, a system of purposive actors whose interactions
actively shape and create the process of change.29 Philosophically, the
future, then, resembles a set of contending outcomes rather than a single
predetermined destination.
The notion of a society as purposive actors attempting to speculate
on the future is particularly strong when it comes to the problem of
war—a situation reinforced over the past seventy years by the existence
of nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly, futures studies and the evolution
of modern strategic studies have been closely related as parallel endeavors. Indeed, the futures and strategic studies fields share a number of
common characteristics. First, in both fields, prospective thinking about
the future is seen as an indispensable skill. Second, both areas have a
strong policy orientation and many practitioners tend to see themselves
not just as scholars but also as “action-intellectuals.”30 Third, both futures
and strategic studies possess an interdisciplinary focus for the purposes
of problem solving. Fourth, there is considerable cross-fertilization in
methodologies with both futures studies and strategic studies employing common approaches such as trend analysis, gaming, and scenario
construction. Finally, both fields often employ historical analysis as an
important database to link the past and the present to the future.31
It is no accident, then, that Herman Kahn was both a futurist and
a nuclear strategist; or that Andrew W. Marshall, long-time head of the
Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, has spent his career identifying future strategic challenges to the United States; or that Andrew F.
Krepinevich, director of the Center for Budgetary and Strategic Analysis,
should have written a book in 2009 speculating on future global crises.32
There is a direct line of intellectual convergence in futures and strategic
studies from Kahn through Marshall to Krepinevich. Moreover, some
of the main philosophical assumptions from futures studies transfer
directly to strategic studies. For example, notions of presumptive truth
and surrogate knowledge have been central in strategic thinking about
how to manage the nuclear weapons revolution. Since a nuclear war has
mercifully not been fought, much of the epistemology of nuclear age
strategic thought—in the form of theories of deterrence, escalation, and
limited war—are clearly based on forms of presumptive truth.33

28     Raymond Aron, “Three Forms of Historical Intelligibility,” in idem, Politics and History (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1984), 61, 47-59.
29     Bell, Foundations of Futures Studies, Vol. 1, 159.
30     Roman Kolkowicz, “Intellectuals and the Nuclear Deterrence System,” in The Logic of Nuclear
Terror, ed. Roman Kolkowicz (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 15-46; Bell, Foundations of Futures
Studies, Vol. 1, 189.
31     Dator, Advancing Futures: Futures Studies in Higher Education and Thomas G. Mahnken and
Joseph A. Maiolo, eds, Strategic Studies: A Reader (New York: Routledge, 2008).
32     Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Andrew W. Marshall, “Strategy as a Profession
for Future Generations,” in On Not Confusing Ourselves, Marshall, Martin and Rowen, 302-11; Andrew
F. Krepinevich, 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century (New York:
Bantam, 2009).
33     From the vast theoretical literature, see especially Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), chapters 12-13 and Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of
Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
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The Use of History in Futures Studies

Few academic historians today would accept the views of military
thinkers, B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller that the main aim of
historical study is to illuminate patterns in understanding future war.
Liddell Hart was convinced that, “the practical value of history is to
throw the film of the past through the material projector of the present
on to the screen of the future.”34 Similarly, Fuller wrote, “unless history
can teach us how to look at the future, the history of war is but a bloody
romance.”35 These utilitarian ideas are today seen as the antithesis of
sound historical practice. “To professional historians,” wrote one
soldier-scholar, “the idea of history having a direct utility seems a bit
odd, bordering on some form of historiographic and epistemological
naïveté.”36
How then should military professionals and defense analysts concerned with pondering war in the context of futures studies use the
discipline of history in general, and military history in particular? First,
they must understand that any study of the future of war must rest on
a firm foundation of historical knowledge.37 Military professionals need
to learn to think in terms of integrating the functional (the application of
historically informed military expertise) and the dialectical (knowledge
of the interactions of the past, present, and future) and to understand
how the interplay of continuities and contingencies on these two planes
determine outcomes.38 There has never been a better statement on the
relationship between the use of history and forming a vision of future
war than that advanced by General Donn A. Starry:
The purpose of history is to inform our judgments of the future; to constitute an informed vision; guide our idea of where we want to go; how best
to get from where we are (and have been) to where we believe we must be.
Implicit is the notion that change—evolution (perhaps minor revolution) is
both necessary and possible.39

Second, in approaching the use of history, military professionals
must accept that their requirements are legitimately different from
those of professional scholars. For most military practitioners, history
is of interest less as a pure academic discipline and more as an applied
laboratory of knowledge. A soldier’s principal interest in the past is to
use it to gain insights of professional value in preparing for, and conducting, the art of war in the present and the future. If the scholarly
world seeks to reconstruct history in the pure spirit of Ranke, the armed
forces seek to reveal its secrets in the applied spirit of Liddell Hart. In
an applied process, some form of military historicism —that is history
as evidence and illustration becomes inevitable—if only because the

34     Liddell Hart, the Remaking of Modern Armies (London: John Murray, 1927), 173.
35     J. F. C. Fuller, British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century (London: Hutchinson, 1925), 242-43.
36     Harald Høiback, Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge, 2013), 80.
37     Williamson Murray, “History, War and the Future,” Orbis 52, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 544-63.
38     Dominick Graham, “Stress Lines and Gray Areas: The Utility of the Historical Method to the
Military Profession,” in Military History and the Military Profession, eds. David A. Charters, Marc Milner,
and J. Brent Wilson (Westport CT: Praeger, 1992), 148-58.
39     General Donn A. Starry, “A Perspective on American Military Thought,” Military Review 69
(July 1989): vii, 3.
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conceptualization of war represents a dialogue between the past and the
present aimed at illuminating the future.40
Third, to help make an applied approach to history intellectually
useful in futures studies, military professionals need to cultivate a capacity to think across time. As a philosophical position, they should adopt
as their guide the mantra of R. G. Collingwood that “the present is the
actual; the past is the necessary; the future is the possible.”41 A professional historian who has specifically sought to align historical method
to futures studies is David Staley and his work is instructive for military practitioners. “Historical method,” Staley argues, “is an excellent
way to think about and represent the future in the classical sense of
historia, a cognitive intellectual inquiry.”42 He seeks to link the seen (the
present and the past) to the unseen (the future). All three zones of time
are intertwined and intelligent speculation is possible exactly because
there are pre-designed factors in the structure of the present. Staley
identifies intellectual similarities between the historical method and the
scenario method. Both are attempts at reconstruction and are therefore
essentially representations rather than realities; both must be sensitive to
context, complexity, and contingency; both employ analogies as indicators of similiarity in the midst of apparent difference. Finally, given the
absence of direct experience, historians and scenarists both construct
mental maps of the past and future respectively.43
Most scenario-building in futures studies involves the use of synchronic narratives (those that describe bounded structures and relations
in a given time and space) as opposed to diachronic narratives (those
that describe changing events over time). Staley suggests that historians can enrich scenario-construction when they employ a synchronic
narrative with a sophisticated historical understanding of plausible
situations.44 Futures studies should, therefore, use history to construct
a structural anthropology of the future—an approach which is focused
more on examining environments and less on seeking to foresee events. In
scholarly terms, this is the historical method favored by Fernand Braudel
and the French Annales school who believed that the history of social
structures was more significant for human understanding of change
than the sudden fluctuations caused by wild card, unexpected events.45
Staley concludes that, in futures studies, empirical historical methodology is “in many ways better than that traditionally employed by social
scientists and other scientifically minded futurists.”46 Staley’s linkage of
historical method to futures studies in general, and to scenario-building
in particular, especially his focus on issues of plausibility and synchronic
narrative, are techniques that should be studied by any military officers
engaged in speculating on future war.

40     Høiback, Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach, 78-85.
41     R. G. Collingwood, “Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 1926” in The Idea of History: With
Lectures 1926-1928, ed. J. van der Dussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 412-13.
42     David J. Staley, History and Future: Using Historical Thinking to Imagine the Future (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2007), 2; 48.
43     Ibid., 11-12; 57-60.
44     Ibid, 70-84.
45     Ibid., 71-73; Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), 28-31.
46     Staley, History and Future, 2.
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A useful companion to Staley’s integration of historical method and
futures studies is contemplation of the growing literature on counterfactual thinking.47 A counterfactual is “any subjunctive conditional in
which the antecedent is known to be false.”48 “What if” counterfactual
reasoning is a highly underrated asset in the training of military professionals involved in futures analysis. Unlike a future scenario that uses
conjectural knowledge, a historical counterfactual thought experiment—for
example, conceiving of Confederate victory in the American Civil
War—operates with confirmed knowledge of what actually occurred and
then proceeds to think about a different outcome. In scenario-building,
backcasting may be employed in which one posits a desirable future and
then works backwards to identify actions that will connect the future
to the present. In contrast, those involved in developing a historical
counterfactual must learn to treat known moments in the past as if they
are like the present with only limited foreknowledge of the future. The
use of subjunctive thinking (the employment of imagination) and the
disciplined need for ensuring plausibility and probability in historical
counterfactuals, make them useful learning devices and mind-set changers for scenario development in futures analysis.49
Ultimately, the value of historical knowledge in futures studies,
particularly in the military realm, lies in its demonstration that there is
no single future and that many alternatives beckon. Indeed, the intimate
relationship between historical knowledge and futures studies is vividly
captured in the Jorge Luis Borges story, “The Garden of Forking Paths.”
In this tale, a Chinese sage, Tsu’i Pen, invents an invisible garden labyrinth in which “time forks perpetually toward innumerable futures.” 50
The Chinese master chooses one path, and eliminates others to produce
multiple outcomes. By human agency, he partially constructs the future
by a choice of alternatives from among the forking paths. Today, in
attempting to think incisively across time, make value judgments, and
construct alternative courses of action, the work of a military futures
specialist is not unlike that of Borges’s sage.

Speculations on Future War

Having established the anatomy of futures studies, we must contemplate how such studies can be employed in examining the future of war
beyond Afghanistan. Predictions on future war may be impossible but
rational anticipation through research and organizational learning are
required to improve understanding and readiness. The aim of futures
studies in the armed forces must be to enhance institutional creativity for

47     Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Niall Ferguson, ed., Virtual History: Alternatives and
Counterfactuals (London: Picador, 1997); Philip E. Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow and Geoffrey Parker
eds, Unmaking the West: ‘What If ’ Scenarios That Rewrite World History (Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, 2006); and Richard J. Evans, Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History (Waltham, MS:
Brandeis University Press, 2013).
48     James Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics
43 (1991): 169-95.
49     Steven Weber, “Counterfactuals, Past and Present,” in Tetlock and Belkin, Counterfactual
Thought Experiments in World Politics, 268-90.
50     Jorge Luis Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths,” in idem, Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other
Writings (New York: New Directions, 2007), 28; 19-29.

86

Parameters 44(1) Spring 2014

theorizing about war in the pursuit of long-term military effectiveness.51
Colin Gray puts the intellectual challenge well when he writes, “we know
a great deal about future war, warfare, and strategy. What we do not know
are any details about future wars, warfare episodes, and strategies.”52
When applied to analyzing military conflict, futures studies should
draw on its own cognitive corpus reinforced by knowledge from strategic
studies and history to facilitate holistic analysis. Such an interdisciplinary merger yields a useful set of mental tools ranging from trend analysis
and scenario development to concepts of presumptive truth, surrogate
knowledge, and predesigned factors through to the notion of society as
a system of purposive actors governed by the intelligibility of a probabilistic determinism. A focus on building historical knowledge yields
a number of key approaches. These include thinking across time both
functionally and dialectically; the construction of synchronic narratives
for environmental rather than predictive event analysis; and the use of
historical logic for case study analysis including a capacity for counterfactual thinking.
In an era in which digital networks, precision weapons, and media
penetration are transforming the geography of conflict into diffuse
forms; where the domains of space and cyber are emerging alongside
the increased automation of war from robotics to unmanned systems;
and an array of global-regional inflection points make intersected crises
more likely—the application of imaginative and robust futures studies
is imperative. To demonstrate how some of the conceptual tools and
techniques of futures studies might be applied to thinking about war,
contending contemporary views about armed conflict are examined.
This is a contested area which reveals much about the factors shaping
future war—ranging from continued globalization through transformational geopolitics to the challenge of rapid demographic change.

Contending Views of Future War: Radicals, Traditionalists, and Integrationists

Over the last decade there has been no Western consensus on the
future of war. Rather, there has been a split in thinking among three
loose schools of thought: radicals, traditionalists, and integrationists. The
radicals constitute a group who see the future of war largely in irregular
terms related to the impact of globalization. The traditionalists continue
to uphold the primacy of conventional conflict and are inclined toward
seeing the future of war in terms of great powers and transformational
geopolitics. The integrationists believe the intersection of globalized
conditions, transformational geopolitics, and changing demographic
patterns will produce a world in which modes of armed conflict will
overlap and merge. For analysts involved in the professional study of
armed conflict, the premises and beliefs of the radicals, traditionalists,
and integrationists of future war need to be carefully interrogated.

The Radicals: The Regularity of Irregular War

Those who argue in favor of a future marked by irregular warfare
believe there has been a paradigm shift away from conventional conflict.
51     Richard W. Woodman, John E. Sawyer, and Ricky W. Griffith, “Toward a Theory of
Organizational Creativity,” Academy of Management Review 18, no. 2 (April 1993): 293.
52     Colin S. Gray, “The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War,” Parameters,
37, no. 4 (Winter 2008-2009): 17. Emphasis added.
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They point to the over-preoccupation of Western militaries in the
1990s with high-technology and information warfare theory as proof
of failure to anticipate the asymmetrical challenges of the post 9/11 era
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their theoretical touchstone is Rupert Smith’s
“war amongst the people” in which nonstate actors and assorted indigenous forces in failing states combine to create protracted campaigns
of combat and stabilization.53 Leading international advocates of this
view of future war include David Richards, a former Chief of the British
Defense Staff; Greg Mills and Vincent Desportes; and, in the United
States, scholars such as John Nagl and John Arquilla.54 Much of the
prevailing attitude is summed up by Richards and Mills in their introduction to the book, Victory Among People:
Conventional war is a thing of the past. Such is one lesson from Afghanistan
and Iraq. This appears even true for those countries that possess a considerable array of conventional weaponry. Why should they risk everything in a
conventional attack, if they can instead achieve their aims through the use
of proxies, or through economic subterfuge and cyber-warfare?55

These beliefs are shared by many in the French military. For example,
General Vincent Desportes writes that “the symmetrical war is dead,
or at least the chances of it happening are negligible” making irregular
war the reality for the foreseeable future.56 American thinking can be
found in the work of the so-called “COINdinista,” or irregular school
of thought, in which the central argument is a need to restructure US
forces for sustained counterinsurgency and stabilization operations on
the basis that “our [US] capacity to win the wars we are not fighting far
exceeds our ability to win the ones in which we are currently engaged.”57
The argument appears to be that, given the frequency of irregular conflict, “the long debate between the leading conventional and irregular
thinkers . . . seems finally over. The irregulars have won.”58
The above views require careful examination by futures specialists
simply because the idea of “the regularity of irregular warfare” conflates
tactical asymmetry with strategic difference and detracts from a holistic
understanding of war.59 Despite the predominance of irregular warfare
over the last decade, the notion that long-term, expensive, populationcentric counterinsurgency must be adopted was deeply problematic for
both military and political reasons.60 This development can, in part, be
53     General Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London:
Allen Lane, 2005).
54     David Richards and Greg Mills, eds,Victory Among People: Lessons from Countering Insurgency and
Stabilising Fragile States (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies,
2011); General Vincent Desportes, Tomorrow’s War: Thinking Otherwise (Paris, Economica, 2009); John
Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 2005); John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular
Warfare Have Shaped Our World (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011)
55     Richards and Mills, “Introduction in idem,” Victory Among People, 1.
56     Desportes, Tomorrow’s War, 27; 41.
57     John Nagl and Brian M. Burton, “Dirty Windows and Burning Houses: Setting the Record
Straight on Irregular Warfare,” Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (April 2009): 98.
58     Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits, 279-80.
59     W. Alexander Vacca and Mark Davidson, “The Regularity of Irregular Warfare,” Parameters
42, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 18-28.
60     For a critique see David Ucko, “Whither Counterinsurgency: The Rise and Fall of a Divisive
Concept,” in The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, ed. Paul B. Rich and Isabelle
Duyvesteyn (New York: Routledge, 2012), 67-79; US Army, ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations
(Washington DC: Department of the Army, October 2011)
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attributed to the typology of theorizing in the decade from 2004-14,
much of which was based on forms of presumptive truth, surrogate, and
conjectural knowledge drawn from flawed historical analogies.
A futures analyst might note that, in the revival of counterinsurgency after 2004, most historical lessons were drawn from twentieth
century colonial-domestic conflicts such as Malaya and Algeria rather
than from more relevant expeditionary-interventionist conflicts such as
Vietnam. A close examination of US intervention in Vietnam would have
revealed the basic flaw in post-2006 counterinsurgency: the problem of
weak host regimes. The conclusion of Charles Maechling Jr, Lyndon
Johnson’s advisor on counterinsurgency in Vietnam, resonates when it
comes to the expeditionary-interventionist approach adopted in fighting
insurgents in Afghanistan:
COIN in theory failed in practice [in Vietnam] since it had to be implemented by an unpopular, unrepresentative local regime. Moreover, the
presumption by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in supposing
that middle-grade US Army officers and civil servants from the American
heartland could create a viable rural society in a primitive and densely populated Asian country in the middle of a civil war is staggering. There was no
way for the Americans to get beneath the surface of Vietnamese life.61

To use the language of futures studies, the weakness of the centralized Karzai regime in ethnically diverse Afghanistan represents a
classic predesigned factor in a decentralized tribal society. Progress has
been difficult for the intervening Western forces in Afghanistan since,
to quote Maechling again, “dependence on a weak central government
[represents] the old horror of responsibility without authority elevated
to the plane of high strategy.”62 In recent counterinsurgency efforts, if
Charles Maechling’s strategic warnings and the “deadly paradigms”
identified by counterinsurgency scholars such as D. Michael Shafer had
been studied—rather than the tactical techniques of David Galula and
John Nagl—a deeper understanding of actual conflict environments rather
than merely the pattern of military events might have occurred in the
decade 2004-14.63
In dissecting the notion of an alleged dominant irregular paradigm
in future war, military analysts need to avoid over-determinism and
historicism in their prospective thinking and focus on discretionary
forms that Western counterinsurgency might assume in the years ahead.
While the 2012 US Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis publication, Decade of War may be correct to state that “operations other than
conventional warfare will represent the prevalent form of warfare in the
future,” prevalence is not a determinant of intervention.64 The document’s recommendations that the United States and its allies focus on
environmental knowledge, improved language-culture skills, interagency
coordination, and better special operations and general purpose force
61     Charles Maechling, Jr., “Counterinsurgency: The First Ordeal by Fire” in Low Intensity Warfare:
Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Antiterrorism in the 1980s, eds. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh
(New York, Pantheon, 1987), 46.
62     Charles Maechling, Jr., “Our Internal Defense Policy—A Reappraisal,) Foreign Service Journal
(January 1969): 27.
63     Michael D. Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1988).
64     Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from the Past
Decade of Operations (Suffolk VA: Division of the Joint Staff, 15 June 2012), 7.
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integration and military assistance (foreign internal defense and security
force assistance) are useful—but such measures are all contingent on the
rationale of strategic choice.65
Military analysts need to remember that irregular conflict has many
conceptual manifestations that require careful case-by-case treatment in
the spirit of Staley’s structural anthropology of the future—from jungle
through mountain to city—and these require synchronic forms of
operational analysis. For example, future special operations and general
purpose forces integration need to be accompanied by an appreciation
that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are less blended than distinct modes of military activity that can operate at cross-purposes if
improperly applied. In an interventionist campaign, a counterinsurgency
approach is designed to build the political capital of a host government
while a counterterrorism approach requires that a host government use
its political capital in authorizing kill-capture missions by external forces
that may further erode its support base.66
Future war analysts surveying the problem of irregular conflict
require a balanced perspective: one that avoids the institutional amnesia
of the post-Vietnam era but does not exaggerate the importance of this
field of armed conflict. Analysts must pay special attention to political
dynamics and to the development of indirect approaches by external
intervention forces. In particular, they must treat the proposition that
war among the people represents the future of war as simply a form of
conjectural knowledge and subject it to case studies using synchronic
analysis aimed at determining actual environmental conditions and identifying any predesigned factors. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be
used as conclusive evidence that insurgency per se represents the future
of armed conflict; nor should recent conflicts be used by professional
militaries to benchmark their military effectiveness, especially when
most irregular adversaries are devoid of close air support, advanced
missiles, and combined arms formations.

Traditionalists: Conventional War as the Gold Standard

In examining the second view of future war, the traditionalist
approach that upholds the primacy of conventional conflict, military
futures analysts need to be equally rigorous. While it is certainly true
that conventional war looms as the most serious, if not the most likely,
test for armed forces, it is much less clear what forms it might assume in
the years to come. The case for a strategic future dominated by powerful
states was set out by Philip Bobbitt as early as 2002 when he wrote in
the wake of the 9/11 attacks: “I strongly believe the greatest threats to
American security in the early twenty-first century will come from powerful, technologically sophisticated states—not from ‘rogues,’ whether
they be small states or large groups of bandits.”67
Since that time, military analysts such as Michael Mazaar and Gian
Gentile and historians such as Douglas Porch have condemned America’s
preoccupation with irregular conflict as a folly which can only degrade
65     Ibid., 1-2; 7-10.
66     Michael J. Boyle, “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?” International
Affairs 86, no. 2 (March 2010): 333-53.
67     Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2002), 315.
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core military skills and strain the operational depth of the armed forces.68
The concerns of American traditionalists are shared in other militaries.
In a reflection on modern joint operations, the British general serving
as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) reflected
on how a preoccupation with counterinsurgency prejudiced the Israeli
military’s capacity for armored warfare in Lebanon in 2006:
The Israelis failed to grasp the opportunity to employ manoeuvre to isolate
and destroy Hezbollah. . . . An [Israeli] Army which was once seen as the
exemplar of bold manoeuvre but which had adapted for enduring COIN
operations in the occupied territories had lost its collective understanding
of the art of manoeuvre, particularly armoured manoeuvre, at formation
level.69

Traditionalists are concerned with conventional warfare challenges
in which high-technology and weapons platforms are dominant from
ballistic missiles to anti-satellite weapons through submarines and aircraft carriers to unmanned systems, cyberwarfare, and anti-access and
area denial (A2AD) capabilities. They would be heartened by the content
of the 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept and by the ideas of the 2012
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations.
The latter document outlines much that is important in conventional
war including digital collaboration, global agility, joint flexibility, crossdomain synergy for focused combat power, cyberwarfare, precision
strike, and information operations.70
Many traditionalists, particularly those associated with navies and
aerospace power, view the rise of China as the central strategic challenge
facing the United States and its allies in the coming decades. The literature on China’s military rise is vast and is outside the analytical scope
of this article. It is sufficient to note that much contemporary American
strategic assessment of China is a heady brew of Western realism that
bears more than a passing resemblance to the Europe of 1914-1945.
Indeed, the scholarship on an Asian Europe by leading social scientists
such as John J. Mearsheimer and Aaron L. Friedberg represents an interesting exercise in Western probabilistic determinism.71
However, for military analysts, Occidental historical analogues
regarding China must be treated as no more than a combination of
presumptive truth mixed with historicism. China remains a society of
purposive actors who are heirs to an ancient Confucian civilization and
its military modernization trajectory is neither that of Imperial Germany
nor a delayed duplicate of Meiji Japan. Military futures specialists need
to ponder carefully Asia’s own martial history by thinking in functional
and dialectical time streams that consider the military implications
68     Michael Mazarr, “The Folly of “Asymmetric War” Washington Quarterly 31, no. 3 (Summer
2008): 33-53; Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: The
Free Press, 2013); Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of a New Way of War (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
69     General Sir Richard Shirreff, “Conducting Joint Operations” in The Oxford Handbook of War,
eds. Julian Lindley-French and Yves Boyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 379.
70     US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: JCS,
January 2012), 14-27; 33-36; and Capstone Concept for Joint Operations; Joint Force 2020 (Washington,
DC: JCS, September 2012), 4-14.
71     John Mearsheimer, “The Rise of China Will Not be Peaceful,” The Australian, 18 November,
2005, 10; John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W, Norton, 2001);
Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New
York: W. W. Norton, 2011).
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of David C. Kang’s celebrated counterfactual challenge to American
realists: “I wondered why we would use Europe’s past—rather than
Asia’s own past—to explore Asia’s future.” 72 In short, China’s military
modernization needs to be carefully situated in a study of Sinological
strategic culture in all its indigenous complexity—ranging from the
cultural realism of Alastair Iain Johnston through the cultural exceptionalism of Yuan-Kang Wang to Mikael Weissmann’s “mystery of the
East Asian peace.” 73
Finally, we need to remember that, unlike the conventional wars
with Iraq in 1990-91 and 2003, a US military confrontation with China
in Asia would ultimately be a collision between two nuclear-armed
states. If such a confrontation escalated, it would represent a global crisis
of a magnitude not seen since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. For these
reasons, the likelihood of conventional armed conflict between the
United States and China—whether couched in terms of air-sea battle
doctrine or joint anti-access concepts—remains remote. As strategist,
Edward N. Luttwak, warns:
Large [US] military expenditures aimed at China must . . . be closely questioned. . . . Nothing resembling a general China/anti-China war with armies
in the field, naval battles, and conventional air bombardments is possible in
the nuclear age. China may be making exactly the same colossal error that
Imperial Germany did after 1890, but this is not a devolution that ends with
another 1914, another war of destruction. The existence of nuclear weapons does
not preclude all combat between those who have them, but does severely limit its forms.74

It is incumbent on those who see China as a long-term antagonist
of the United States to make their case not just in terms of conventional
capabilities but in the context of deeper currents of military rivalry,
ideological conflict, economic competition, strategic culture, and geopolitics. If such a multi-layered, synchronic analysis is not performed
convincingly, then distorted forms of conjectural and surrogate knowledge from preconceived notions of Sinology may come to dominate
American strategy.

Integrationists: The Confluence of Warfare

A third group of thinkers on future war are the integrationists
who view the coming of globalization and its interaction with geopolitical change and demographics as facilitating a conventional and
unconventional spectrum of armed conflict involving both nonstate
and state actors. The world of the integrationists is one in which lethal
technologies ranging from battlespace drones to battlefield improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) coexist. As senior US defense officials from
Robert Gates to William Lynn have noted, the categories of war are
blurring into “hybrid or more complex forms of warfare” and the
consequent “increase in lethality across the threat spectrum means we
72     David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2007), xi.
73     Alastair Iain Johnstone, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Yuan-Kang Wang, Harmony and War: Confucian
Culture and Chinese Power Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Mikhael Weissmann,
The East Asian Peace: Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
74     Edward N, Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy (New York: Belknap Press of
Harvard UP, 2012). 98. Emphasis added.
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cannot prepare for either a high-end conflict with a potential near-peer
competitor or a lower-end conflict with a counterinsurgency focus.” 75
This multi-mode, or hybrid understanding of war, is reflected in the
January 2012 document Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense which outlines a broad range of tasks from countering
irregular conflict through A2AD and nuclear deterrence to stabilization
tasks.76 After two long counterinsurgency campaigns, the US Army is
moving towards a greater notion of unified and full-spectrum operations in which it is “capable of defeating or destroying a hybrid threat,
defined as a diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal elements or some combination thereof, unified to
achieve mutually benefiting effects.” 77 A hybrid view of future conflict, a
confluence of warfare, has gradually become a form of received wisdom
in the English-speaking West. The National Intelligence Council’s Global
Trends 2030 states that while great power conflicts remain unlikely, “the
risks of interstate conflict are increasing [due] to changes in the international system.” However, it cautions, “if future state-on-state conflicts
occur, they will most likely involve multiple forms of warfare.”78 This is
a view shared by the British defense establishment.79
It is most important for military futures analysts to note that hybrid
warfare did not suddenly appear with Hezbollah in the Lebanon conflict of 2006. Historically, the phenomenon has long roots and was
encountered in China during the Chinese civil war of 1946-49; in South
Vietnam in the form of simultaneous Viet Cong guerrilla cadres and
North Vietnamese main force units; and in Sri Lanka with the multidimensional campaign of the Tamil Tigers. The concept of hybridity in war
has received little attention in the United States until recently perhaps
because of the neglect of Vietnam as a field of study by the professional
military. It is an interesting counterfactual thought experiment to consider that, if the United States had succeeded strategically in Vietnam,
whether the hybrid character of the Viet Cong-North Vietnamese enemy
would have been more fully appreciated and understood.
There is much to be considered by futures specialists in hybrid
manifestations of armed conflict, not least in the demographic implications of merged aspects of armed conflict in the urban realm. Between
2015 and 2030, up to one billion people are expected to move from
rural areas into cities and towns throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. The global population will expand from 7.1 to 8.3 billion with
over sixty percent living in urban areas characterized by an unequal
and multi-speed global economy, increased social fragmentation, and
pervasive social media.80 The phenomenon of a global urban transi75     Robert M. Gates, “The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance,” Joint Force
Quarterly (January 2009), 52, 1st Quarter, 5; William J. Lynn, III, “Global Security Forum 2011
Keynote Address,” (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 June 2011) at
csis.org/files/attachments/110608_gsf_plenary-transcript pdf
76     Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), 3-8.
77     Association of the US Army, US Army Training for Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC:
Institute of Land Warfare, September 2011), 8.
78     Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, 53-55; 65. Emphasis added.
79     United Kingdom, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, October 2010), 16.
80     Jack A. Goldstone, “The New Population Bomb: The Four Megatrends That Will Change the
World,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (January-February 2010): 31-43.
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tion will yield a rich field in trend analysis, scenario-building, pattern
recognition and synchronic narratives. Since military conflict mirrors
human habitat, aspects of warfare are likely to involve cityscape as well
as landscape and the consequences for security and stable governance
from competition for natural resources and energy supplies from overpopulated megalopolises and shanty cities from Lagos through Karachi
to the Indo-Pacific littoral will be challenging. “In the future,” notes one
British document, “we will be unable to avoid being drawn into operations in the urban and littoral regions where the majority of the world’s
population lives.” In 2006, for the first time in history, the global urban
population exceeded the rural population.81
For integrationists, the rise of strategic pluralism is the central
reality of present and future war. Such pluralism yields a range of globalregional inflection points ranging from crises in the Islamic world, the
transformation of parts of Asia, the rapidly changing demography of
urbanization, and irregular and hybrid challenges emanating from
fragile states. While outcomes cannot be predicted, their repercussions
may be dangerous since they are rapidly transmitted by the power of
information networks and instant images.

Conclusion

The Czech novelist Milan Kundera once wrote that “man proceeds
in the fog. But when he looks back to judge people of the past, he sees no
fog in their pasts.”82 The conceptual challenge of war is like movement
through a mist of the unknown; it is the cognitive demand to understand
how the past and the present interact to shape armed conflict in the
future. The passage of historical time into first the present and second
into the future, means that forms of futures studies will always be
essential despite their inability to predict events. In the military realm,
such studies provide a corpus of ideas and methods that can be used to
explain the structure and components of war and their relationship with
political, economic, and social factors. The primary goal is to anticipate
in general rather than to predict in particular; to build skills in foresight
by exploring alternative possibilities—the forking paths of the future.
Seen in this light, futures studies are far better at explaining potential
environments of conflict rather than the shape of conflict’s events.
Knowledge of strategic-military environments is a valuable asset
to cultivate if only because it ensures that prospective thinking can
be as much about orientation as expectation. Properly conducted with
interdisciplinary rigor, military futures studies should encourage a brisk
exchange of creative ideas and critical modes of thinking on plausible
alternatives and probabilities. Such a process encourages flexibility and
the more flexible an armed forces establishment is, the more adaptable
it is likely to be when faced with the unexpected. A fusion of historical knowledge with an understanding of present trends is important in
constructing any image of a future. In this realm, the task of the military
futures specialist is an unforgiving intellectual struggle to grasp meaning
from fleeting time and circumstance. It is a task for the creative and bold
81     Ministry of Defence, The Future Character of Conflict (Shrivenham: Development, Concepts
and Doctrine Centre, February 2010), 21.
82     Milan Kundera, Testaments Betrayed (NY: Harper/Collins, 1990), 238.
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mind in which error and misjudgment are as likely as accuracy and foresight. In a real sense the military futures analyst shares the melancholy
fate of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s adventurer, Jay Gatsby, who, conscious of
the past yet trapped in the present, reaches out continuously towards the
green light of the future:
[T]he orgiastic future that year by year recedes before us. It eluded us then,
but . . . tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther. . . . So
we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.83

83     F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (New York: Scribner reissue edition, 2004, original publication 1925), 180.
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The National Guard as a Strategic Hedge
James D. Campbell
Abstract: This article suggests alternatives to proposed organizational reductions and balance between the Active force and the
National Guard. It examines specifics of the cost, use, and effectiveness arguments on both sides of this contentious issue. Finally,
this article serves as a catalyst to renew the broader public discussion regarding the proper roles of the regulars and the militia—the
National Guard—as integral parts of the nation’s defense and security architecture.

A

s the year 2014 approaches, the nation anticipates the close
of what has widely been described as the longest war in
our country’s history. With the assumed ending of that war,
many citizens and political leaders anticipate our regular military will
be required to do what it has historically always done at the end of a
war—shrink. Despite the fact the war in Afghanistan is not the nation’s
longest, and our involvement there will likely not entirely end in 2014, the
broad expectation or even demand that the military’s size and budget be
reduced is both normal and necessary.1
This expectation of significant post-war regular military reductions
reflects long, deep-rooted, and traditional national practice. Indeed,
following most of our country’s earliest wars there was a significant
national movement to eliminate the regular army altogether, and return
to our traditional reliance on the citizen-soldiers of the militia for the
country’s defense. After the Revolutionary War the Continental Army
was, in fact, effectively disbanded, with less than one hundred soldiers
retained to guard stores.2 After the War of 1812, the War with Mexico,
the Civil War, and the War with Spain, the regular army was drastically
reduced, and in spite of continuous fighting on the Western frontier, the
nineteenth-century regular army never exceeded a “peacetime” strength
of approximately 30,000.3 In contrast, the organized militia strength
remained at well over 100,000 during this period.4 The first half of the
twentieth century was little different, with the regular army (including
the nascent Army Air Force) reaching a strength of only 125,000 on the

1     The Seminole Wars lasted on and off between 1819 and 1858; the Sioux Wars between 1854
and 1890; the Apache Wars between 1849 and 1886; and the fighting with the Cheyenne people from
the 1850s until 1878. The US involvement in Vietnam lasted fourteen years, from 1961 when the
first combat advisors were deployed until 1975 when the government of South Vietnam collapsed.
2     In 1784, Congress disbanded the Continental Army in the wake of the Newburgh controversy,
and left only 80 soldiers and a handful of officers to guard remaining military stores. See Allen
Millett, and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense, a Military History of the United States
from 1607 to 2012 (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 91.
3     Ibid., 280.
4     Ibid., 264.
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eve of the Second World War in 1936.5 That same year the strength of
the National Guard was roughly 400,000.6
The post-conflict reductions of the Army and the Air Force after
the Second World War, the Korean War, and the War in Vietnam were
not as drastic as after previous wars, due to the ongoing Cold War with
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), but there were reductions nonetheless. Finally, in the 1990s following the first Gulf War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the active military once again
was reduced in hopes of a “peace dividend.” Certainly these reductions
were not as great as those of many previous major post-war periods, but
they were significant and perceived by the nation and its leadership as
both normal and necessary. At the same time, the combined strength of
the National Guard, both Army and Air, remained close to its historic
norm, approximately 450,000 soldiers and airmen.
One constant has existed through all these wartime expansions and
post-war contractions of the regular military. That constant has been
the relatively steady size of, and national reliance on, the nation’s militia
(since 1903 the National Guard) as a strategic hedge to allow for rapid
expansion of the country’s military capacity in time of emergency. The
militia (and later the National Guard) has provided the “expansible
Army” function first advocated by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun
in the 1820s, and has always been federalized (or has provided state
volunteer units) to augment regulars during emergencies. As a result,
much of American military history is really the history of the activated
militia or National Guard; there were virtually no regular units at
Gettysburg, for example, and the second American division to deploy
to France in 1917 was the 26th “Yankee” Division, composed solely of
National Guard units from the New England states. One of the two
Army divisions in the first wave of assault landings on Omaha Beach
at Normandy in 1944 was the 29th Division, a primarily Virginia and
Maryland National Guard division.7 This expansible strategic hedge has
continued to allow for needed growth in regular forces in times of crisis:
In 2004-05, approximately half of the units deployed in Iraq were from
the National Guard, allowing the regulars to reset and begin the growth
in size which allowed virtually continuous unit combat rotations, including units from the National Guard, ever since. 8
This is our history, our national paradigm for military organization and employment which has served us well for the past 237 years.
These peacetime contractions of the regular military and reliance on a
larger, well-trained, and resourced National Guard have been critical to
the nation’s ability to husband resources, and refocus peacetime budget
priorities toward domestic development and economic expansion. This
5     Gene Gurney, A Pictorial History of the United States Army (New York: Crown Publishers, 1966),
372.
6     Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Military History, United States Army, 1975), 409-417.
7      Ibid., 418-419; Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, a Military History of the United
States, 280; Dramatically, the 1940 federalization of the National Guard allowed Congress to more
than double the size of the active Army overnight. Federalizing the Guard allowed 300,000 trained
soldiers to be inducted into active duty, augmenting the approximately 125,000 soldiers of the regular Army.
8     Brigadier General Todd McCaffrey, “Active Component Responsibility in Reserve Component Pre-and
Post-Mobilization Training,” (Washington, DC: HQDA G3, 12 March 2013).
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ensured we retained the capacity to deter potential adversaries, respond
to crises, and rapidly augment the active military when needed. The
long-recognized fact throughout our history that the militia, when not
federalized, costs significantly less than the regular military has allowed
for this routine peacetime reprioritization of national resources. A lessoften discussed, but nonetheless critical, function of this organizational
method was recognized by the founders of the nation—a small standing regular force and reliance for the preponderance of our security
on the militia acts as a significant brake on executive power, requiring
Congress either to authorize a federalization of the militia or vote for
an expansion of regular forces to mobilize the nation for engagement in
a major conflict. This model has been accepted with a broad consensus
throughout our history by military and civilian leadership and the mass
of our citizens.
The year 2013–14, however, would appear to be different from the
previous 237 years of the country’s existence. During the past twelvemonth period, both Army and Air Force leadership have argued for, and
even attempted to force through, a reduction in forces that would result
in, at best, a partial reversal of this historically proven and accepted
national paradigm. At worst, these moves by the services might result
in a complete reversal of our accepted military system by drastically
reducing the National Guard to what may be its lowest relative level
of strength and combat capability in our history, all while attempting
to keep the active Army and Air Force at a larger size even than at the
beginning of the current period of conflict.
What is different about this particular period of post-conflict national
retrenchment that would cause our service leaders to change historically
proven and accepted norms and practices? Why is there a need, given the
current National Military Strategy and significant resource constraints,
when our conventional forces are not likely to be widely engaged or
deployed in the near future, to retain large forces in the active military
and cut the vastly less-expensive National Guard to the bone? We must
ask these questions while recognizing that our nation has a newly modernized National Guard which more than ever before in its history has
dramatically proven its military capability and effectiveness, and which
has repeatedly reinforced its critical Constitutional domestic support
role in the past twelve years.
To be sure, there is a compelling need for the United States to have
a capable active Army and Air Force. The global commitments of the
nation, and the uncertainties and fast moving crises we may face, all
dictate that our military needs the capability to commit our standing
forces rapidly, and in some cases, in a matter of days or even hours. The
numbered war plans of the Combatant Commands all have validated
requirements for forces which can be deployed swiftly or forwardstationed to execute national strategy. We always have and will continue
to need a strong, ready, and capable regular Army and Air Force as a key
component of our larger military. However, the following discussion
examines some of the pertinent issues in the debate over the roles of the
regular active duty and National Guard forces.
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During the last year, as part of the debates concerning reductions in
the size of the services, one area of disagreement is the question of the
cost of regular forces as compared to the cost of the National Guard.
Various studies have produced differing conclusions; studies by the
Reserve Forces Policy Board, the RAND Corporation, and from within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense are some of the best known.
Advocates for reductions in the National Guard have argued that there
is no major cost saving to be had by either growing or retaining the
current size and structure of the Guard at the expense of the regulars.
Support for this position has consisted largely of data showing that when
federalized, Guard units and personnel cost the same as regular forces.
Additionally, adherents to this position argue that maintaining Guard
units at the high levels of readiness and modernization they have held
over the past twelve years have resulted in higher costs.
Undeniable, when federalized, Guard units cost roughly the same as
regular units. Similarly, it is also true regular forces maintain the large
institutional military training and professional education structure from
which all components of the services benefit. There is also no denying
that significant resources have been expended over the past twelve years
to meet the Defense Department’s statutory and moral obligations to
recapitalize the National Guard and bring its units and personnel up
to par with active forces in terms of fielding the same equipment and
maintaining the same standards of readiness in training, personnel, and
logistics. However, these arguments miss some major points.
First, since the modernization of the Army Guard has been virtually
completed over the past twelve years, the costs of providing updated and
modern equipment will not continue at the same levels in the future.
Clearly, the costs of modernization for the Air Guard are a somewhat
different matter, as the Air Force has not invested in modernization of
the Guard in the same way the Army has done. Maintaining a modern
and capable National Guard is a necessity for the nation; in the absence
of a draft these forces have been and will continue to be used in combat,
and must have the same capabilities as the Active Army and Air Force.
This moral imperative dictates that modernization requirements will not
go away, regardless of the relative balance between Regular and Guard
forces. That investment will go far given the other cost-effective aspects
of the Guard.
Second, in the case of the Army, given the current Force Generation
Model, Guard units are only planned to be federalized for one year out
of every five—assuming Guard units will actually be mobilized with
any consistency at all. Given that deployments for all service components have slowed since the end of our involvement in Iraq and we can
expect they will be further reduced after the end of combat operations
in Afghanistan next year, in the future Guard units will rarely be federalized, except for routine deployments in support of operations in places
like Kosovo, or for training events. Additionally, as the reductions in
operational tempo and deployments affect the regulars in the same way
as the National Guard, it begs the question: In an era of severely constrained resources, when much of our military will be in a nondeployed
“dwell” status, why would we maintain large, expensive, and static
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regular forces at a reduced level of readiness, when we can maintain
those same forces with virtually identical capabilities and levels of readiness, at a fraction of the cost, in the National Guard?
Ultimately, the facts remain as they have for the entire military
history of this country. The National Guard, when not called into active
federal service, even when kept at a high state of readiness, does not cost
as much as regular forces. The majority of Guard personnel are paid
for a baseline of sixty-three days per year, and the federal government
does not maintain a large support structure of housing, schools, base
facilities, and support services for the Guard which are maintained for
the regulars. Retirement and medical costs for the Guard are a fraction
of the same costs for regulars. Training, equipment maintenance, operational mileage, and flying hour programs for the Guard are significantly
lower than those for the Active Force. The cost of maintaining National
Guard facilities is partly borne by the states. National Guard headquarters are smaller and do not require the same personnel overhead as their
active counterparts. Finally, the National Guard does not have to pay
to move its personnel and their families every two to three years. These
facts have remained unchanged for the past 237 years. The Army’s own
current cost data show that in one year, when not mobilized, Army
National Guard Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and other units cost
approximately one-third that of similar regular units.9 The fact that the
Army National Guard, which at current force levels is only one-third
smaller than the regular Army and provides thirty-nine percent of the
Army’s operating force, and yet only uses twelve percent of the Army’s
total budget, should make any further arguments about the relative costs
of each component irrelevant.10

Use

One of the arguments made by senior service leadership in support of
keeping a large active force is that the services do not have rapid or direct
access to the National Guard in a crisis or during routine circumstances
in the same way they have access to the regulars or reserves. The services
have complained that to gain access to the Guard for military operations
they must receive permission from states, governors, the Congress, and
follow other cumbersome procedures when trying to prepare and deploy
forces. They also have argued that even when they do gain access to the
Guard, it takes Guard units up to twenty-four months to prepare for
deployments, which is too long in a crisis situation. Consequently, they
argue they must have a large standing regular force ready to respond
instantaneously or overnight, and cannot be expected to work through
the complex and lengthy requirements needed to mobilize and deploy
the Guard.
To address these arguments, it is important to clarify the processes and authorities available to the services and to the President
and Congress when they need the country’s militia. Since 1792 when
Congress passed the Militia and Calling Forth Acts, the President and
Congress have had the statutory authority to federalize the militia, and
9     ARNG-G3 Briefing, “Many Feasible Alternatives Exist,” 24 July 2013 (US Army “FORCES”
costing model, 28 June 2013.
10     Ibid., slides 7-14.
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the laws now in place allow for rapid and complete federalization of
all the National Guard, parts of it, individual units, or even individual
soldiers and airmen. This federalization can be done without permission
from states, governors, Adjutants General, or anyone else. These are
the processes used since the beginning of the twentieth century, when
National Guard units were federalized to assist in the Mexican Punitive
Expedition; these same authorities were used to call into federal service
the entire National Guard at the stroke of a pen in both 1917 and 1940.
Three National Guard divisions were federalized during the Korean
War, and since 1991 the number of National Guard units, soldiers, and
airmen who have been mobilized into federal service for either training, overseas contingency operations, or direct combat has numbered in
the hundreds of thousands. In each of these cases, mobilizations have
been rapid, have followed the procedures set in law—and have not been
restricted by state authorities. Not once in the past twenty-five years
have the services been delayed or denied complete access to the combat
reserves of the National Guard when needed.
The argument that it takes up to twenty-four months to mobilize a
National Guard unit is also specious. There is no legal requirement for
any advance notice for the mobilization of the National Guard. In fact,
between 2001 and 2006, many National Guard units had as little as
thirty days notice for their deployments. The “requirement” for twentyfour months notification is a policy put in place by Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates to allow for more predictability for the Guard during
repeated deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. In actuality, the Air
Force requires all its National Guard units to maintain themselves and
their individual airmen at a level of readiness capable of being mobilized
and deployed in 72 hours, and the Army’s own training model dictates
that National Guard BCTs, the largest and most complex units in the
militia, can be mobilized and sent to a combat theater in an average of
80 days.11
Given these facts, it is likely that when the services use arguments
about “access,” they really mean “control.” Indeed, the services do not
exercise routine, direct control over the National Guard when it is in a
Title 32 United States Code (USC) status. When not under federal, or
Title 10 USC status, the National Guard is under the authority of its
respective state or territorial governors. As a result, the services do not
exert direct control over the National Guard all the time, but they do,
in fact, exert a significant amount of indirect control through regulatory
and fiscal mechanisms. National Guard officer promotions are managed
by the state, but this management must be done in accordance with
federal law and the regulatory requirements of the services. Standards
of training, personnel readiness, maintenance, and operational performance are dictated and managed by the services. Air National Guard
wings and other units operate daily under the management oversight
and control of their respective Air Force Major Commands—many
perform important operational missions seven days a week, while not
formally mobilized, under the control of those commands.

11     Office of the Secretary of Defense Report to Congress, “Reserve and Active Components Units of
the Armed Forces,” (Washington, DC: Draft working document, 26 September 2012).
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It is possible, therefore, that this issue of control can be reduced
to these terms: first, the Adjutants General respond to their governors
and not the service chiefs; second, the militia can be used by the governors in a state active duty status without reference to the services or
anyone else in the federal government; third, the governors can appoint
senior officers in the National Guard using individual state laws and
procedures, and only then submit those officers to a federal recognition
process for approval by Congress; and finally, the services cannot, by
federal statute, make major force structure or organizational changes to
the National Guard without permission from Congress and the affected
state governors.
Convenient or not, this is our military system, and it has been constituted in this fashion since the earliest days of the Republic for very
specific reasons. The militia tradition of this country dates back to the
English reaction against oppressive standing armies resulting from the
aftermath of the English Civil War in the mid-seventeenth century, and
the requirement for a strong, state-controlled, citizen militia was viewed
by the founders as a critical hedge against an oppressive executive power
or overreach by the central government.12 Finally, having such a large
and important part of the Army and Air Force residing in local communities, under state control, provides the enormous benefit to the
nation of creating and fostering close bonds between the military and
its parent society—bonds which would not exist if the military was stationed only on federal bases, isolated from the broader American people.
The National Guard is the military in our communities, a role which
is particularly important in the majority of states and territories where
there are no large federal installations. General Creighton Abrams, when
Chief of Staff of the Army in the early 1970s, recognized this very useful
bond when he reinforced the military construct through the doctrine
which bears his name, and which ensures the country cannot go to war
without mobilizing its citizens and communities through activation of
the National Guard and Reserve.
There is one final point about the use of the National Guard which
should be a part of the national discussion concerning the balance
between Active and Reserve Component forces. Our military currently
has only a limited amount of strategic deployment capacity, both air and
sea. This lift capability is a critical element in decisions about managing everything our military does in support of the national strategy,
from how it is organized, to the size and basing of units. Our strategic
lift capacity restricts the numbers of Army BCTs and other supporting
forces we can send around the world in a crisis. The time it takes to get
the first, limited number of units in place overseas, and then to get the
ships and planes back and set to move follow-on forces is and should be
a centrally important factor in how we manage the balance between the
number of regular combat units and the number of combat units in the
National Guard.

12     James Madison asserted in Federalist 46 that, given that the population of a country could
only support a Regular Army of a certain size, at the time of his writing the United States could
only expect to have a maximum standing force of 25-30,000. He then stated that the various states’
militias should be “half a million” strong to counter any potential threat to liberty from this standing force.
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For example, as stated previously, the Army’s training model directs
that it takes an average of 80 days to mobilize and prepare a National
Guard BCT for deployment. When during a crisis it takes 80 days or
longer for the first units to be deployed and for the ships and aircraft
to return for a second lift, it would perhaps make sense to plan for
a significant number of our second lift of combat forces to be from
the National Guard. Since the services can, in fact, rapidly call these
units and personnel into federal service immediately in time of emergency, we would merely need to mobilize them and begin final training
at the start of a crisis, so they would be ready for the second lift. Of
course, most situations which would require the deployment of large
numbers of conventional forces would not arise overnight, so in reality
the National Guard could actually be mobilized and start final training
well in advance of any projected or required deployment date. All units,
regardless of service component, not part of the first lift of forces are, in
fact, part of a second echelon; they are not a part of the first-line force
and standing by at a somewhat reduced level of readiness. Given this
fact, it is arguably more economically and militarily feasible in a time of
severely constrained resources, to choose the force which is the most
cost-effective to constitute the bulk of this second echelon. Doing so,
of course, would require that our national military leadership embrace
the fact that Guard forces are actually part of their larger service, and
are capable of performing at levels equal to their regular counterparts.

Effectiveness

A final argument in this debate, one which has been made perhaps
less stridently in the past few years but one which has existed for as long
as our country’s military, is that of the relative combat effectiveness
of the National Guard. The argument between Regular and Provincial
during the colonial period, between Continental and Militiaman during
the Revolutionary War, and between the Regulars and the Volunteers
and militia during the nineteenth century are all a part of this age-old
conundrum. The post-Civil War position taken by one of the fathers of
modern American military thought, Emory Upton, was that regulars
were the only really viable force on the modern battlefield and that
militia or volunteers were of limited value, at best.13 But his contemporaries Leonard Wood, Nelson Miles, and later, John Pershing, were very
complimentary of these soldiers and used them to great effect in their
campaigns in the American West and especially in Cuba, the Philippines,
and WWI.
The very small size of the peacetime regular Army during the first
half of the twentieth century was probably responsible for this debate
subsiding—the massive national mobilization efforts during the world
wars demanded a far less parochial view of the various service components’ relative levels of efficacy. The argument has returned since then,
and seems to be a regular manifestation of our peacetime jockeying for
reduced military resources. The most recent incarnation of this perennial debate has taken a few distinct tacks. First, full Air National Guard
unit mobilizations have not occurred at any significant level during this
wartime period—the Air Guard has met its deployment responsibilities
13     Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).
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by using individual volunteers or small parts of units, because the larger
units themselves are not ready or able to take on a full mobilization.
Second, although the Army Guard has undoubtedly mobilized and
deployed enormous numbers of units and soldiers, its divisions and
BCTs have not performed as true “battle-space owners” in the conduct
of full-spectrum combat operations—they lack the higher-order skills
and experience to do so effectively.
These arguments obscure some important truths. Air National
Guard units have mobilized and deployed exactly those capabilities,
sometimes embodied as full units and sometimes as unit or individual
contributions to the Air Expeditionary Forces, which the Air Force has
directed them to provide. Air Force senior leaders, to their credit, have
openly acknowledged that without the routine and critical contributions
of the Air National Guard, the Air Force would not have had the successes they have enjoyed over the past twelve years. Indeed, the Air
Force could not have performed its mission at all. Air National Guard
units provide virtually all of the Combat Air Patrols over the continental
United States, and without the refueling missions performed daily by
the Air National Guard, such as the Atlantic air bridge provided by the
Guard’s Northeast Tanker Task Force, these operations would flatly not
have been possible. It is important to note that mobilization and deployment policies and procedures are set by the Defense Department and the
services, not by the National Guard or the states; these policies, which
have been in place during the past several years, do not necessarily reflect
the laws which govern Guard mobilizations or combat employment.
Army senior leaders have stated that Guard combat brigades and
divisions have not performed the same difficult missions as their regular
counterparts, and have insinuated that although at the company and
even battalion level the Guard performs very well, the higher headquarters do not. Again—Guard units have performed exactly those missions
which they have been given by the Army, and do not have a say in what
those missions are. Additionally, over seventeen of the forty-six Guard
brigades deployed since 2001 have, in fact, performed full-spectrum
operations in theater.14 Those that have not were acting as security
forces or in many cases as training teams embedded with either Iraqi or
Afghan forces—arguably the most critical mission ensuring the longterm success of both theater strategies. It is important to note that at the
height of National Guard combat deployments to Iraq in 2005, when
over forty percent of the combat units were from the National Guard,
the Guard also rapidly mobilized and deployed over 50,000 soldiers
and airmen in domestic support of Hurricane Katrina relief operations,
including two division headquarters to exercise command and control.
National Guard BCTs and divisions routinely manage the Guard’s
complex Constitutional role of domestic support during emergencies,
a military mission at least equal in importance to overseas operations.
Ultimately, however, these arguments are unnecessary and unhelpful. At the outset of any conflict, regular units generally can be expected
to have a more rapid transition to a wartime footing, and can in most
cases conduct complex operations more readily. After a transitional
14     ARNG-G3 Briefing, 28 June 2013, "ARNG BCTs Deployed by Year," (source DAMPS
orders).
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period, the militia gain the skills needed and perform equally as well
as regulars. This paradigm has been the case in every single war this
country has waged, and the past thirteen years have been no different,
except perhaps in the fact that the transitional period was far shorter
and in some cases nonexistent, due to the great investments made by
the services in training and leader development for the National Guard
following the First Gulf War. National Guard units, both Army and
Air, have performed just as well in the past thirteen years as any of
their regular counterparts—there is no evidence suggesting they have
had leadership or disciplinary problems, or combat failures out of the
norm. The truth is that regardless of service component, there are good
units and good leaders, and there are ineffective units and marginal
leaders. Some of them are regulars, and some are in the National Guard.
Again—there were virtually no regular units at many of the most important military engagements in our history, and the oldest and some of the
most highly decorated units in the military are in the National Guard.
A final word on this argument: How many National Guard units must
fight and succeed, suffer casualties, earn decorations and citations, and
serve with dedication and honor before we stop this destructive debate
and make no distinction between organizations, regardless of component? A soldier or airman, an Army Brigade Combat Team or Air Force
Wing is and ought to be an interchangeable combat capability, regardless
of component. Acceptance of this fact is the only way to solve the larger
problems we face as a military.

Conclusion

In 2000, before the start of the current series of wars and interventions, the Army National Guard had, along with myriad other units,
forty-two combat brigades within its force structure. The regular Army
contained thirty-three combat brigades. This ratio was widely perceived
as normal and acceptable by senior leaders and force planners—after
all, throughout the country’s history the peacetime balance between the
militia and the Regulars has always been that way—a highly trained,
professional, and ready regular force, supported by its combat reserve
of a larger, well-resourced, and ready militia. This balance served us
well in the initial years of conflict after 2001. As planned and executed
time and again in the past 237 years, the National Guard mobilized
units and provided follow-on forces after the regulars conducted initial
operations. In the breathing and reset space allowed by the mobilization
of the National Guard, the United States had time to grow the size of
the regulars while maintaining steady deployments.
A difference, however, between these past twelve years and our
other periods of conflict, occurred regarding the balance of militia and
regular combat forces. Throughout this period of conflict, the number
of combat brigades in each service component was radically altered.
Between 2001 and 2013, the regular Army has grown to include fortyfive combat brigades, while the National Guard has been reduced from
forty-two to twenty-eight combat brigades—a thirty-three percent decline
during wartime. Why is this? Many of the Guard combat brigades have
been converted to either support or multifunctional units, while a few
have been eliminated. This change has altered the important balance
in our forces which has always allowed for our country to mobilize its
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combat capacity rapidly without spending enormous sums in peacetime
to maintain a standing force. Additionally, the regular Army is now out
of balance and no longer has the ability to support itself with units which
provide engineering, logistics, and other support functions for combat
formations—these types of units overwhelmingly now reside in the
Guard or the Army Reserve. The Combat Reserve of the Army, which
has historically always been the National Guard, is now for the first time
in our history in danger of not being able to mirror or provide the same
maneuver combat functions as the active Army.
This article posed two questions: What is different about 2014
and this particular period of post-conflict national retrenchment that
would cause our service leaders to try to change historically proven and
accepted norms and practices? Why is there a need, given the current
National Military Strategy and significant resource constraints, when
our conventional forces are not likely to be widely engaged or deployed
in the near future, to retain large forces in the active military and reduce
the vastly less-expensive National Guard? I would suggest there is, in
fact, no difference between now and any other period of post-conflict
retrenchment in our national history. There is no valid reason to abandon
our time-tested and broadly accepted methods of military organization
in peacetime.
There may be some who argue that the world is a much more
unstable and dangerous place now than ever before, and that the United
States has far too many commitments to allow for a significant reduction
in active forces, and so the needed cuts in forces must be found elsewhere. There are also those who argue that whatever cuts are made must
be “fairly apportioned” between the various components of the Army
and Air Force. These arguments do not support close examination. The
world is not more dangerous or unstable now than in the past—there
are fewer wars and other conflicts now across the globe than at any time
in the past thirty years. The United States faces no existential threats,
and there are no peer military powers on earth immediately pressing our
allies or other interests. There is, still, a valid need for us to have a military that can respond to crises and maintain the ability to deploy rapidly
in emergencies, while being able to fight and win against any adversary.
But there are no truly looming threats and adversaries who are any more
dangerous than those we have faced in the past, and who should cause us
to reverse hundreds of years of proven military organizational practices.
If our global commitments are such that some argue we must maintain a large standing regular force, an historical comparison may be useful
as a rebuttal. At the height of the British Empire, in the years around the
turn of the twentieth century when the global political, diplomatic, and
military situation was fraught with crises and tensions which ultimately
built to the start of the First World War, the British government was
able to maintain its dominion and exercise its military commitments to
the Empire—one quarter of the earth’s surface including one quarter
of the earth’s population—with a regular Army that never exceeded
300,000 men.15 Does the United States now have commitments and a
global dominion that would cause us to exceed this number? Or can we
15     In August, 1914, at the start of the First World War, the regular British Army had a strength
of 247, 342. See Tim Travers, “The Army and the Challenge of War,” in The Oxford History of the
British Army, ed. David Chandler (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 211.
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afford to transfer some of our active military capacity into our proven
National Guard, where it can remain trained and ready and cost the
nation approximately one-third what it would cost to maintain it on
active duty?
What is the reason for the emphasis on “proportionality” in proposed military reductions? Any adherent to this position must explain
a few things. If all units, soldiers, and airmen are truly viewed as equal,
interchangeable, and important elements of their respective services,
why would not the Army and the Air Force work to save vast amounts
of money, and preserve a broader and higher level of unit readiness, by
retaining a greater number of combat brigades and Air Wings through
transferring them, by apportion, from the Active Army and Air Force
to the National Guard? “Fairness” and “proportionality” have nothing
whatever to do with it—the real issue is for us together to rationally
determine how we can maintain the best military with the largest capacity and capability at the least cost to the nation. In order to reach this
point, this point of decisionmaking, truly visionary leaders would have
to finally and completely abandon the parochial views which pit regular
against militiaman, and which view one component as somehow inherently superior to another, without recognizing the unique values and
strengths of each which combine to provide the nation with its best
possible military.
Clearly these questions require serious and open debate, in circles
both inside and outside the military hierarchy and the government. The
successful future of our all-volunteer military and our country’s financial health demand that it occur soon.
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Abstract: The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) costing
model suggests Active and Reserve forces cost about the same.
Thus, many of the assumptions about the cost-effectiveness of Reserve Components may need a closer look.

Budget Cycles

A

s we close the book on one of America’s longest military
engagements, the battle for shrinking resources is growing
more intense. But what risk can we realistically assume before
we place US security interests in jeopardy? Many solutions call for the
Army to move more of its capabilities to the Reserve Component.
However, the cost savings may not be as great as we might think. This
article explores some of those costs through the Army Force Generation
(ARFORGEN) costing model.

Cost-Effective Reserve Components

The National Guard Bureau 2013 Posture Statement: Security America
Can Afford states “The National Guard is the DOD’s most cost effective
component.” One of the reasons listed is that “For 11% of the Army
Budget, the Army National Guard provides 32% of the Army’s total
personnel and 40% of its operating forces.”1 The United States Army
Reserve 2013 Posture Statement makes a similar claim: “As the Army’s only
Federal Operational Reserve Force, the Army Reserve provides a costeffective way to mitigate risk to national security. For only 6 percent of
the Army budget, the Army Reserve provides almost 20 percent of the
Total Force.”2
Clearly, the percentage of total force provided by each reserve component is correct. However, statements about percent of the Army budget
need to be qualified. They hold true when viewing the Army budget
purely from an appropriations-sponsor perspective, but the Army pays
for several National Guard and Army Reserve expenses through active
Army appropriations. Here are a few examples:
•• Other Procurement of Army (OPA) appropriation is used to purchase
new equipment for all three components. The Army may buy 50 new
trucks and allocate ten to the ARNG and ten to the USAR. The cost of
new equipment is not included in reserve component appropriations.
•• Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation pays the
overhead costs of operating ten rotations per year at the National
1     GEN Craig R. McKinley, 2013 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement, 4, http://www.nationalguard.mil/features/ngps/2013_ngps.pdf.
2     LTG Jeffrey W. Talley and CSM James L. Lambert, America’s Army Reserve: a Life-Saving and
Life-Sustaining Force for the Nation, 2013 Posture Statement, June 6, 2013, ii. http://www.usar.army.mil/
resources/Media/ARPS_2013_6-6-13%20(2).pdf .
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Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).
The National Guard uses one rotation per year at each center and pays
its own military personnel costs and a portion of the O&M expenses
associated with training away from home station.
•• OMA also pays to operate the initial military training sites in which
the ARNG and USAR send tens of thousands of soldiers through
each year (Basic Combat Training and Advanced Individual Training,
etc.). The reserve components pay their own personnel costs via their
National Guard Pay, Army (NGPA) and Reserve Pay, Army (RPA)
appropriations for soldiers while they are on active duty, but the
overhead costs of operating those training bases are under the OMA
appropriation.
Put differently, the percentage of the total Army budget attributed
to the ARNG and USAR would be higher if the portion of active
appropriations in the base budget spent on the RCs were included in
the calculations.

But How Cost-Effective?

From 2010 to 2012, I led a team of analysts on a project directed
by HQDA. We were tasked by the Army G-8 Program, Analysis and
Evaluation Division (PA&E) to determine the comparable costs of providing similar AC/RC units in a Force Generation Cycle. The purpose
was to gain commonality of numbers, specifically the cost of active
component and reserve component soldiers so we could meet three
objectives: (1) Conduct a comprehensive analysis on the Business Case
for Operationalizing the Reserve Component; (2) establish common
Army costing baselines to compare Active and Reserve Component
costs; and (3) gain leadership agreement (AC, ARNG, and USAR) so
those leaders could accurately engage the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and other agencies outside the department.3
My team, comprised of top analysts from all three components,
designed a cost model that supported a range of utilization scenarios.
We focused on three unique applications: (1) Allocated: A unit moves
through the ARFORGEN cycle and deploys during the available year; (2)
Apportioned: A unit moves through the ARFORGEN cycle and deploys
on a noncombat contingency mission at some point in the available year;
and (3) Apportioned: a unit moves through the ARFORGEN cycle but
has no mission in the available year and does not deploy. HQDA asked
us to provide cost comparisons on the Heavy Brigade Combat Team
(BCT), Stryker BCT, Infantry BCT, and the Combat Aviation Brigade
(CAB). We also included results for four types of smaller formations to
gain an appreciation of how manpower, mission sets, and equipment
impacted the results. We included the engineer battalion, civil affairs
battalion, medium truck company, and military police company in our
report. We chose units found in at least two of the three components
with the same Standard Requirements Code (SRC). Figure 1 lists the
SRCs and which components the unit types reside in.
3     COL Morrison earned recognition as the military runner -up for the 2010 Pace Award for
his effort in leading this team to create the AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model. The Pace Award
is named for former Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Jr., who served in the position between
1950 and 1953, during the Korean War. The award has been presented annually since 1962 to an
Army officer under the grade of colonel and a civilian, GS-14 equivalent or below.
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Unit Type
HBCT
IBCT
SBCT
CAB
Engineer BN
Civil Affairs BN
Medium Truck CO
Military Polic CO

SRC
87300G301
77300G301
47100F501
01300G201
05435R001
41705A001
55727F101
19667L001

Morrison
AC
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

ARNG
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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USAR

X
X
X
X

Figure 1. The unit types, their respective Standard Requirements Code (SRC), and
the components in which they reside.

The AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model produced results that
provided the following observations. In general, reserve component
ARFORGEN cycle costs are lower for Personnel and Operations &
Support; however, equipment recapitalization cost is a significant offsetting factor for equipment-intensive units. The differential in cost is
greatest in units with lower equipment operating costs.
Unit Type
BOG/DWELL
HBCT
IBCT
SBCT
CAB
EN BN
CA BN
TC CO
MP CO

ARNG
1:4/1:5
$0.97/$0.87
$0.88/$0.85
$0.92/$0.88
$1.02/$0.94
$0.92/$0.91
$0.91/$0.90
$0.87/$0.84

USAR
1:4/1:5

$0.86/$0.85
$0.77/$0.71
$0.86/$0.84
$0.86/$0.83

Figure 2. Results from the AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model in this figure can
be stated using this example for the HBCT: "For every $1.00 the AC spends on an
HBCT in a 1:2 ARFORGEN cycle, the ARNG will spend $0.97 for an HBCT in a
1:4 ARFORGEN cycle or $0.87 in a 1:5 ARFORGEN cycle.

Review Figure 2 to see how relative costs indicate there are some
unit types that might be best suited for the Active Army, while others
might be best suited for the ARNG or USAR, at least from a cost perspective. We used the allocated scenario (units in an ARFORGEN cycle
that deploy or mobilize to a combat theater) to create this table. Costs for
Active units were based on the unit going through a 1:2 ARFORGEN
cycle (9 months boots-on-the-ground: 18 months in Reset and Train/
Ready). Costs for ARNG and USAR units were based on both 1:4 and
1:5 ARFORGEN cycles (1-year boots-on-the-ground: 4 or 5 years in
Reset and Train/Ready Phases).
As Figure 2 shows, for every dollar the Army spends on an Active
Component unit, it will spend the amount indicated for an ARNG or
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USAR unit of the same type. For example, for every dollar spent on an
Active Heavy Brigade Combat Team in a 1:2 ARFORGEN cycle, the
Army will spend $.97 to send an ARNG Heavy Brigade Combat Team
through the 1:4 cycle and $.87 for the 1:5 cycle. These data show that to
train, equip, and deploy an ARNG Heavy Brigade Combat Team in a 1:4
ARFORGEN cycle costs basically the same as an Active Heavy Brigade
Combat Team. It also shows that a 1:5 cycle is the cheaper option for
the ARNG relative to what the Army spends on the same type of Active
Army Heavy Brigade Combat Team. At the other end of the cost spectrum, an Army Reserve civil affairs battalion only costs $.77 and $.71
on the dollar for a 1:4 and 1:5 ARFORGEN cycle, respectively. In both
ARFOGREN cycles, it is much cheaper to have civil affairs units in
the Army Reserve than in the Active force. Look closely at the Combat
Aviation Brigade costs in Figure 2. It is actually more expensive for an
ARNG Combat Aviation Brigade to go through the 1:4 ARFORGEN
cycle than it is for its Active counterpart in a 1:2 cycle.
Compare this result to statements in the media claiming ARNG
and USAR soldiers (personnel costs) are about one-third the cost of
the active component when not mobilized. That is a valid statement.
However, one has to be aware that simply comparing personnel costs
between the components is only a small part of the issue. One has to
consider OPTEMPO, equipment, and capital reinvestment costs to gain
a true appreciation of the costs involved.

Addressing Risk?

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 12 of the Constitution provides the
impetus for expanding and contracting the Active Army while maintaining a relatively constant militia.
The Congress shall have Power To . . . raise and support Armies, but no
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years....
Article I, Section 8, Clause 12

The language in the Constitution implies that the Army will grow
in times of crisis and return to “normal” afterwards. But what should
“normal” look like in 2015 or 2025?
The AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model does not address the
risk involved if a unit is placed in the Reserve Component. It typically
takes ARNG and USAR units longer to train for deployment than their
Active counterparts. However, some smaller Army Reserve units only
need the statutory minimum 48-unit training assemblies and 15 days of
annual training to deploy at the T-2 standard. Those units should remain
in the Reserve Component.
The basic premise for the Operational Reserve is to provide
enough premobilization training to allow reserve component units that
require additional training days to deploy in less time once they reach
the mobilization station. If our national security goals can be met by
risking a longer wait for reserve component formations to deploy, then
the AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model can inform Army leaders as
to which units might be better suited—from a budget perspective—for
the ARNG or USAR and those that should reside in the active force.

Reserve Components: Point-Counterpoint

Morrison
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Equipment-intensive units (Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams, Combat Aviation Brigades) should primarily
reside in the active force since the same SCRs in the ARNG cost almost as
much, if not more, to maintain across an ARFORGEN cycle and because
these unit types require more intensive collective training to deploy.
If we accept the results of the AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model,
one potential conclusion is that, since Heavy Brigade Combat Teams and
Combat Aviation Brigades are expensive to maintain in the ARNG, they
should be moved to the active force. In that way, we can significantly
reduce one part of the risk equation. The ARNG might respond by
arguing it has to keep its heavy forces for homeland defense, but would
be willing to help reduce the active force by rebalancing the combat
support and combat service support units into the reserve force.
The Army is trying to remain relevant to the new security environment, and each of the Army’s three components is making its case. The
basic question is how much risk are we willing to take? What happens when
our active forces are insufficient and complementary reserve component
forces cannot be deployed fast enough to fill the gap? This is a perennial
question, one usually (and unfortunately) answered in hindsight. How
small can our Total Army be and still protect our vital interests? What
risks are we willing to accept by reducing any of our Army’s components
further than what the current drawdown plan calls for?
Insights from the AC/RC ARFORGEN Costing Model and can
help the Army reduce its operating costs by rebalancing forces among
components. Only after we assess these results will we be able to design
an affordable, balanced, relevant total force that allows us to meet our
national security objectives.

Commentaries & Replies
On “Confronting Africa’s Sobels”
Chris Mason
© 2014 Chris Mason

This commentary is in response to the article, “Confronting Africa’s Sobels” by Robert L.
Feldman and Michel Ben Arrous published in the Winter 2013-14 issue of Parameters
(vol. 43, no. 4).

“

Confronting Africa’s Sobels” by Robert Feldman and Michel Ben
Arrous is a solid and scholarly discussion of the problem of military personnel in Sierra Leone who crossed sides in Sierra Leone’s
bloody civil war from 1991 to 2002. They acted as “soldiers by day and
rebels by night” to maximize their ability to prey on their own civil
population, often coordinating with insurgent bands to deconflict the
despoliation of villages where both forces were operating. The authors
point out that in Sierra Leone, rebel leaders and the army both recruited
young men from the same demographic of the same ethnic group. They
note that in most civil conflicts in Africa, where government soldiers
and rebels are drawn from different ethno-linguistic groups, massacres
and reprisals driven by ethnic conflict are the norm. However, they do
not suggest the Sobel phenomenon may be limited to rare cases like
Sierra Leone where ethnic animosities were not a major factor fueling the
insurgency. Indeed, a major shortcoming of the article is that the authors
suggest there are other examples of this phenomenon but do not cite
additional cases. This commends the potential for further research into
the Sobel issue to determine if it exists elsewhere or was unique to the
civil war in Sierra Leone.
The article is most intriguing in its discussion of the role of private
military companies in Africa, and least satisfying in its conclusions. The
intractable issues of post-colonial Africa have frustrated diplomats and
development agencies for decades, and the vague and chimerical suggestions of the authors—that a troubled African nation should simply
“get its own house in order,” for example—are not policy prescriptions likely to cut the Gordian Knot of Africa’s manifold governance
problems. Furthermore, it remains an open question whether foreign
military training efforts in Africa, which include several hours of classroom lectures on respecting human rights and so on, actually change
deep-rooted social values and behavior and “professionalize” African
armies or simply make them more lethal and efficient. Certainly, they do
nothing to improve the governments which give them their marching
orders. As John Foster Dulles advised President Eisenhower sixty years
ago, “strong armies do not make strong governments. Strong governments make strong armies.”

Dr. Chris Mason, is the
Senior Fellow, Center for
Advanced Defense Studies in
Washington, DC.
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The Authors Reply
Robert L. Feldman and Michel Ben Arrous

T

he authors thank Dr. Mason for his thoughtful critique of our
article. With regards to his request for further examples, let us
preface our response by stating that shifting loyalties and periodic changeovers from soldier to rebel are certainly not limited to Sierra
Leone. As discussed below, Algeria, Pakistan, Mexico, and the Central
African Republic had or have various iterations of the Sobel phenomenon. In Sierra Leone the phenomenon may best be seen as a dramatic
configuration of nonspecific patterns. The duration of whatever state
(soldier or rebel) can be longer, as in the Tuareg case discussed in the
article. Repetitive instances of army passivity, as in Algeria during the
90s, when villagers were massacred in the immediate vicinity of army
compounds, do not occur without a degree of complicity within security
forces. A similar point has repeatedly been made regarding the reliability
of Pakistani military and intelligence agencies and their reluctance to
attack a number of Taliban bases. Other disturbing configurations are
observed in drug wars, such as that in Mexico where vigilante groups,
some of them duly integrated in the army, fight specific cartels while
banding up with others.
What was unique to the war in Sierra Leone was the concentration
of military, political, and economic power in an urban lumpenproletariat. Condemned as a “recruiting ground for thieves and criminals
of all kinds,” the lumpenproletariat was analyzed by Karl Marx as a
“social scum” unable to develop a political struggle on its own, a “passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of society” that could
only become, on occasion, “the bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.”
The underprivileged youth of Freetown proved Marx wrong. One may
wonder if history isn’t repeating itself in the Central African Republic,
as the border between anti-balaka militias (many of them wearing army
uniforms) and the rank and file of the army, who are largely drawn from
the same social margins, appears extremely fuzzy.
Perhaps the most widespread security threat in Africa today is
the destruction of citizens’ confidence in the institutions that are supposed to protect them. Military training programs may help to curb
this destructive process, but we concur with Dr. Mason that these are
often inadequate. Concerted efforts also need to be made in other key
sectors like the judiciary and the police, though previous efforts here,
too, have often fallen far short of desired outcomes. In this regard,
we may mention the issue of “poldits,” a portmanteau of “police” and
“bandits,” in reference to off duty policemen or checkpoint officers who
rent their uniforms and weapons to coupeurs de route (personal observations in Benin, Burundi, and Cameroon): this is yet another variation of
the Sobel phenomenon.
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On “The True Tragedy of American Power”
J. Thomas Moriarty II
This commentary is in response to the article ,“On the True Tragedy of American Power”
by Isaiah Wilson published in the Winter 2013-14 issue of Parameters (vol. 43, no. 4).

I

n “The True Tragedy of American Power,” Colonel Isaiah Wilson
III argues that US policymakers often conflate the use of force with
power. He argues, “Power is the foundation of force; but an excessive
employment of force—not just military, but economic and political—
can erode the power foundation.”1 With a conceptual tip of the hat to the
classics, he analogizes the United States to a tragic hero and focuses on
the negative repercussions of an overreliance on force, especially military
force, in meeting global responsibilities.
Wilson should be commended for offering a valuable discussion
on the differences between power and force. That said, while Wilson’s
emphasis on the consequences of excessive force has merit, it comes at
the expense of fully developing the exact causal relationship between
power and force, and, specifically, the role of power in limiting the availability of certain force options.
Wilson’s warning for how excessive force can lead to a decrease in
state power is wise. However, this begs the question of why powerful
states feel the need to employ force excessively in the first place. If a
broad explanation of power is the ability to get states to do something
they are not likely to do on their own, then a state that feels a need to
use a disproportionate amount of force is, by definition, a state that lacks
power or is in decline. Powerful states do not need to rely primarily on
force; weak states do. Importantly, a state with declining power finds
itself limited not only in its ability to achieve its goals without the use
of force but also in the types of force it can employ. For example, a loss
in economic power reduces the ability of that state to utilize economic
force to settle its affairs. Thus, conceptually speaking, decreases in a
state’s power create the conditions for overreliance on force, which,
eventually, causes even greater power loss.
The increasing dependence of the United States on military force
is not the result of leaders mistaking force for power, as Wilson argues;
rather, it arises ironically from the attempts of the United States since
the end of World War II to create a stable international system. A consequence of developing democratic and economically diverse countries
throughout the world is that these states have begun to challenge
US dominance in international affairs.2 As these states increase their
political and economic powers, the United States has seen its ability
to influence others though the use of these advantages decline. Faced
with this loss of power, the United States has begun to rely on the one
1     Isaiah Wilson, “The True Tragedy of American Power,” Parameters 43, no. 4 (Fall 2014):17.
2     Arthur Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma,” International Organization 38, no. 2 (Spring
1984):355-386.
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element of national power for which it retains dominance—its military.
If there is a true American tragedy, it’s almost certainly this. It is not that
policymakers misunderstand the distinction between force and power;
instead, it is their flawed belief that military force can halt the loss of
power in other arenas.
Analogizing the United States as a tragic hero is problematic.
Central to a tragic hero is a sense of inevitability, an inability to reverse
the looming doom that awaits. While the decline in US power was, and
is, inevitable, the United States need not suffer Hamlet’s horrific fate; it
need not be a tragic hero. The United States must accept limits to both
its power and its military force. In this vein, Colonel Wilson and I are in
complete agreement.

The Author Replies
Isaiah Wilson III

M

y sincere thanks and compliments to Dr. J. Thomas Moriarty
II for his commentary and his thoughtful critique of the
propositions and arguments I offered in my article. The
issue—of the present, past, and future of American uses of force and
our understanding and appreciation of the difference between “force”
and “power”—is a fundamental one, not merely as a point of academic
debates, but critically determinative of our Nation’s future roles, responsibilities, and most importantly, reputation and legitimacy of future US
global leadership . . . its suasive “power” both at home and abroad. Dr.
Moriarty’s response keeps this debate alive and dynamic, at a most precipitous moment: at a time when the potential “tragedy” of mistaking
force and acts of force as acts of real power could prove most deleterious
to both the United States’ future presence and prestige in world affairs
and, more impactful, to future global stability, security, and prosperity.
Failure to distinguish between applications of strategic tools from
strategy itself, combined with flawed displacement of force (to include
over-use of military treatments) over time can lead to the decline and
fall of great powers. This is the tragedy to which I am speaking. The
“tragedy” is not merely additive, it is multiplicative . . . logarithmic.
Choosing how one “displaces available force(s) over time” is an essential part of the power equation . . . of strategy itself; especially critical
in times of compounding security dilemmas under austerity. Being
capable of producing reliable, durable, enduring, and legitimate power
solutions to geostrategic problems under conditions of rapidly declining
force resources, first demands a clear-eyed and accurate understanding of the difference between force (ways and means) and power—the
former being a necessary part of the latter, but considered separate from
principled and value-informed ends, woefully insufficient proxies to real
long-lasting power. Additionally, seeing, understanding, and leveraging
the power potential in “other’s” forces available (that is, the power of
multilateralism; collective actioning) as part of our own power equation offers genuine possibilities for overcoming America’s current tragic
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flaw, and consequently, America’s tragedy. Dr. Moriarty would be well
reminded (as should we all) to take some solace in the fact that America
may only be in “Act III,” the “Climax of Action,” of this five-act
tragedy, where the Hero stands at a crossroads, still at a point of choice,
of decision and opportunity to avoid the “Falling Action.” As in all of
Shakespeare’s tragedies, dark tragic endings seem inevitable primarily
in retrospect, once the hero’s fall is complete. Tragedy dooms its hero,
but it promises to its audience that a sense of the tragic—of the limits
of force—might save them from the hero’s fate. In this sense, tragedies
are not inevitable, but rather reversible. Conflicts in force and power can
be resolved, and eventually will be, whether through a catastrophe, the
downfall of the hero, or through his victory and transfiguration. Once
again, as in past times, why and how America chooses to intervene will
matter most.
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On “Rebalancing US Military Power”
J. Kane Tomlin
© 2014 J. Kane Tomlin

This commentary is in response to the article, “Rebalancing US Military Power,” by
Dr. Anna Simons published in the Winter 2013 issue of Parameters (vol. 43, no. 4).

I
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t is always a pleasure to read diplo-military articles, as I have long
been an advocate of a full spectrum approach to conflict that
includes diplomacy at one end and military force at the other. Dr.
Simons presents compelling arguments for the use of “partnering” as
both a strategically and tactically superior option to the current US
post-Cold War role as a world leader in an increasingly asymmetric
and destabilized world. However, I feel that some of her arguments
could be more fully developed and that her lack of focus on military
advisors’ leadership requirements along with chronological details limits
the applicability of her recommendations. I would like to develop her
thesis further and respectfully include actionable recommendations that
would more effectively turn the concept of “partnering” into policies
that could be implemented.
Dr. Simons’s economic arguments are particularly valid, as the
“development of a global land power network” and “limit[ing] boots
on the ground” are admirable goals. However, looking to the Marshall
Plan’s post-WWII successes, one should add significant time commitments in addition to troop levels (or lack thereof). Her partnering
argument becomes much more compelling when policymakers realize
these endeavors take decades to cement, in contrast to Dr. Simons’s
assertion in the article. Therefore, the economic and resource requirements of a partnership versus a counter-“everything under the sun”
approach becomes more attractive provided academics and diplomats
without field experience do not overlook the leadership requirements.
As any combatant commander will attest, leadership is paramount to
success in partnering.
Rather than accept Dr. Simon’s thesis outright, I argue the actual
shift to partnering is a two-step process that should not be shortchanged
in pursuit of expediency. True partnership and professionalization
requires direct leadership instead of mere advising. Only leadership’s
trust building function leads to true partnering as a longer-term sustainment strategy. Many successes in WWII were predicated on American
military leadership in a direct role during combat operations. Merrill’s
Marauders and General Stillwell’s Chinese forces are both examples
of successful diplo-warfare precisely because these generals led their
forces from the front. Distrust of advisors grows exponentially when
the partner nation’s military leadership feels the advisors view themselves as superior. The element of leading from the front is overlooked
in this article.
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While Dr. Simon’s familial relationship analogy is accurate in many
respects, it does not take into account what I coin the “father-son”
element. Similar to the parent-child relationship in later stages, the early
stages of a leadership-based partnership require leadership by example.
Just as a young son learns to “be a man” by watching his father’s example,
young militaries learn professional behaviors by seeing them in action.
No amount of formal training can replace the “follow me and do what
I do” style of a direct leader. Additionally, just as a son emulates his
father’s example in order to win approval, host nation militaries try to
earn praise by following the example of leaders they trust and respect.
Tactically, this is the first step to professionalizing the host nation’s
military. Subsequently, the relationship should morph into a “marriage”
type espoused by Dr. Simons. Failure to lead and earn trust means the
recommendations in this article are doomed to fail.
Civic action as the ultimate litmus test of military readiness to
partner is a fantastic recommendation and should leverage the existing
Civil Affairs organization within the military. I also agree flag officers
should retain the authority to curtail these operations when the host
nation’s military proves unable or unwilling to provide basic civil services for their citizens. I argue the partnership envisioned by Dr. Simons
should be tactically implemented as a two-stage process; first, in a direct
leadership role of the host nation’s military, and then in an advisory role
once trust is earned between both parties. I also think that coercive
diplomacy and prioritization of American interests are viable diplomatic
options for gaining rapid tactical advantages in spite of the indictment
they are given in the article. Unfortunately, there is simply not room in
this commentary to expound fully, though many will agree that creating
an asymmetry of motivation to comply with US desires is sometimes
necessary ( vis-à-vis Pakistan’s air space after 9/11).
While the professional soldier has a long and illustrious history
associated with the storied ideal of the “warrior poet,” Dr. Simons is
advocating for a new twist on an old ideal—the Warrior Diplomat.
Conceptually, this is a sound and timely ideal that limits American
expenditure of manpower and treasure. This goal becomes more important in endeavors that increasingly require long time commitments to
avoid the fate we see in Iraq today. With the addition of leadership
skills to Dr. Simons’s list of required traits, her ideals can certainly be
implemented “on the cheap” compared to the large scale COIN strategy
recently promoted by General Petreaus. In an era of shrinking budgets
and growing crises around the globe, Dr. Simons’s recommendations are
much more realistic.

The Author Replies
Anna Simons

M

any thanks to SFC Tomlin for the seriousness with which
he took my arguments. I agree with him: partnering should
last decades, if not longer. However, I also want to be clear:
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determining whether we have a worthwhile partner should not take
decades. Indeed, it should not even take a decade.
We Americans should be very cautious and not fall for laws of
“averages” when it comes to partnering, advising, stability operations,
nation-building, counterinsurgency, or anything else involving other
countries’ militaries. Yes, according to current conventional wisdom,
a successful counterinsurgency takes at least a decade to wage. But this
is precisely why I concentrated on the Huk Rebellion. What Ramon
Magsaysay and Edward Lansdale accomplished not only represents a
short, decisive success, but should suggest that every case is sufficiently
unique; none should be treated as an average anything. Otherwise, it
becomes too easy to want to reach for manuals rather than do what
Lansdale did: read the situation in the Philippines for itself, and not for
something else.
I also turned to Lansdale because the success he assisted with
required minimal time, minimal money, and a minimal footprint—but a
great deal of nondoctrinaire thinking and a willing partner. Magsaysay’s
willingness, along with his and Lansdale’s wile, were key. Willingness to
turn the Filipino Army around preceded legitimacy. And, again, willingness should never be too hard for advisors to accurately gauge.
As for the issue of “direct leadership,” I agree with SFC Tomlin.
Taking charge was surely the easiest way for American and British
leaders to attain results during World War II. However, sensibilities and
sensitivities have shifted considerably since then. It is hard if not impossible to imagine where an American would be allowed to ‘lead’ another
military’s forces today. Guerrilla forces, maybe. But a unit in a sovereign
country’s military? We did not even attempt that in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Nor is it clear whether it would be locals or the American electorate who
would resist such a notion more vigorously.
At the same time, SFC Tomlin alludes to the attributes advisors
should possess. I again agree. They do need to lead by example – which
means their comportment needs to be beyond reproach. They must
embody the best our military has to offer in terms of maturity and
expertise. Of course, this means that what American advisors communicate nonverbally is as important as anything they say. In fact, I’d
submit that the 21st century challenge for “warrior-diplomats” or for
any Americans sent abroad to advise foreign forces is to be able to lead
without taking charge.

Review Essays
Drones, Drone Strikes, and US Policy: The
Politics of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Ulrike Esther Franke
© 2014 Ulrike Esther Franke

T

he use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in military operations
is currently among the most hotly debated topics in the national
and international media. While at first few showed interest in
this military technology, the increasing number of missile strikes carried
out via UAVs in remote areas of Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia by the
United States Armed Forces and the CIA has raised public awareness.
Today, reports on “drone strikes” are published daily; UAV names such
as Global Hawk, Predator, or Reaper are on everyone’s lips. Criticism
of the use of unmanned technology has equally gained momentum.
Several organizations lobby for the complete or partial ban of drones,
efforts which have resulted in a discussion on adding a protocol to the
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to ban fully autonomous
UAVs. High-ranking members of the US defense community have
advised caution regarding the use of armed drones and propose moratoria on US drone strikes.1
Drones—unmanned, remotely piloted, aerial vehicles, short
UAVs—are now used by the armed forces of approximately 70 countries around the world. The club of armed UAV holders remains more
exclusive; for the moment, its members only include Israel, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and most likely China and Iran. This situation, however, is likely to change sooner rather than later with many
countries considering the procurement of armed drones.
The four books reviewed in this essay are all motivated by the belief
that “the precipitous increase in drone use we have witnessed over the
past few years represents just the beginning of the proliferation and
widespread use of UAVs, across many contexts.”2 Disagreement may
reign over whether or not this development is positive; however, the
authors agree on one point: drones are here to stay.
Many articles and papers have been written on UAV use, but
scholarly debate has been surprisingly slow with academia only getting
intensively involved in recent years. Accordingly, this review features
works by a journalist, an anti-drone activist, and several academics.

Winning the Battle but Losing the Hearts and Minds—The
Importance of Drone Perceptions

Perceptions matter, sometimes even more than reality. Drones certainly have a dreadful reputation—even though they may not necessarily
1     David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum, “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,”
The New York Times, May 16, 2009.
2     Bradley Strawser, ed., Killing by Remote Control. The Ethics of an Unmanned Military (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 9.
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deserve it. This is what Brian Glyn Williams
tells readers in Predators: The CIA’s Drone War
on al Qaeda.
Williams, a professor of Islamic History
at the University of Massachusetts at
Dartmouth and an expert on the history of
the Middle East, cofounded in 2009 UMass
Drone, a research project and open-source
online database on attacks carried out via
armed drones.3 With Predators, Williams aims
at “record[ing] the history of what amounts
to an all-out CIA drone war on the Taliban
and al Qaeda.”4 A historian by training, he
claims wanting to stay neutral in the emotive
drone debate: “Proponents and opponents
Brian Glyn Williams, Predators: The CIA’s
of the campaign can do with this story what
Drone War on al Qaeda (Washington DC:
Potomac Books, 2013), 281 pages, $29.95. they will.”5 His neutrality may be debatable;
Williams clearly has his own opinion on
whether the use of drones in counterterrorism is effective. Nevertheless,
Predators is recommended reading to those interested in how US counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan and elsewhere have affected civilian
populations living in the targeted countries.
Williams studies the impact of the missile strikes by US drones
in remote regions of the world, in particular in Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The book is clearly enhanced by
Williams’s deep knowledge of Pakistani politics and the Pashtun tribal
areas. He ensures his readers get at least a general notion of its history,
emphasizing that the FATA has always been an independent entity
rather than a proper part of the Pakistani state.
Williams’s main argument has three parts: (1) The US drone strikes
in Pakistan are precise and succeed in killing high-value targets and
lower-level Taliban operatives (some of whom have plotted against the
United States and other Western nations); (2) The perception of the
strikes is very negative in Pakistan and abroad; (3) The drone campaign
may ultimately prove counterproductive as it alienates the public whose
hearts and minds need to be won.
In Williams’s words, the United States:
[C]ontinue[s] to wrestle with a paradox. While the war against the Taliban
was transformed into a hunt for HVTs [high-value targets], it became
obvious that America’s most advanced weapon in the hunt for elusive terrorists might also be their worst enemy in the underlying battle to win the
hearts and minds of the people of this volatile region;6
Perceptions can be more important than reality;7 and

3     UMASS Drone Home Page, http://www.umassdrone.org/.
4     Brian Glyn Williams, Predators: The CIA’s Drone War on al Qaeda (Washington, DC: Potomac
Books, 2013), xi.
5     Ibid.
6     Ibid., 38.
7     Ibid., 207.
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Drone strikes are a public relations and strategic disaster in Pakistan.8

Williams argues the missile strikes by American UAVs are precise
and kill comparatively few civilians because of six distinct factors:
bureaucratic safeguards ensuring targets are selected properly; UAVs’
ability to loiter for a long time, which increases intelligence and allows a
strike at the most opportune moment; high resolution cameras; human
intelligence on the ground thanks to a spy network and support by the
Pakistani government and security services; the use of smaller missiles; and the tactic to target combatants while they are in vehicles.9 By
analyzing many strikes, he shows that although mistakes and accidents
have caused civilian casualties, the majority of those killed are highvalue targets and lower-level Taliban operatives. Williams’s analysis of
the strikes is thorough; his assessment and critique of some of those
organizations collecting data on these strikes is at times, however, disproportionate and would have benefited from more extensive editing.
The fact that the strikes are efficient has clearly not reached the
Pakistani public, or rather, Williams argues, it was not communicated
properly: “Without an American public relations campaign to counteract the critics’ attacks on the drone efforts, they remained a mystery
for most outsiders, who assumed the worst.”10 Misperceptions do not
only exist regarding information on the number of civilian casualties.
Many Pakistanis were and still are outraged by the apparent US drones’
incursions into their national territory. Williams argues:
[B]oth their elected leaders (Musharraf, Zardari, and Gilani) and their military leaders have actively supported the drone campaign—so much so that
they have allowed the CIA to run drone strikes on the Taliban and al Qaeda
from the Shamsi Air base in Pakistan. If the United States is, or was, allowed
to operate on Pakistani soil with Pakistani troops guarding the drone base
at Shamsi, their operations cannot be termed a violation of sovereignty.”11

But, Williams criticizes, neither the United States nor the Pakistani
government has made real efforts to fight misperceptions or even
deliberate misrepresentations, which is why these misperceptions have
spread. Ultimately, the reader is left wondering whether this is all worth
it: “Opinion in Pakistan, a country of 190 million people, is being turned
against the United States all for the sake of killing hundreds of low-level
Taliban fighters.”12

The Macro View

Mark Mazzetti’s The Way of the Knife is not about the use of UAVs per
se. Rather, Mazzetti, The New York Times national security correspondent
and Pulitzer Prize winner, discusses more generally the new ways of
US military action: the use of a “scalpel” rather than a “hammer”— a
phrase coined by former chief counterterrorism advisor John Brennan
and which inspired the book’s title.13 For Mazzetti, the “way of the
8     Ibid., 206.
9     Ibid., 101-110.
10     Ibid., 86.
11     Ibid., 189.
12     Ibid., 212.
13     The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan at CSIS, May 26, 2010.
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knife” is, however, not a positive metaphor
but consists in “a shadow war waged across
the globe” in which “America has pursued
its enemies using killer robots and specialoperations troops.”14
The book is based on hundreds of interviews with current and former government
officials as well as members of the CIA and
the military. Mazzetti opens the black box
of some of the most secretive US organizations—the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC),
the State Department, and the Pentagon.
Mazzetti describes, placing much focus on
the story of individuals, how the context of
Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife. The
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the following
CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends
military interventions have transformed the
of the Earth (New York: Penguin Press,
2013), 381 pages, $29.95.
United States and its ability to wage wars.
In the book, the author explains how US intelligence and military
work became blurred and how it militarized the CIA. In the early 2000s,
“the Pentagon had the capabilities for hunting-and-killing operations,
but the CIA had the authorities.”15 After 9/11, and due to the workings
of a number of influential officials, the CIA revived and JSOC came
of age. The result was a jockeying between the Pentagon and CIA
for supremacy in new American conflicts. Eventually, “the Central
Intelligence Agency has become a killing machine, an organization
consumed with man hunting,”16 while JSOC became “the secret army
. . . needed to fight a global war.”17
Mazzetti retraces the development of the CIA since the 1990s. He
describes how the agency lost most of its power with the end of the Cold
War and some embarrassing revealings of past activities. This changed
with the Global War on Terror. The CIA is “no longer a traditional espionage service devoted to stealing the secrets of foreign governments,
[it] has become a killing machine, an organization consumed with man
hunting.”18 The descriptions of the inner-CIA discussions about the
role of the agency and their use of armed UAVs are particularly interesting. When the first missiles where strapped onto Predator aircraft in
2000, the CIA did not show much enthusiasm for them. The aircraft
“looked like a gangly insect and had a loud engine that made it sound
like a flying lawnmower.”19 Also, in this pre-9/11 world, “the idea of
the CIA establishing military-style bases anywhere in the world seemed
crazy.”20 Targeted assassinations were not an option: “We’re not like
that. We’re not Mossad,” Richard Clarke is cited saying. A former head
of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Centre later told the 9/11 Commission
14     Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife. The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth
(New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 5.
15     Ibid., 81.
16     Ibid., 4.
17     Ibid., 75.
18     Ibid., 4.
19     Ibid., 91.
20     Ibid., 92.
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that in the years before the attacks, they would have refused a direct
order to kill bin Laden.21
The JSOC is portrayed as the brain child of Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld—the chapter on JSOC is entitled “Rumsfeld’s Spies.”
In it, Mazzetti describes how Rumsfeld “envied the spy agency’s ability
to send its operatives anywhere, at any time, without having to ask
permission.”22 His answer? “[T]o make the Pentagon more like the
CIA.”23 Eventually, JSOC became “the secret army [Rumsfeld] needed
to fight a global war.”24
Readers predominantly interested in UAVs will find chapter 5 particularly informative; in it, Mazzetti describes the initial stages of the
CIA’s drone program. Equally enlightening are Mazzetti’s reports of
several instances where drones were used because manned operations
were considered too risky politically. Putting boots on the ground would
be considered an invasion, while putting armed drones in the air to do
the same job was considered less of an infraction.25
Mazzetti’s book is an interesting and even entertaining work, loaded
with interview quotes and background information. He underlines the
importance of the context in which the new US way of warfare was born
as well as the role specific individuals played. Indeed, his focus on the
individuals involved can, at times, be distracting. The author rarely mentions a person without giving his or her background—education, family
situation, and career development. This, combined with the novel-like
writing style, can at times distract from more important elements.
Furthermore, there is no chronological and very little geographical or
thematic order in Mazzetti’s writing—trying to find a specific piece of
information can, therefore, be challenging. This critique notwithstanding, this book should lie on the nightstand of all those readers interested
in the CIA and the inner workings of a nation at war.

Stop the Drones—The Activist’s View

No review on drone literature would be complete without Medea
Benjamin’s Drone Warfare, which has become one of the most-read books
on UAV use. Benjamin is a political activist, best known for her interruption of President Obama’s counterterrorism speech at the National
Defense University in May 2013 where she demanded to “take the drones
out of the hands of the CIA” and to end signature strikes.
There is no ambiguity—Benjamin is an activist, and Drone Warfare
is an activist’s book. It is not a book about drone use, but against it.
Benjamin’s position is clear: “The drone wars represent one of the greatest travesties of justice in our age.”26 For her, UAVs are “death robots,”27
“killing machines,”28 and “killer drones.”29 The book is a pamphlet
21     Ibid., 88.
22     Ibid., 68.
23     Ibid., 68.
24     Ibid., 75.
25     Ibid., 116, 133.
26     Medea Benjamin, Drone Warfare. Killing by Remote Control (London: Verso, 2013), 124.
27     Ibid., 53.
28     Ibid., 28.
29     Ibid., 15.
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against armed drones, and parts of it could
double as a pacifist manifest. Benjamin
quotes President Eisenhower’s famous statement that “Every gun that is made, every
warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who
hunger and are not fed, those who are cold
and are not clothed.”30 Following this same
logic, she criticizes the procurement of US
drones during a financial crisis which “led to
the slashing of government programs from
nutrition supplements for pregnant women
to maintenance of national parks.”31 The
book is permeated by emotional stories of
maimed Pakistani and Afghan children and
parents who have to bury their sons “in the
Medea Benjamin, Drone Warfare. Killing
by Remote Control (London: Verso, 2013), dry cold soil of the village they had loved.”32
246 pages, $16.95.
The last two chapters are dedicated to activism against drone use and US military policy.
This is one side of Benjamin’s book. At the same time, Drone Warfare
is also an informative, well-researched work that provides the reader
with an extensive list of references. Benjamin tries to discuss the most
important aspects of the use of armed UAVs: the history and development of drones, the drone market, the points of view of drone pilots,
the legality and morality of their use, drone use by other countries, and
the points of view of drone use by terrorists and victims. As informative literature on UAV use is still scarce and mainly comes in forms
of newspaper reports, this in itself is laudable. Her discussion of the
drone market and the UAV-“military-industrial-complex” is particularly
enlightening. Even well-informed readers can be sure to find new pieces
of information and good quotes. Readers new to the subject get an overview of the main points of discussion.
Unfortunately, Benjamin’s generic opposition to the use of armed
drones stands in the way of an academically rigorous discussion of the
topic. Her critique is unfocused, as the object of her criticism is not clear.
She often does not differentiate between the technology, i.e., unmanned
weaponry, and policy, or using unmanned weaponry in specific ways
in specific contexts. This is a general problem of the drone debate; for
Benjamin it means that a lot of her criticism appears ill-directed.
At times, her critique of both the wars and drones appears a bit
naïve, as no alternative is proposed. It is not clear what Benjamin argues
in favor of. When she criticizes that “[w]hen military operations are
conducted through the filter of a far-away video camera, there is no
possibility of making eye contact with the enemy and fully realizing
the human cost of an attack,” the reader is left wondering what the
alternative would be.33 Returning to a type of warfare in which soldiers
make eye contact with their enemies (a type of warfare lying long in
30     Ibid., 54.
31     Ibid., 17.
32     Ibid., 111.
33     Ibid., 160.
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the past, not only since the advent of drones)? Benjamin fails to answer
these questions.
Benjamin’s book is a good introduction to the topic and interesting
read even for those familiar with the debate. One should, however, be
advised to counterbalance the biased view with other, preferably more
academic and analytically rigorous accounts.

Gut Instincts are not Enough—Academia’s Contribution

Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military adds
academic and analytical rigour to the discussion. In the current drone
debate—largely dominated by journalists and activists and often conducted on an emotional level—this book serves as a reminder of the
merits of scholarly work. The volume was edited by Bradley Jay Strawser,
assistant professor of Philosophy at the United States Naval Postgraduate
School in Monterey, California. Strawser is best-known by students of
drone warfare through his groundbreaking article “Moral Predator, The
Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles.”34
While Strawser, because of this paper, is sometimes considered a
drone advocate, his agenda in Killing by Remote Control is to “push the
scholarly conversation [over the ethics of drones] to a deeper analytic
level.”35 He believes the debate needs to move out of the “first wave” of
journalistic attention: “those of us working on and thinking seriously
about these questions need to move out of those early phases […]. Killing
by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military is part of that deeper
analytic push.”36
The book’s chapters discuss the ethics of using remotely controlled
weapons for lethal missions. The focus lies on armed UAVs, targeted
killings, and autonomous systems. Many tricky ethical questions are
addressed in the book:
•• Can drone warfare be analyzed through
the lenses of Just War Theory or are new
theories and rules needed?
•• Does the use of UAVs undermine military
virtues?
•• Does the use of UAVs imply the judgment that the targets of such weapons are
expendable while the operators are not?
•• Do UAVs make war more likely and is this
necessarily a negative development?
•• Should extreme military asymmetry in
warfare be condemned?
•• Are there ethical differences between
Strawser, ed., Killing by Remote
remotely piloted and autonomous Bradley
Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned
Military (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 296 pages, $49.95.

34     Bradley Jay Strawser, “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles”
Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010): 342-68.
35     Strawser, Killing by Remote Control, 5.
36     Ibid.
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weapons?
In the particularly thought-provoking chapter 6, “Robot Guardians:
Teleoperated Combat Vehicles in Humanitarian Military Intervention,”
Zack Beauchamp and Julian Savulescu address the claim that armed
drones will make war easier and, therefore, more likely—an assertion
frequently brought forward by anti-drone activists. The authors argue
that “lowering the threshold is not, as commonly assumed, necessarily
a bad thing. In at least one case, the bug is in fact a feature: drones
have the potential to significantly improve the practice of humanitarian
intervention.”37 In their opinion, often, “the wars states do not fight
are the ones they most ought to,” namely, interventions to stop human
rights abuses and crimes against humanity.38 The reason for the reticence
is casualty aversion. If drones make going to war easier as they minimize the risk to the intervening soldiers, this means that intervening
for humanitarian reasons would equally be made easier. Furthermore,
according to Beauchamp and Savulescu, when states grant significant
weight to minimizing their own casualties, “they are more likely to
fight in ways that result in significant—and preventable—loss of civilian life.”39 UAVs could, therefore, help to reduce civilian casualties in
humanitarian interventions.
Avery Plaw’s chapter “Counting the Dead: The Proportionality of
Predation in Pakistan,” should become compulsory reading for anyone
interested in the discussion of the effectiveness of targeted killing via
drones. Plaw, a colleague of Brian Glyn Williams at UMass Drone,
analyzes the numbers on civilian casualties in Pakistan gathered by the
four “most rigorous and transparent databases” that track the impact of
drone strikes, namely The New America Foundation, The Long War Journal,
UMass Drone, and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.40 By meticulously
studying their numbers, Plaw concludes the missile attacks have been
“highly effective in eliminating enemy operatives, including key
leaders, particularly when these HVTs [high-value targets] are hidden
in inaccessible and politically problematic locations like the FATA.”41
Furthermore, Plaw shows that US nondrone operations in the FATA,
such as precision artillery strikes or commando raids, have caused much
higher civilian casualties than attacks via drones. Therefore, he argues
that the issue of proportionality does not provide a basis “for claiming
that US drone strikes in general are either unethical or illegal (although
this does not preclude such claims on other grounds).”42
Not all of the authors see the development towards an increased
use of UAVs positively though. David Whetham (chapter 4 “Drones and
targeted killing: Angels or Assassins?”) warns the US strikes in remote
areas of Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia are establishing a norm which
“doesn’t get used just by ‘nice people’.”43 He criticizes the United States
for not being more transparent with regard to its actions.
37     Ibid., 106.
38     Ibid., 114.
39     Ibid., 112.
40     Ibid., 126.
41     Ibid., 145.
42     Ibid., 127.
43     Ibid., 78.
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Without transparency as to why an individual has been killed, a targeted
killing carried out anywhere for the best of reasons and in the most careful,
conscientious, and professional way might as well be considered an assassination or just plain murder. If a state is not prepared to provide any of that
information at all or any reason or justification for a killing, then we should
refrain from calling such an action targeted killing and instead call it what it
effectively becomes—an execution.44

In “War without Virtue?” (chapter 5), Australian philosopher
Robert Sparrow expresses concerns that the use of UAVs for military
purposes poses a significant threat to martial virtues such as physical
and moral courage, loyalty, honor, and mercy. In his view, the introduction of UAVs marks “a significant quantitative—and perhaps even
qualitative—change in the nature of military combat.”45 Because of the
absence of risk to life and limb, and the fighting in complete safety,
martial virtues are no longer required. For Sparrow, this is a “disturbing
prospect.”46
It is impossible to do each paper of an edited volume justice in a
short review. Each of the eleven chapters in Killing by Remote Control
deserves more attention. The collection’s main contribution, however,
does not lie solely in the quality of its chapters and well-made arguments.
Rather, the volume in its entirety demonstrates the valuable contribution
scholarly writing can make to the current drone debate.
As editor Bradley Strawser emphasizes, it is crucial to question one’s
beliefs and intuitions. At first sight, there appears to be “something
profoundly disturbing about the idea of a war conducted by computer
console operators, who are watching over and killing people thousands
of kilometers away.”47 On closer examination, though, the views “that
something is intrinsically wrong with this form of killing over other
forms of killing, simply in virtue of being remotely controlled, across all
possible circumstances . . . are surprisingly hard to articulate consistently
and clearly.”48 Strawser’s call to look closer and be more rigorous is particularly convincing since he admits “in following the arguments where
they led, I ultimately arrived at several conclusions rather far afield from
my initial ‘gut instincts’ that first got me interested in the topic.”49 “Gut
instincts” can and should not lead an academic debate. Rather, “such
sentiments must be unpacked . . . ; an argument is needed, not mere
assertion. At this point in the debate, we still await such an argument.”50
Killing by Remote Control is an important step in this direction.

Conclusion

Each of the four books discussed in this review has specific merits—
Predator gives a fascinating account of the Pakistani perspective; The Way
of the Knife allows an insight into the black box of US state agencies in their
global fight against terrorism; Drone Warfare is an appealing example of
activism literature; and Killing by Remote Control is a useful scholarly work
44     Ibid., 82, 83.
45     Ibid., 86.
46     Ibid., 104.
47     Ibid., 88.
48     Ibid., 10
49     Ibid., xvii.
50     Ibid., 12.
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on the ethics of drone use. While these books naturally have flaws, as a
whole they form a comprehensive overview of the current drone debate.
The drone literature still suffers from shortcomings. As the four
books show, the debate revolves almost exclusively around the use of
armed UAVs for lethal operations. Unarmed UAVs, which have proliferated extensively over the last few years, are rarely, if ever, discussed.
While “killer robots” may be more attention-grabbing than surveillance
UAVs, the almost complete disregard of other UAV types is deplorable.
The focus also predominantly lies on the US use of drones even though
more and more countries procure and use UAVs. More research is needed
with regard to these developments. In general, more data, official data in
particular, is needed, such as the numbers of civilian deaths caused by
missiles fired from UAVs.
One interesting fact that deserves more attention is touched on
by several of the authors but not discussed in detail. It appears that
operations—even lethal ones—carried out by UAVs are perceived as
being less intrusive, less of an infraction of a state’s sovereignty. Brian
Williams shows how the Pakistani public appears to accept UAVs more
than boots on the ground: “The Pakistanis were willing to countenance
the occasional civilian death or attacks on militants if they were administered by unmanned drones, US troops landing on Pakistani territory
was essentially construed as an act of war.”51 Mark Mazzetti makes
a similar point. While most international lawyers would not support
such a view, President Obama recently voiced the same idea when he
discussed the drone program in May 2013. He warned about the risk
that manned operations would “lead [the US] to be viewed as occupying armies, unleash a torrent of unintended consequences,” and “may
trigger a major international crisis.”52 Sending drones, the message was,
is much less controversial.
It is clear that much research remains to be done with regard
to the study of UAV use for military purposes. The works reviewed
here provide a useful basis for further research and are a good step
in this direction.

51     Williams, Predators, 74.
52     The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at the National
Defense University, May 23, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/
remarks-president-national-defense-university.

Review Essays: Terrill

131

T. E. Lawrence: Enigmatic Military Visionary
W. Andrew Terrill

T

.E. Lawrence is the most well-known British national hero of
World War I. In the Arabian Desert, Lawrence waged a war of
movement against Turkish forces that contrasted starkly with the
gruesome deadlock on the Western front. In pursuing his own version
of desert combat, Lawrence was an early and important advocate of
modern guerrilla warfare tactics, and his exploits during the 1916-18
desert war showed significant military gains for his highly inventive and
unorthodox form of combat. Geopolitically, Lawrence’s actions had a
direct bearing on the formation of the modern Middle East, and his
controversial legacy is still important today. Under these circumstances,
it is hardly surprising that a number of Lawrence biographies have been
published during and after his lifetime. More recently, there has been a
notable increase in such works in the years following the US invasion
of Iraq in March 2003. As the United States encountered ongoing difficulties in that country, Lawrence’s actions throughout the Arab world
may have seemed relevant to the important strategic and operational
questions that needed answers. These questions revolved around not just
guerrilla warfare but also finding ways in which Arab and Western troops
could build mutual trust and function effectively as partners.

Lawrence as a Military Thinker: Amateur Among Professionals

Former war correspondent Scott Anderson has some interesting
insights about Lawrence’s understanding of military culture and the
conduct of military operations, including his willingness to challenge
conventional wisdom. Anderson notes that Lawrence was well-read on
military topics, but he had no formal officer’s training prior to receiving a
1914 direct commission as an acting second lieutenant. As a junior officer,
Lawrence was assigned to intelligence duties
in Cairo due to his understanding of Middle
Eastern cultures and the Arabic language.
He developed these skills over his four years
as a junior field archeologist, primarily based
in Syria. In his early army career, Lawrence
was a brilliant intelligence officer, but he
also had a rebellious personality and maintained a dismissive attitude toward higher
authority. His sometimes uncomfortable
encounters with military bureaucracy and
various doctrinaire senior officers also gave
him serious doubts about the future of the
war. Early in his military career, Lawrence
provided strategic briefings to a number of
senior officers assigned to the Mediterranean
Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia: War,
Expedition (MED-EX) and was appalled Scott
Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making
when he found out about their plan for of the Modern Middle East (New York:
an invasion at Gallipoli, Turkey, which he Doubleday, 2013), 57 pages, $28.95.
W. Andrew Terrill, Ph.D. is a research professor at the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks,
PA.
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viewed as a “despicable mess.” While Lawrence expected the landing at
Gallipoli to be a disaster, even he was probably surprised by the scale of
the catastrophe. The young officer was further disillusioned as evidence
began to pour in that the alternative invasion site advocated by the Cairo
intelligence office appeared to have been a golden opportunity for an
easy victory. This alternative plan called for an invasion of Alexandretta
(now called Iskenderun) which was defended by a garrison of mostly
Arab conscripts on the verge of mutiny against their Turkish officers.
Lawrence had an even closer view of the next Middle Eastern
disaster following Gallipoli. This was the effort to seize Baghdad from
the east with an Anglo-Indian army. This force advanced deep into the
Iraqi hinterland without properly protected supply lines and the Turks
correspondingly surrounded and isolated it in the city of Kut. As with
Gallipoli, proper military procedures were disregarded due to a prevailing belief that the enemy was “tough but slow-witted” and, therefore, did
not need to be treated in the same way as a European adversary. Also
like Gallipoli, there was a high price for this arrogance. Lawrence was
called in from Cairo in late 1915 to help British Major General Charles
Townshead negotiate with the Turks for the release of his surrounded
troops. Through Lawrence and other intermediaries, the best the British
commander could do was to seek to bribe the Turkish general with gold.
This treasonous offer was quickly and contemptuously rejected and the
entire British force of 13,000 was compelled to surrender. As a mediator
brought in for the specific task of negotiating with the Turks, Lawrence
was not made a prisoner of war, but he had a firsthand view of the fruits of
poor planning and lofty British distain for the enemy. Closer to the Cairo
headquarters, British offensives to break through the Turkish line at Gaza
failed twice. Lawrence was also deeply unhappy with what he called the
“staggering incompetence” on the Western front in Europe where two
of his brothers, Frank and Will, were killed in 1915 and 1916 respectively.
In generating his own strategic vision, Lawrence believed the British
should embrace the “Arab way of war” as the organizing principle for
the “Arab Revolt” against Turkey. This uprising had originated with
Sherif (later King) Hussein of the Hejaz (in what is now western Saudi
Arabia). In Lawrence’s view, warfare in Arabia bore a striking resemblance to the medieval warfare he had studied at Oxford with its use of
multiple decentralized forces under various autonomous nobles. Arab
raiders had no military discipline, no NCOs, and numerous debates
among themselves over just about everything they did. In evaluating
their potential against the Turks, Lawrence believed that Bedouin forces
fought effectively in small groups of raiders while they were usually
extremely poor raw material for training as conventional troops. In
particular, he saw the potential for Arab forces to play an effective role
in the war through hit-and-run strikes, long-range sharpshooting, and
a tradition of surprise attacks. Lawrence felt that the Arab forces could
make their greatest contribution by avoiding large battles and striking
unexpectedly at weak points in the Turkish defense, particularly logistical units and facilities and most especially the Hejaz railway. Lawrence
also hoped (as most competent military leaders do) to find ways to inflict
the absolute maximum damage with the minimum loss of life.
Lawrence gained the trust of the Arab Revolt’s leaders in ways that
went beyond simply being polite and knowing the Arabic language.
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Lawrence also passionately identified with Arab aspirations for independence. While this fervor is well known, Anderson goes further than
many authors and suggests that Lawrence became more loyal to Arab
independence than to anything else in the war. He notes that Lawrence
told the leading Arab field commander, Prince Feisal, about the SykesPicot Agreement for British and French domination of post-war Arab
lands, while it was still a state secret and by doing so technically committed treason. This act was the beginning of what Anderson calls “a
quiet war against his own government” where he “arguably betrayed his
country” (486). Anderson also notes that Lawrence attempted to convince an American intelligence officer, Captain William Yale, to speak to
his superiors in favor of Arab independence and push against British and
especially French policies for dominating the post-war region. Viewed
in this light, it is difficult to see how Feisal or the other Arab leaders
could have found much fault with Lawrence. He had their political best
interests at heart and he served as their strongest advocate in British
circles especially when vying for British military resources including
weapons and gold.
Anderson’s charge of possible treason seems vastly overblown since
the future of the Arab world was yet to be decided at the Paris Peace
Conference where British policies on such issues were to be finalized
in coordination with the other allies. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was
mostly a place holder that did not represent final or fully formed policy.
Additionally, General Allenby later made it clear that Feisal should have
been told about the Sykes-Picot Agreement at some point and expressed
surprise in 1918 when Lawrence (dishonestly) told him he had not done
so. Moreover, the British leadership knew of Lawrence’s commitment
to Arab freedom, and always saw it as an asset (but not a guide for
policy). Lawrence himself gave his own take on the loyalty issue in a
more indirect manner. The former guerrilla leader, who was famous
for his monumental self-recrimination (bordering on masochism), never
indicated that he felt the slightest bit disloyal to the United Kingdom
as a result of his wartime conduct. Rather, for the rest of his life, he
brutally blamed himself for lying to the Arabs on his country’s behalf
over the issue of Arab independence. While Lawrence was torn by conflicting British and Arab interests and priorities, he inevitably defaulted
to British interests while trying desperately to help the Arabs within the
constraint of these priorities. If Lawrence betrayed his country, he never
knew it and never felt it.
In a departure from other Lawrence biographies, Anderson’s book
also devotes considerable attention to the activities of British intelligence
units in the Middle East and the various spy networks in the Middle
East. The book also follows the activities of American oilman, soldier,
and government official William Yale, Zionist leader Aaron Aronson,
and German “orientalist” and spy Curt Prufer. These individuals were
important to the history of the Middle East but mostly peripheral to
the story of T. E. Lawrence. One cannot help suspecting that Anderson
included their activities in such depth in order to distinguish it from the
numerous other Lawrence biographies. Readers will probably view this
approach as either a useful innovation or a mistake, depending on their
interest in these people.
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Lawrence’s Personality: Strengths and
Weakness

A different kind of book is Hero by bestselling author Michael Korda. This work
serves as a comprehensive biography of T.
E. Lawrence from his childhood until his
death in a 1935 motorcycle accident. The
title clearly indicates Korda’s reverence for
Lawrence, whom he refers to as both a hero
and a genius. In contrast to the evaluation
put forward by Anderson, Korda states, “It
is worth noting that even though Lawrence
wanted the Arabs to win, and hoped by
getting to Damascus first to invalidate the
Michael Korda, Hero: The Life and Legend Sykes-Picot Agreement, he never forgot that
of Lawrence of Arabia (New York: Harper
he was a British officer first and foremost”
Perennial, 2011), 762 pages, $17.99.
(400). In a slightly more equivocal statement
he also claims, “No man ever tried harder to
serve two masters than Lawrence” (400). This argument may be more
defensible than Anderson’s technical treason argument for reasons
already discussed. Additionally, Lawrence was certainly hostile to the
Middle Eastern aspirations of the United Kingdom’s French ally, but
he would hardly be the first Briton to view the interests of the United
Kingdom and France as divergent. He further assumed some sort of
post-war association between the Arabs and the United Kingdom and
saw this as good for both parties.
A recurring point in this study is that Lawrence, by purpose or happenstance, had something approaching the perfect background for his
role as a driving force for the revolt in Arabia. Lawrence’s credentials
included his years in the Arab world, understanding of Arab social
structure, language, and culture, and wide-ranging reading on military
topics. Lawrence’s undergraduate passion for medieval fortifications
gave him a “feel for topography,” which he developed even further as
an intelligence officer and mapmaker for British intelligence in Cairo.
While still an undergraduate working on his thesis, Lawrence walked
over 1,000 miles throughout the Middle East visiting 36 castles dating
back to the crusades. Lawrence was even a crack pistol shot, although he
later fell short on this count when he accidentally killed his own camel
while participating in a charge against Turkish forces around 40 miles
from Aqaba. Lawrence also had a high tolerance for hardships and a
dismissive attitude toward creature comforts that served him well as
a guerrilla leader. He had no trouble existing on small amounts of bad
food and was able to go without sleep for days at a time. He tolerated
repeated bouts of malaria, dysentery, infected boils, and other ailments.
According to Korda, Lawrence, “lived at some point beyond mere stoicism and behaved as if he were indestructible” (198). This endurance
gave him the ability to inspire others and earned him the respect of very
tough Bedouin leaders such as Auda Abu Tayi of the Howitat tribe.
Korda’s detailed consideration of Lawrence’s personality and pre-war
background may be especially useful for military audiences interested in
questions of leadership. Lawrence had a great deal to offer the military
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but was sometimes a difficult officer to manage. He often assumed (correctly) that he knew more than his superiors and had very little regard
for military rank. Yet some leaders, including Brigadier General Clayton
of the intelligence service and especially General Edmund Allenby commanded Lawrence’s deep respect and loyal service. General Allenby,
and Lawrence maintained an especially strong relationship based on
mutual trust. Lawrence made significant promises to Allenby and then
endured tremendous hardship to keep them to the extent he could do so.
Lawrence was always attentive to the danger of disappointing Allenby
and on occasion took very serious personal risks to avoid letting his
commander down. Allenby in turn “rode Lawrence on the loosest of
reins” (196). He provided him with goals and objectives and then allowed
the young commander to reach them in his own way. In first meeting
with Lawrence, Allenby was clearly on the same page as the emerging
guerrilla leader. As a former horse cavalry officer, he quickly saw the
potential of Lawrence’s mobile force for conducting hard-hitting raids.
Allenby’s support for the Arab Revolt remained unequivocal, although
London showed uneven interest, and the British government in India
was concerned about its potential to inspire rebellious Muslims in India.
As noted, Korda’s book is the only study under review that provides
a comprehensive examination of Lawrence’s post-war activities. In the
years following the war, Lawrence moved forward some important
tasks before seeking obscurity. He played a key role at the Paris Peace
Conference as an advisor to Feisal and advocate of Arab goals. He
further served for a year as a senior official of the colonial office working
with Winston Churchill and others to help establish the new states of
Iraq and Transjordan (later Jordan). The part of his life that is more
difficult to understand is his decision to serve in the Royal Air Force,
and more briefly in the Royal Tank Corps, as a junior enlisted man for
a number of years. Surely his efforts to help the Arab people achieve
greater autonomy and eventual independence could have continued
after the war with him serving in progressively more responsible positions. In some ways, Lawrence seemed more interested in atoning for his
perceived sins than seeking to mitigate them. Korda has more difficulties with this part of the book, sometimes maintaining that Lawrence’s
decision to seek obscurity was rational, understandable, and based on
wartime trauma. He also somewhat defends the way in which Lawrence
rode his motorcycle (“motorcycles always appear suicidal to those who
don’t ride one” (590), while also noting that many of Lawrence’s friends
were mortified at what they saw as his daredevil ways. Lawrence had
already had two potentially fatal accidents with his motorcycle before a
third accident claimed his life in 1935.

Lawrence and Guerrilla Warfare

James Schneider’s book is an examination of Lawrence’s role in revolutionizing irregular warfare. It deals almost exclusively with the desert
war and gives no attention to Lawrence’s activities before or after the war.
This is not a book based on newly uncovered information or sources on
Lawrence’s life. Rather, it is a commentary and elaboration on the reasoning behind Lawrence’s military theories and actions by a professor
emeritus of military theory at the School of Advanced Military Studies of
the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.
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This analysis is often conducted effectively
with Schneider teasing out the implications
of Lawrence’s views and analyzing why they
were effective in directing desert warfare
against conventional adversaries. He also
indicates the ways in which the Arab guerrilla forces were able to support General
Allenby’s conventional army as part of
the overall campaign. Schneider considers
Lawrence’s ideas about guerrilla warfare to
be a revolutionary reframing of the Arab
revolt. This reframing involved turning the
uprising into a war designed to exhaust the
Turkish enemy rather than seize territory or
capture cities such as Turkish–held Medina.
James Schneider, Guerrilla Leader: T. E.
Throughout this study, Schneider disLawrence and the Arab Revolt (New York:
plays a recurring interest in the concept of
Bantam, 2011), 328 pages, $28.00.
military leadership. He provides a particularly good critique of General Allenby, who despite early difficulties in
Europe became one of the war’s best generals. Schneider also considers
the role of Prince Feisal as a leader, although his most detailed consideration is naturally directed at Lawrence. Lawrence served as a key
decisionmaker on the distribution of British gold, weapons, and other
forms of support. Such responsibility creates leverage and opportunities
but only makes one a transactional military leader if it remains the sole
source of authority. Lawrence, however, quickly emerged as an inspiring
leader through his intelligence, bravery in battle, soaring oratory, and
total identification with their struggle against the Turks. Additionally
Schneider states that Lawrence increasingly relied on outstanding tribal
leaders for tactical leadership, thereby freeing him to provide purpose,
direction, and motivation to the Arab Revolt.
Schneider maintains that Lawrence was an effective leader because
he empathized with not only the wider goals of the Arab revolt, but also
with the needs of his own troops. Lawrence was sometimes reckless with
his own life, but never wasteful of the lives of the fighters who served
with him. The casualties inflicted on his forces troubled him deeply,
especially high among his personal bodyguard, who fought beside him
and were also needed due to the price on his head of twenty thousand
pounds alive or ten thousand dead. Scheider maintains that Lawrence’s
sensitivities dovetailed closely with the Arab view of warfare. He notes
that in Western militaries, the mission assigned by higher headquarters
almost always takes precedence over efforts to keep casualties low. In
contrast, among Arab raiders the welfare of the unit is almost always
more important since the fighters were often irreplaceable. If a mission
becomes too potentially costly in human lives, it is simply abandoned.
While Lawrence never willingly abandoned important missions set by
higher authority, he was careful to avoid striking well defended areas
and may have missed some lucrative targets of opportunity to protect
his own forces.
Schneider also states that Lawrence failed as a leader near the Arab
village of Tafas when, according to his book Seven Pillars of Wisdom,
Lawrence issued a “no prisoners” order to Arab forces moving against

Review Essays: Terrill

137

a retreating Turkish force after it had committed atrocities against Arab
villagers. Schneider maintains that at this point, Lawrence had lost his
“moral compass” and, therefore, his capacity for leadership. There are,
nevertheless, some uncertainties about this incident that Schneider
does not seem to consider. As is well known, Lawrence was a man of
extremely strong views about the Arab Revolt to the point that some
scholars view his writings as “sanitized” to portray the Arab army in the
best possible light.1 At no time was his version of events more suspect
than in the Tafas incident where he had been accused of being “transparently tendentious and misleading” for such factors as overemphasizing
the innocence of the Arab villagers, who were most likely well-armed
and in open rebellion against the Turks.2 James Barr (see below) has
additional reasons for doubting Lawrence’s account of Tafas based on
other eyewitness descriptions of the events there. Lawrence’s empathy,
which Schneider repeatedly notes as an asset, makes his acceptance of
the blame for this incident at least somewhat suspect. Events in Tafas
may have occurred despite Lawrence’s orders, and avenging Arab tribal
forces may have been uncontrollable by any one person at this point
regardless of leadership skills.

The Meaning of the Arab Revolt

Former journalist James Barr’s Setting the Desert on Fire is a focused
and thoughtful consideration of both the Arab Revolt and Lawrence’s
role in the uprising. More than any of the other books under review,
Barr considers the context and geopolitical consequences of Lawrence’s
actions by noting overlapping and clashing interests among a variety
of individuals, groups, and countries associated with the Middle East
theater. Like Anderson, Barr spends considerable effort sorting out
the motives and disagreements of a variety of nations and individuals.
Imperial powers like the United Kingdom and France had a number
of global interests and priorities, and many
of them were in contradiction. Adding to
the richness of the work, Barr is particularly nuanced in his understanding of Arab
tribal, regional, and other differences. He
also notes Lawrence’s own subtlety of mind
when considering intersecting political and
cultural/religious problems that came up
during the war. An important example of
Lawrence’s good judgment was his opposition to sending a British brigade into the
heart of the Hejaz. Non-Muslims are not
welcome in the Hejazi cities of Mecca and
Medina, but Lawrence believed that British
troops in this region were more of a political than a religious problem for the Arabs.
While religion might offer a strong religious James Barr, Setting the Desert on Fire:
Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War
justification for excluding Western troops, T.E.
in Arabia, 1916-1918 (New York: W.W.
Lawrence also knew that even Muslim Norton and Company, 2009), 362 pages,
troops from the British Empire would be $27.95.
1     John D. Grainger, The Battle for Syria, 1918-1920 (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2013), 176.
2     Ibid. p. 166.
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equally unwelcome in such large numbers. His judgment was allowed to
prevail in this instance because of the agreement of a number of senior
officers.
Barr notes that one of the first guerrilla raids against the Hejaz railway
was conducted by Arab forces accompanied by Major Herbert Garland,
a British explosives expert, who eventually taught Lawrence about
techniques for using mines and bombs. Garland’s raid was a success,
destroying an irreplaceable Ottoman locomotive and seriously disrupting rail traffic between Anatolia and the Hejaz. Yet Garland returned
to the base at Wajh hating everything about working with Arab forces.
In particular, he viewed Arab raiding forces as insufficiently committed
to the missions they were given, unwilling to move quickly, constantly
diverted by efforts to find forage for the camels, and democratic to a
fault so that nothing gets done until considerable squabbling is worked
out. A variety of other British officers were equally appalled by the Arab
propensity for looting and belief that they were entitled to go home
after they had acquired a sufficient level of booty. British complaints are
easily understood, but the culture clash also presented a serious problem
for British-Arab unity of effort. Lawrence, in contrast to many of his
contemporaries, attempted to immerse himself in Arab culture, accepting delays and other problems as the cost of doing business. Lawrence
stated that he wanted to “rub off his British ways.” He endeavored to act
according to tribal values even when, as a foreigner, he would have been
easily forgiven for not doing so, at least in small matters. He also dressed
in Arab clothing, unlike other British officers.
Barr further displays a strong understanding of the nature of the
Arab military campaigns and probably does the best job of explaining the evolution of Arab tactics in this conflict. Lawrence started by
attacking trains with explosives, destroying train tracks, and demolishing telegraph wires and poles. He also attacked Turkish patrols, and
Arab raids became larger and struck at more important targets over the
course of the war. On one important occasion, he changed his approach
to defend the town of Tafileh which was threatened by conventional
Turkish attack. Lawrence’s victory at Tafilah gave the Arab army some
increased credibility, but it never really outgrew its raiding heritage or
developed into an effective force for seizing and retaining territory. It
was not easy to guide an Arab army during this period, even when many
differences could be overcome with liberal amounts of gold. Among
the “regular troops” who had defected from the Ottoman army, Syrian
and Iraqi factions were often angry with each other and required constant mediation. Likewise, the inexhaustible capacity of Bedouin troops
for looting often made this a higher priority for them than externally
imposed military objectives. Some would even seize booty while they
were under fire. Accountability for British-provided gold and supplies
was often maddeningly nonexistent.
Barr agrees with Anderson who states that Lawrence was a
“booster” and an “apologist” for the Arabs with whom he served. The
most striking example of this behavior occurred during the previously
noted incident near the village of Tafas shortly after a Turkish brigade
committed a number of atrocities, including the murder of children.
Furious Arab leaders, and especially the Howeitat chieftain, Auda abu
Tayi, demanded revenge and wiped out the entire force, killing the
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wounded where they had fallen and refusing to allow enemy troops to
surrender. According to Barr, and in contrast to Schenider’s analysis,
Lawrence seems to have had nothing to do with the decision to kill the
wounded Turks, although he did take responsibility for it. Barr quotes
Lawrence as stating, “We ordered ‘no prisoners’ and the men obeyed”
(287). Other witnesses do not remember it that way. Ali Jawdat, a future
Iraqi prime minister, described how Lawrence attempted to save a group
of prisoners but was unable to do so in the face of Arab forces bent on
revenge. Another British officer, Frederick Peake, who worked closely
with Lawrence stated that he was certain Lawrence did all he could to
stop the massacre but the tribal force was “beyond control.” As overall
victory approached, Lawrence may simply not have been prepared to see
the Arab army criticized or portrayed as an avenging mob so he changed
the story to assume the blame himself.
In the final campaigns of the Middle East theater, Allenby continued
to view Lawrence as indispensible. The squandering of vast amounts of
gold by Prince Feisal’s younger brother Zaid convinced him that while
the Arabs had been doing “pretty well,” they were also an “unstable lot”
who needed British leaders “they know and trust” (224). In Allenby’s
scheme of action, Lawrence not only had to cut important railroad links
and destroy key bridges, but he had to do so at precise times so the
Turks would lose capability to move troops exactly when these troops
were needed. Often he accomplished these goals, although setbacks
occurred. The Arab army was also important in supporting Allenby’s
deception plan, which sought to convince the Turks that the main allied
force arrayed against them would not strike on the coast. In late 1918,
Arab forces severely disrupted railroad activity at the important railroad
hub of Deraa and moved on to play an important role in the liberation
of Damascus.

Conclusion

Obviously, one will find a tremendous degree of overlap in four
recent books on T. E. Lawrence, although the same story can appear
quite differently from alternative vantage points. Scott’s book may
annoy some readers by its continuous biographical forays into the lives
of people Lawrence barely knew, but it is exceptionally strong in other
respects including the discussion of Lawrence’s personal growth as a
strategist and leader. Korda’s book is outstanding as a childhood-tograve biography, although the author’s great regard for Lawrence may
have caused him to appear a little too apologetic for some of Lawrence’s
more eccentric decisions. The Schneider book is interesting as an intellectual exercise, but Barr’s study is probably most valuable for a military
audience due to its detailed description of the military campaigning
associated with the Arab revolt and the political context in which this
struggle was conducted. The strong link between military actions and
political outcomes is clear in all these books but is especially nuanced
in Barr’s study.
Surprisingly, US military personnel seeking answers about contemporary problems through the prism of Lawrence’s life may find such
answers elusive when examining what Korda presents as his almost
perfect background and preparation for his task of supporting the
Arab Revolt. Beyond Lawrence’s linguistic skills and his understanding
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of Arab history and sociology was his total identification with Arab
goals. Lawrence believed in Arab independence and was continuously
searching for ways to achieve this goal through Arab battlefield accomplishments. Without this total commitment, Lawrence would never have
been fully trusted by leaders such as Prince Faisal no matter how well he
could congregate Arabic verbs. As fearless and knowledgeable as he was,
T. E. Lawrence could never have become Lawrence of Arabia if he felt
his mission was to convince the Arabs that they had no interests apart
from those of the United Kingdom. He knew better, they knew better,
and this understanding was the basis of brilliant wartime collaboration.

Book Reviews
Predicting War
Who Wins? Predicting Strategic Success and
Failure in Armed Conflict
By Patricia L. Sullivan
Reviewed by Thomas G. Mahnken, Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic
Geography and National Security, US Naval War College

P

atricia L. Sullivan’s Who Wins? seeks to understand why strong states
so often are unable to achieve their aims in wars against weaker
adversaries. She demonstrates that the reason rests not merely with the
belligerents’ resolve or their strategic choices, but rather with the nature of
the political objectives they pursue. In particular, she argues strong states
are most likely to succeed when their aim is to seize territory from a weaker
opponent or overthrow its regime. By contrast, victory is least likely to
follow attempts to coerce a weaker adversary into changing its behavior.
This is a timely and important study, one that illuminates the relationship between political objectives, the value that statesmen and soldiers
attach to them, and victory. Two centuries ago, Carl von Clausewitz
wrote about the correlation between the value a state attaches to its ends
and the means it uses to achieve them:
Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political
object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for
it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds
the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace
must follow.

Sullivan delves deeply into this relationship, examining different
political objectives and how easy—or difficult—it has been for the
stronger power to achieve its aims in war. She develops several sets
of hypotheses and tests them systematically in conflicts from the end
of World War I to the present. It is a thoughtful and relevant work
of scholarship.
That said, one suspects that “predicting strategic success and failure
in armed conflict” (the book’s subtitle) using the model she describes
is more an art than a science. First, one wonders just how accurately
we can know a priori how much we, or our adversaries, value achieving a particular aim, or even what the precise aims of our opponents
are. As she points out in her recapitulation of conflict between Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq and the United States (31-43), such estimates are often
mistaken and frequently plagued by misperception. Furthermore, both
ends and assessment of the political, social, and economic costs of war
often change as a conflict unfolds. States may continue fighting beyond
the “rational” point of surrender when their leaders’ prestige becomes
invested in the war or the passions of the people become aroused.
Alternatively, heavy losses may lead to escalation of a conflict, changing
its character.
Second, it is worth questioning the author’s taxonomy of political objectives. At times, she portrays them as existing on a spectrum
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running from “brute force” objectives (including acquiring or defending
territory, seizing resources, overthrowing a regime, or defending state
sovereignty) to coercive ones involving changing an adversary’s policy
(46). In other places, she views such aims discretely (124), although her
main argument is built around the dichotomy between “brute force”
and “coercive” objectives. Yet the line between brute force and coercion
is hardly clear. Having seized territory (a “brute force” objective), a government must then coerce its adversary into renouncing efforts to retake
it. Indeed, most of the “brute force” objectives in Sullivan’s taxonomy
require a great deal of coercion to bring a war to a successful conclusion.
If there is to be a useful distinction among the varieties of aims that
states may pursue in war, it is likely that which Clausewitz drew between
wars fought for limited aims and those fought for unlimited aims. As
he wrote:
War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow
the enemy—to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus
forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his
frontier districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the
negotiating table.

The former is a true “brute force” aim, while the latter involves considerable coercive leverage.
These observations should not obscure the value of the volume. Who
Wins? is a book that both scholars and policymakers will find insightful
and thought-provoking.

Wargames, From Gladiators to Gigabytes
By Martin van Creveld
Reviewed by Douglas B. Campbell, Director, Center for Strategic Leadership
and Development, USAWC

M
Cambridge University
Press, 2013
321 pages
$27.00

artin van Creveld has produced an extensively researched and
exhaustively written history of wargaming. This is especially timely
given that wargaming is regaining visibility within the national security
community writ large. As the United States, NATO countries, and other
regional leaders seek to understand the national security issues developing post Arab Spring and, more specifically, post Iraq and Afghanistan,
wargames are returning as a key tool in this effort.
Van Creveld defines a wargame as a contest of opposing strategies
that, while separated from real warfare, simulates some key aspects of real
war. He begins his study examining the behavior of animals, then transitions into hunting, combat sports and contact sports, all which reflect
issues associated with warfare and wargames. Play fights, as he describes
them, provide the earliest indications of the conduct of wargames and
the concepts of wargaming. During his discussion of Great Fights—
staged engagements between primitive societies—he highlights some
of the limitations of wargames, which are encounters prearranged in
both time and place, sacrificing perhaps the most important “principle
of war,” surprise. Throughout the book, van Creveld constantly returns
to the theme regarding the limitations of wargames in substituting for
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real war. His extensive research into the behavior of tribes throughout
the world and his demonstration of similar behavior patterns where they
engage in “wargames” to settle issues and disputes provide a detailed
understanding of the universality of this behavior.
As he addresses single combat as wargames he starts with the interesting story of David and Goliath, attributing to David a strategy that
allowed him to exploit specific advantages to defeat his opponent. The
author spends considerable time discussing champions who fought in
lieu of major combat throughout ancient civilization. He then leads us
through the history of gladiators and ancient Rome and its eventual
decline due to the incredible cost of maintaining a professional combat
force used specifically to entertain people. The conduct of tournaments
during the Middle Ages, where champions and later knights, who
reflected the flower of their societies and fought each other for prestige,
honor, and advancement, reflects the same motto as modern soldiers of
fortune, “meet interesting people—and kill them.”
The changes that overtook warfare in the 15th and 16th centuries
had a significant impact on these types of games. The introduction of
gunpowder and firearms essentially eliminated the honor associated with
champions, who fought in tournaments to demonstrate their abilities
without fighting a war. Other games began to be used, and van Creveld
highlights chess as an example of a game that reduces the threat of physical injury while developing strategic thinking. Although chess reinforces
Clausewitz’s dictum that the objective of war is to overthrow the enemy,
i.e., capturing the opposing monarch, it reflects the imperfections van
Creveld continues to raise regarding wargames—the lack of any of the
threats or pains associated with war.
He traces the rise of the hex-based board games that allowed leaders
to conduct complex wargames as we understand them today. By the
19th century, wargames that used complex rules and a hex-based board
system allowed leaders to use them for military training and education.
They encouraged leaders to practice command and control and exposed
them to the world of strategy and dealing with the paradoxical and
unexpected. He also highlights the introduction of what we today call
the “after action review.” Each game ended or was supposed to end
with a thorough discussion. The objective was to find out what had
been simulated, what had not been simulated, and what had and had
not worked and why. One of the other interesting points he raises is
that while military leaders selected the scenarios to wargame, the vast
majority of them were never translated into reality. Van Creveld does
identify the key objective of military wargames is to allow participants to
try their hand at dealing with the unexpected, whether a scenario is ultimately realized is almost irrelevant. Wargames also allow participants
to understand simple but essential ideas regarding the conduct of war.
Van Creveld also highlights the introduction of the political dimension into wargaming. He quotes President Kennedy as saying, following
the Bay of Pigs operation, that senior American military did not understand the political implications of their recommendations, opening up a
new perspective to wargaming. The key factor of political games is that
there are no detailed rules as to what constitutes victory. The author
also discusses nuclear wargames and the implications of computer-based
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wargames as leaders continue to replicate all aspects of warfare within
their wargames.
He details the fact that conventional warfare is far more complex
than ever before and that wargames must be connected to the real world
as these games are serious business on which many lives depend. Much
of what van Creveld addresses in this book is deep history and of questionable value to someone trying to understand the issues of wargames
and their value to the military; however, the sections that outline the
current uses of wargames and, more specifically, the issues that limit
their value are worth consideration.

Book Reviews: Strategic Flexibility

145

Strategic Flexibility
Strategic Thinking in 3D: A Guide for National Security,
Foreign Policy, and Business Professionals
By Ross Harrison
Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, Colonel (USA Retired), Professor of Leadership
and Cultural Studies, US Army War College

A

s a former corporate chief executive officer, current professor of
practice of international relations at Georgetown University, and
having worked with corporate and nongovernmental agencies, Ross
Harrison has an enduring professional interest in developing strategies.
Over the past decade, he has had substantial engagement with US Army
War College (USAWC) and other senior level college faculty members
as a contributor to the Teaching Strategy Group. A quick review of
the book’s bibliography, endnotes, and in-text references reveals that
Harrison is steeped in materials used in the curriculum for the Army War
College’s Theater of War and Strategy course. Accordingly, the author’s
approach is familiar to this reviewer as well as reflective of the USAWC
curriculum in its Strategic Leadership and Defense Management courses.
While many critics lament the current state of American strategy
and offer commentary on the paucity of the strategic thinking among
US leaders, Harrison gets to the core question long posed by USAWC
colleagues and other scholars, “Why is strategy difficult?” (Jablonsky,
1992). His Strategic Thinking in 3D offers a framework for how to think
about strategy and how to think strategically. The former is about discernment of individual as well as organizational purpose and goals and
the creation of a viable approach to attain each. The latter is about posing
questions to gain situational awareness of the factors that influence the
development and successful execution of strategy.
The author succinctly presents the many conceptions about the
nature of strategy as it is interpreted across traditional domains—government, military, and corporate/business. He adopts an overarching
definition from Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, where “Strategy
is fundamentally about identifying or creating asymmetric advantages
that can be exploited to help achieve one’s ultimate objectives despite
resource and other constraints, most importantly the opposing efforts of
adversaries or competitors and the inherent unpredictability of strategic
outcomes” (2-3).
Harrison’s presentation of eight underlying assumptions about
strategy is very useful and helps to define its nature—subject to human
agency, intentional, competitive, and possessing system properties as
it interacts with other systems. The assumptions are formed around:
interests, opposing wills, choices, limits, passion, integration causality,
and leverage. While he offers a base definition of strategy, the author
does not provide one for strategic thinking. Our USAWC definition is
complementary and would be useful: strategic thinking “is the ability
to make a creative and holistic synthesis of key factors affecting an
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organization and its environment in order to obtain sustainable competitive advantage and long-term success.” (Allen and Gerras)
The book is well organized and presented in three parts: the inward
face of strategy, the outward face of strategy, and the power of integration. The “3D” in the title is the author’s suggestion that strategy is best
thought of and executed in three dimensions: systems, opponents, and
groups. Understanding one’s own system is imperative to determining
the existing and needed capabilities. Examining current and potential
opponents’ systems as sources from which competitors generate their
capabilities allows the targeting and disruption of opposing strategies.
Leveraging one’s own stakeholder group adds resources to prosecuting
a successful strategy. For each discussion of the strategic dimensions,
Harrison provides practical examples to illustrate concepts and principles in the application of his framework. Harrison’s concluding section
offers a refreshing twist as the framework is applied to a prominent
and persistent security threat to the United States today—al Qaeda.
Rather than developing a US strategy against its foe, he uses the “3D”
framework to examine the al Qaeda strategy and, in doing so, provides
interesting insights.
Harrison appropriately establishes disclaimers and caveats in his
preface and conclusion. Perhaps the most important is, “the general
framework is intended to be used suggestively rather than dogmatically.”
So there is a duality with the internal and external focus of strategy that
requires balance—adapting the organization/enterprise to its environment as well as designing methods to shape that same environment to
attain its goals and objectives.
This book is an effective primer on strategy. Harrison holds his
own against several more cerebral and complex treatments of strategy
and strategic thinking—he does not promise too much. Readers should
be wary of any book about strategy and strategic thinking that is so
compact, lest they think strategy is merely about determining ends,
ways, and means. To paraphrase Clausewitz, “Everything in [strategy] is
very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” Far from an easy read,
Strategic Thinking in 3D is accessible, thought provoking, and pragmatic
for a wide range of individuals who may wrestle with the challenges of an
uncertain and competitive environment. The value in Harrison’s work is
not that it provides answers but asks the questions that drive leaders and
their organizations to explore factors which may have strategic effect
and substantive impact—then enables the crafting of viable strategies.

On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal
Surprise on the Battlefield
by Meir Finkel
Reviewed by Raphael D. Marcus, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of War
Studies, King’s College London.

Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
Security Studies, 2011
324 pages
$25.95

A

dapting to surprise on the battlefield has been a challenge militaries have faced since the beginning of history. In the progressively
growing field of scholarly literature pertaining to military innovation
and adaptation, there are few works which convey the complexity and
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difficulty of military change as thoughtfully as On Flexibility. Written by
Colonel Dr. Meir Finkel of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), On Flexibility
provides an original and elegant theoretical framework for analyzing
military adaptability, as well as offering practical recommendations for
modern militaries to enable rapid recovery from battlefield surprise on
the doctrinal, operational, and techno-tactical levels.
Finkel’s main thesis is that modern militaries must maintain a flexible and adaptable doctrine and organizational culture to cope with
inevitable battlefield surprise and the constantly changing operational
environment. He convincingly makes his argument by elucidating seven
historical case studies which pertain to doctrinal, operational, and
techno-tactical aspects of warfare: four case studies exemplify successful
recovery from surprise due to the flexibility of the military organization,
and three case studies highlight military failure to recover from surprise
due to inflexibility. These cases are drawn from select British, French,
and German experiences in World War II, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War,
and the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, and highlight the degree of
organizational flexibility of each military and their ability or inability to
“recover from battlefield surprise.
Finkel provides succinct definitions of technological and doctrinal
surprise while also outlining sensible criteria for “successful recovery”
from surprise on the battlefield, which, he notes, is not confined to the
techno-tactical level of war. Using a graded criteria scale, successful
recovery is defined as the military’s complete recovery and ability to
devise a counterresponse; the next best response would be neutralizing
the damage from surprise without devising a counterchallenge, followed
by minimizing (but not neutralizing) damage caused by the surprise.
“Failure” of recovery would be inability to minimize damage from
the surprise. The theoretical framework also discusses various forms
of flexibility present in military organizations: conceptual and doctrinal flexibility, organizational and technological flexibility, flexibility in
command-and-control and cognition, as well as mechanisms for implementation of lessons learned.
Case studies of successful recovery are drawn from German experiences in WWII dealing with the T-34 Soviet tank and the British chaff,
and the IDF during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The case study focusing
on IDF surprise to the Egyptian introduction of anti-tank weapons in
the Sinai in the 1973 War is particularly compelling. The informal and
improvisational organizational culture of the IDF fosters tenacity and
promotes mission-command principles; armored corps commanders on
the ground were able to adapt their tactics fairly rapidly (despite a lack
of weapons diversity—a key enabler of flexible responsiveness). Hence,
Finkel notes that IDF organizational culture and individual unit initiative was of paramount importance.
Case studies of failure to recover from surprise are drawn from
the slow British recovery from bouts with German armor, the French
experience with the German blitzkrieg, as well as the Soviet campaign in
Afghanistan. The Soviet failure to recover from surprise in low-intensity
conflict (LIC) while engaged in Afghanistan against the mujahedeen is
a relevant historical study of inefficient military learning during LIC.
Soviet doctrinal dogmatism and a hierarchal command-and-control
structure inhibited decentralized autonomy of soldiers and prevented
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Soviet recovery from the surprise of its own ineffectiveness on the
Afghan battlefield.
Given the timely nature and current focus on low-intensity conflict
and counterinsurgency (COIN) by many military organizations, the
book could have benefitted from additional case studies of military adaptation and recovery from surprise during LIC or COIN, which for the
most part (with exceptions), has been absent from the broader military
innovation literature until recently. As we know, adapting “under fire”
was an immense challenge that confronted United States, British, and
Israeli forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere, and further
case studies could have provided additional relevant lessons for Western
militaries that, in the present operational environment, are doctrinally
and tactically focused on COIN and “hybrid” warfare.
Given that surprise is inevitable, Finkel’s solution for recovery lies
in sensible and flexible force-planning and doctrine development, rapid
techno-tactical adaptability, and officer education grounded in a military
culture which promotes agile thinking. Col. Finkel’s own experiences and
expertise as Director of the IDF Ground Forces’ Concept Development
and Doctrine Department are evident, as he deemphasizes the ability
to make accurate, “perfect” predictions based on intelligence, instead
focusing on organizational and technological adaptability (while also
underscoring technology’s inherent limitations).
Col. Finkel’s work is a compelling contribution to the existing literature on military innovation, and in his conclusion, he appropriately
places his work among the major works in the subfield, “filling the gap”
left by others who analyzed interwar and long-term innovation. Finkel’s
work also nicely complements other very recent publications by Stanford
Security Studies scholars Dima Adamsky, Eitan Shamir, and James
Russell that deal with topics on military culture and innovation, mission
command, and “bottom-up” learning.
In sum, On Flexibility is an interesting and challenging book which
adds to the current conceptual thinking regarding militaries’ ability to
recover from surprise and adapt, something that has been emphasized
in various recent US and British military manuals, and will certainly
continue to remain relevant in the future.
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Urban Fighting
Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq
By Louis A. DiMarco
Reviewed by Gregory Fontenot, Colonel (USA Retired), Lansing, Kansas

I

n Concrete Hell, Louis A. DiMarco surveys historical trends in urban
combat since World War II. Lieutenant Colonel DiMarco brings to
his task both professional and personal interests. An experienced soldier
and historian, DiMarco has focused his recent professional life on the
problem of urban combat as a doctrine writer and teacher at the Army
Command and General Staff College. DiMarco seeks to make three
contributions related to understanding the urban battle space, providing
insights into the nature of urban combat and its evolution—drawing
from tactical, operational, and strategic considerations he believes will
remain relevant. Regarding the last item, he explores the transition of
urban combat from “simplistic conventional” fights in Stalingrad and
Aachen to a “complex hybrid mixture” found in Chechnya and Iraq,
concluding these “hybrid” fights in Chechnya and Iraq foretell the future.
Generally, DiMarco makes his case effectively. He begins by noting
that at the turn of the century the Army was “particularly wary” of
urban combat. DiMarco is absolutely right. The Army and, for that
matter, US armed forces sought to avoid fighting in cities. This tendency
may have come, in part, from focusing on defending cities in Europe.
The Army in Europe, in particular, gave considerable thought to how to
fight in towns and cities in the context of defense but far less thought on
offensive urban combat. At the end of the Cold War, few soldiers imagined the United States would find itself in any kind of urban combat.
Moreover, there were a great many “defense experts” who claimed that
various revolutions in military affairs precluded ground combat let alone
urban ground combat. Some believed that the nature of warfare itself
had changed and that “contactless” battle would result.
But DiMarco’s argument, at least where the US Army is concerned,
would have benefited from reviewing what the Army did do. Shortly
after Operation Desert Storm, General Fred Franks (commanding
the Training and Doctrine Command) confronted the idea that urban
combat would be among the missions the post-Cold War Army might
have to undertake. He did not have the money to develop large urban
combat training centers and instead focused on developing a single
“world class” venue at Fort Polk. However, Fort Polk’s urban combat
venue was useful at the tactical level only.
The absence of large venues did not prevent the Army thinking
and writing about urban combat. DiMarco played an important role in
this effort providing a chapter in one of several books on urban combat
published by the Army. These included Roger Spillers’ Sharp Corners in
2001 and William G. Robertson and Lawrence Yeats, Block By Block in
2003. These major studies were accompanied by lively arguments in
journals as well. In the fall of 2002, the Army’s angst over urban combat
came to a head as the possibility of war with Iraq loomed. Accordingly,
the Army organized Operations Group F within the Battle Command
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Training Program to study and teach the principles of urban combat
to all deploying divisions including the 1st Marine Division. Although
DiMarco did not personally play a role in this effort, he was part of the
team at Fort Leavenworth that developed the means to educate units.
Simultaneously, the Army sought to learn from the Israeli experience
that DiMarco describes in his chapter on Israeli Operations on the West
Bank in 1992.
Despite this observation DiMarco, for the most part, delivers on his
desired contributions. At the strategic level the central insight he offers
is the role policy and politics play in decisions that led to urban combat.
In several examples that DiMarco chose, politics proved central not only
on the decision to fight in cities but also on how the attacker chose to
fight. His assertion is absolutely right and demonstrable. For example, the
operations of 1st Brigade 1st Armored Division in Ramadi in 2007 were
driven by political considerations first. The Ready First Combat Team,
as that brigade was styled, used classic conventional tactics to take the
city while engaging local leaders simultaneously in an effort to separate
them from the insurgents. The Ready First also sought to avoid destroying the city while saving it. DiMarco argues this operation demonstrated
a transition from “simplistic conventional” fights in World War II to a
“complex hybrid mixture of conventional and insurgent combat.”
This assessment is not convincing. In the chapter devoted to the US
operations to seize Aachen in 1944, it is clear the US commanders did
not care whether they reduced Aachen to rubble. Yet DiMarco points
out that, although the Army did reduce much of the city to rubble, US
commanders provided for what they considered a hostile population.
They did so to separate them from the German Army defenders but also
to avoid killing civilians unnecessarily. He further notes that US government troops arrived on the heels of the infantry. In other words, at least
some of the characteristics of complex “hybrid” operations existed even
in 1944. What seems more likely than the fundamental change DiMarco
posits is that the means used depend on the ends the attacker intends
to achieve. If in October 1944, the US Army had wanted to encourage
the inhabitants of Aachen to switch sides or at least be neutral, then
their approach would have been different. DiMarco and others miss
this essential point when they conclude the means have changed for any
other reason than the ends have changed. Finally, describing Stalingrad
and Aachen as “simplistic” is simply not accurate. Fighting to seize a
vigorously defended city may well be merely complicated rather than
complex but it is not simplistic.
DiMarco’s conclusions on the operational and tactical levels are
all on the mark. His consideration of Stalingrad not only reviews the
thoroughly bad strategic choices that Hitler made but also the poor
operational decisions by German commanders. The risks they chose to
take with respect to flank security are only one of several bad choices.
Although DiMarco discovered little that is new, his study reaffirms some
lessons which armies have had trouble learning. For example, one lesson
learned again and again is that tanks are useful in cities. This idea is one
that just will not stick. German tactical guidance in 1938 deemed tanks
too heavy, too awkward, and too vulnerable to flank attacks from side
streets to operate in cities. Yet in each case DiMarco studies, with the
exception of Algiers, tanks proved essential. Generally, this observation
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is a subset of the more important notion of combined arms. Urban
combat absolutely demands a combined arms approach.
Colonel DiMarco’s book is a useful survey of combat operations in
cities. He deserves to be read and, more importantly, the conclusions he
reaches considered carefully and critically as fighting in “concrete hell”
is likely to remain a feature of operations in the future. Doing so will
help realize DiMarco’s goal of the US armed forces taking on board the
often repeated lessons of fighting in cities.

Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla
By David Kilcullen
Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Visiting Research Professor at the
U. S. War College, and Professor of International Relations and Comparative
Politics at Armstrong Atlantic State University, Savannah, GA

D

avid Kilcullen, author of The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars
in the Midst of a Big One and Counterinsurgency, delivers another essential work in Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla.
Kilcullen is no stranger to the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency.
He is a former soldier and diplomat. He also served as a senior advisor
to both General David H. Petraeus and Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Out of the Mountains offers a
new way of looking at the nature of future conflicts given four powerful
tectonic forces impacting the world of the twenty-first century: population, urbanization, coastal settlement, and connectedness. Kilcullen’s
thesis is that the cities of the future—mostly coastal, highly urbanized,
and heavily populated—will be the central focus of tomorrow’s conflicts,
which will be heavily impacted by the four megatrends of population
growth, urbanization, littoralization, and connectedness. He asserts that
“more people than ever before in history will be competing for scarcer
and scarcer resources in poorly governed areas that lack adequate infrastructure, and these areas will be more and more closely connected to
the global system, so that local conflict will have far wider affects” (50).
Within this heavily populated, highly urbanized, littoralized, and
connected world, “adversaries are likely to be nonstate armed groups
(whether criminal or military) or to adopt asymmetric methods, and
even the most conventional hypothetical war scenarios turn out, when
closely examined, to involve very significant irregular aspects” (107).
Kilcullen defines nonstate armed groups as “any group that includes
armed individuals who apply violence but who aren’t members of the
regular forces of a nation-state” (126). Under this broader definition of
nonstate armed groups, Kilcullen includes “urban street gangs, communitarian or sectarian militias, insurgents, bandits, pirates, armed
smugglers or drug traffickers, violent organized criminal organizations,
warlord armies, and certain paramilitary forces. The term encompasses
both combatants and individuals who don’t personally carry arms or use
violence but who belong to groups that do” (126), Those nontraditional
nonstate armed groups not only undermine the authority and legitimacy
of the state but also corrupt the social fabric of society. The “new warrior
class” or “conflict entrepreneurs” are those individuals in society part
of the “bottom billion” who have lost all hopes of a better future, social
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advancement, and have resorted to the use of force to partake in the
spoils of society.
In Kilcullen’s analysis, as the world is greatly impacted by the four
megatrends, some cities in the Third World will become a breeding
ground for conflict. Those cities will become “urban no-go areas,”
where government presence and authority are extremely limited. Those
so-called “urban no-go areas” of a megacity in the Third World which
have become “safe havens for criminal networks or nonstate armed
groups, creating a vacuum that is filled by local youth who have no
shortage of grievances, whether arising from their new urban circumstances or imported from their home villages” (40). Kilcullen explains,
“rapid urban growth in coastal, underdeveloped areas is overloading
economic, social, and governance systems, straining city infrastructure,
and overburdening the carrying capacity of cities designed for much
smaller populations . . . the implications for future conflict are profound
with more people competing for scarcer resources in crowded, underserviced, and undergoverned urban areas” (35-36). Those so-called “urban
no-go areas” are the feral city of the twenty-first century. The concept,
derived from the field of biology, was first introduced to the political
science literature by Richard J. Norton a decade ago in his influential
article entitled “Feral Cities,” which appeared in the Naval War College
Review 66, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), pages 97-106.
According to Norton’s definition, feral cities are “metropolis with
a population of more than a million people, in a state the government
of which has lost the ability to maintain the rule of law within the city’s
boundaries yet remains a functioning actor in the greater international
system” (quoted in Kilcullen, page 66). This definition of feral cities or
urban no-go areas fits any larger urban centers today in the Third World,
such as Mumbai, Karachi, Rio de Janeiro, and Kingston, to mention
only a few locations. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the host of the World Cup
(2014) and the Olympic Games (2016) is currently facing the problems
defined by Kilcullen in his assessment of feral cities or urban no-go areas.
Rio has one of the largest “favelas” or shantytowns in Latin America:
Rocinha. With a population over a million people, Rocinha was recently
appeased by the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs). Prior to the pacification,
Rocinha was controlled by the notorious drug lord Antonio Francisco
Bonfim Lopes, also known as Nen, and his Amigos dos Amigos gang.
Nen is now in prison,but even in prison he controls drug trafficking and
issues commands to his foot soldiers or “new warrior class.”
This text can be especially useful to students at the United States
Army War College, particularly the book’s theoretical framework.
Kilcullen argues that the basis for the control systems applied by nonstate armed groups of all kinds is what he calls the theory of competitive
control (126). Kilcullen defines the theory of competitive control as
follows:
In regular conflicts (that is, in conflicts where at least one combatant is
a nonstate armed group), the local armed actor that a given population
perceives as best able to establish a predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum
normative system of control is most likely to dominate that population and
its residential area (126).
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Kilcullen’s theory of competitive control basically holds that, “nonstate armed groups, of many kinds, draw their strength and freedom of
action primarily from their ability to manipulate and mobilize populations, and that they do this using a spectrum of methods from coercion
to persuasion, by creating a normative system that makes people feel
safe through the predictability and order that it generates” (114). Despite
their control mechanisms, often by using violence and intimidation,
some people in the feral cities of Third World countries support nonstate armed groups due to their false sense of security and order. Since
the police and law enforcement authorities are seen as criminal elements
in uniform, the population responds to predictable, ordered, normative
systems that tells them exactly what they need to do, and not do, to be
safe (126). This author has seen this kind of behavior personally in two
of Rio’s most notorious favelas, the Nova Holanda favela in Bonsucesso
and Jacarezinho favela in the Maria da Graça neighborhoods. The
theory also suggests “a behavioral explanation for the way in which
armed groups of all kinds control populations . . . . It also suggests that
group behaviors may be an emergent phenomena at the level of the
population group implying that traditional counterinsurgency notions,
including “hearts and minds” may need a rethink” (127).
In conclusion, I highly recommend this text to anyone interested
in insurgency and counterinsurgency studies. The traditional view of
insurgency and counterinsurgency in the mountains of Afghanistan is
quickly changing. Conflicts in the twenty-first century will more likely
occur in increasingly sprawling coastal cities, in peri-urban slum settlements that are enveloping many regions of the Middle East, Africa, Asia,
and Latin America. Those so-called “mega-cities” will be the source of
much urban political exclusion and violence in the years to come (see
Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, Mega Cities: The Politics of Urban Exclusion
and Violence in the Global South (New York: Zed Books, 2009).
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World War II
The Guns at Last Light: War in Western Europe, 1944-1945:
Volume Three of the Liberation Trilogy
By Rick Atkinson
Reviewed by David T. Zabecki, Ph.D., Major General (USA Retired)
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he 1944-45 Allied World War II campaign in Northwest Europe
is an oft-told story. In The Guns at Last Light, the third volume of
his award-winning Liberation Trilogy, journalist-turned historian Rick
Atkinson revisits this key episode of the pivotal event of the 20th
century. Is there anything fresh in the way he retells this familiar story?
If you already have read many books on the subject, is this one worth
reading? The answer to both of these questions is an unqualified yes.
This is a large and complex story. As historian Will Durant once
noted, “History is so indifferently rich that a case for almost any conclusion from it can be made by a careful selection of instances.” The craft of
history, therefore, is based on the art of selecting what to include in your
narrative, and what to leave out. In the case of very large and complex
events, that largely becomes a function of where you focus the story.
Most military history writing tends to focus at either the high level
or the low level. As S. L. A. Marshall wrote in his 1947 book, Men
Against Fire:
The body of military history is almost exclusively a record of the movement
of armies and corps, of decisions by generals and commanders-in-chief,
of the contest between opposing strategies and the triumph of one set of
logistical conditions over another. The occasional rare passages from the
battlefront which are thrown in to illuminate and make zestful the story of
the overall struggle are usually of such glittering character or dubious origin
to warrant a suspicion that they have little real kinship with the event.

Atkinson is one of those rare writers who can focus on those two
widely-separated levels and integrate them into a unified and cohesive
story. As he did in his first two volumes, he deftly zooms his lens down to
the level of the individual American GIs, British Tommys, and German
Landsers fighting it out on the line of contact; and then he slowly pans
back out, up the chain of command to the senior commanders at the
operational and strategic levels and their political masters in Washington,
London, and Berlin. The result is a rich tapestry that is a clear and intelligible picture of the western half of the end game of World War II.
Interweaving his own skillful narrative with the voices of those who
fought from the shores of Normandy to the banks of the Elbe, Atkinson
helps the modern reader understand the agonies and the hardships
endured by the soldiers on both sides who faced each other across the
line of contact, while at the same time appreciating the gut-wrenching
and all too often lose-lose decisions forced upon their generals by the
grinding friction of battle and impenetrable fog of war. Nowhere do
these conundrums appear more starkly than in Operation MarketGarden and later in the fight for the Hürtgen Forest, arguably the single
worst defeat ever suffered by the American Army.
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One of the most impressive features of Atkinson’s writing style is
his authenticity of voice. Any military historian or professional soldier
can read his narrative without having to stumble over terms and concepts that are used incorrectly or tossed out loosely in an attempt to
establish some sort of level of authority. Yet at the same time that he
manages to use precise military expressions in their proper contexts,
Atkinson does so without lapsing into jargon or getting bogged down
into pseudo-military babble. His narrative is one that can be read,
understood, and appreciated by laymen and by military insiders alike—
no mean feat of writing.
Although he was never a soldier himself, Rick Atkinson spent a
considerable portion of his life around the American military. The son
of a career US Army officer, Atkinson was born in Munich, Germany,
and grew up on military posts around the world. A three-time winner
of the Pulitzer Prize, he was, from 1983 to 1999, a reporter for the The
Washington Post, specializing in defense issues. During that period, he
was one of the very small number of journalists widely respected by
common soldiers and general officers alike. From 2004 to 2005, he held
the General Omar N. Bradley Chair of Strategic Leadership at the US
Army War College. He understands soldiers at all levels and the world
they live in. His empathy shows clearly in his writing, not only for the
soldiers on the line, but also for their commanders all the way up the
chain. Even when he is dissecting, analyzing, and critiquing the commanders’ battlefield decisions, he does it objectively, without moralizing
or preaching. In 2010, he received a well-deserved Pritzker Military
Library Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing.
Journalism and history are not quite the same things, and as a historian Atkinson does his homework. The research he has put into all
three volumes of the series is impressive by any standards. To develop
an understanding for the ground, he went out to many of the key
battlefields, including for this volume the still dark, foreboding, and all
too-seldom visited Hürtgen Forest. As he wrote in the second volume of
the trilogy, The Day of Battle, “The ground speaks even when eyewitness
no longer can . . . .” Any experienced soldier will know exactly what he
means here, and Atkinson has taught himself to “read the ground” as a
soldier would.
This third volume’s exhaustive listing of his chapter notes and
sources totals 198 pages. The sources run from books to contemporary newspaper and periodical accounts; to papers, letters, personal
narratives, and diaries; and to interviews he conducted with surviving
participants of the actions. He made 23 visits, averaging two to three
days each, to the US Army Military History Institute, part of the Army
Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, which he accurately describes as “among the greatest military archives in the world and
a priceless asset to anyone studying World War II.”
No matter how many other World War II books you may have on
your bookshelf, make room for this one.
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Exposing the Third Reich: Colonel Truman Smith in Hitler’s
Germany
By Henry G. Gole
Reviewed by Richard G. Trefry, Lieutenant General (USA Retired)
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he period of time between World War I through World War II is
a fascinating story that has produced a myriad of books covering
the military history familiar to professional soldiers. Henry Gole has
examined what might be called a second order of history of this era and
has outlined the evolution of US military strategies in earlier works such
as The Road to Rainbow and Preparing the Army for Modern War. These two
books provide studies of the maturation of the profession of arms in the
US Army from World War I through the twentieth century.
Keeping with that theme, Henry Gole’s Exposing the Third Reich is
a story of how influential a single officer was in his service from WWI
culminating in the development of NATO in the early 1970s. Colonel
Truman Smith was the son of a West Pointer who was killed in the
Philippines. Truman himself was a graduate of Yale University, class
of 1915. He secured a commission in the National Guard of New York
and was accepted into the Regular Army. After service on the Mexican
border, he was assigned to the 4th Regiment of the 3rd Division. Colonel
Smith was an outstanding officer in combat in World War II, commanding up to Battalion, and was awarded a silver star for his actions. After
the armistice, he was assigned occupation duty in Coblentz, Germany,
and then to duty in the American Embassy in Berlin, Germany.
The years between 1918 and 1924 provided Truman Smith with the
experience that developed him as an expert on occupation duty and
attaché duty in Germany. He developed many contacts and friendships
with German officers that would last through World War II and the formation of NATO. Both he and his wife developed linguistic capabilities
that made both of them very effective members of the Embassy staff.
Of particular note was an interview Smith had with Adolph Hitler in
Munich in November of 1922.
After his time in Berlin was over, he was assigned to Fort Hamilton
in New York, which he later described as the worst assignment he had
in his total career. However, that assignment led to selection for attendance at the Infantry Officers Advance Class at Fort Benning in 1926-27
immediately followed by attendance at the Command and General Staff
College in academic year 1927-28. He returned to Ft. Benning to serve
on the faculty of the Infantry School from 1928-32, which was under the
direction of Colonel George C. Marshall. Many of his fellow instructors
became Division and Corps Commanders in World War II. His experience in Germany brought him to the attention of Colonel Marshall
and that established a personal and professional relationship that lasted
through their lifetimes. From 1932-33, Smith attended the Army War
College and his assignments to the 25th Division in Hawaii provided
two years as a commander of a battalion in the 27th Infantry Regiment
(The Wolfhounds).
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Perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book is number seven,
entitled “Marshall’s Men.” It provides the best description of how
Colonel Marshall and his faculty revolutionized military instruction. His
methods of instruction and the capabilities of his faculty provided the
keys to military instruction that have lasted until today.
Of particular note is Smith’s relationship with German Army officers. One, Captain von Schell, was an invited German student officer in
the 1930-31 Infantry Advance Course. This relationship provided close
personal and professional friendships that lasted through World War II
and into NATO.
Smith was a model officer in the field of military intelligence. Probably
his most significant coup was inviting Colonel Charles Lindbergh to
Germany where he was given the opportunity to inspect and fly all the
types of planes of the Luftwaffe. Smith and Lindbergh were so effective
they were accused of being pro-Nazi. Smith’s intelligence efforts were
so successful that, in essence, he became General George C. Marshall’s
personal intelligence officer.
During the formation of NATO, Smith played a major role. His
relationship with German officers was essential in securing their participation in NATO. His personal and professional friendships with
General Speidel, who had been Rommel’s Chief of Staff, was particularly relevant.
Colonel Truman Smith deserves this book. Colonel Henry Gole has
provided us with a publication all professional officers should include in
their libraries.
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The Civil War
War’s Desolating Scourge: The Union’s
Occupation of North Alabama
By Joseph W. Danielson
Reviewed by Robert H. Larson, Ph.D., Professor of History, Lycoming College
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he origins of the Civil War as a total war has long been identified
solely with William T. Sherman’s march through Georgia and the
Carolinas in 1864-65. Recently, however, some historians have challenged
this view, arguing instead that the shift towards total war began far earlier.
In his book The Hard Hand of War, Mark Grimsley argues that McClellan’s
defeat in the Peninsula Campaign in the summer of 1862 marked the
turning point when Northern opinion became convinced that only a
harsh policy toward Southern civilians would restore the Union. Charles
Royster’s The Destructive War goes back even further, claiming that calls for
the absolute destruction of the enemy appeared in both the North and
South from the very beginning of the conflict. In this latest contribution
to the subject, War’s Desolating Scourge, Joseph W. Danielson examines the
experience of the sixteen counties of northern Alabama occupied by
Union forces for much of the war and concludes that, at least for this
area, local resistance by pro-Confederate civilians led Union forces to
adopt a “hard war” approach to the conflict.
Union forces first entered northern Alabama in April 1862 when
7,000 troops of General Ormsby Mitchell’s 3rd Division of the Army of
the Ohio entered Huntsville, Alabama, and proceeded to extend their
authority over the entire region. They were under explicit orders from
the commanding general of the Army of the Ohio, Don Carlos Buell,
to avoid any action against Southern property or civilians in the hope
of winning over the local population with a policy of conciliation. The
policy lasted less than a month. The people of northern Alabama were
overwhelmingly devoted to the cause of secession and not at all interested in reconciling with the North. Almost immediately, they began to
engage in acts of resistance, ranging from snubs and insults to outright
attacks on Union soldiers and supply trains. The Union troops responded
with arrests of community leaders, censorship, the destruction of private
homes in the vicinity of the attacks, and even the confiscation of food and
cotton. The struggle only ended when Braxton Bragg invaded Kentucky
in the summer of 1862, and Buell was forced to evacuate Alabama and
follow him. According to Danielson, this five-month occupation neither
dampened the support of northern Alabamans for the Confederate
cause nor led them to doubt that it would be victorious.
For the next seven months, the region remained peaceful, but in
April 1863 Union cavalry began to launch raids into northern Alabama
from bases in Tennessee and the following fall occupied the region once
again. This time their actions were guided by a new War Department
directive commonly known as the Lieberman Code which allowed for
direct action against civilians if military necessity warranted it. It was, in
fact, much like Ormsby Mitchell’s policy the previous year. This second
occupation was far harsher than the first and slowly but steadily—just
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as “a continued dropping of water will wear away a rock”—wore down
the Alabamans’ enthusiasm for independence. By 1865, the region was
reduced to a wasteland, many civilians were forced to rely on the Union
occupiers for food or else starve, and acts of resistance to the Union
occupation “dramatically decreased.” The strength of the rebellion had
been broken, but its spirit had not. Alabamans recognized that secession had failed and that slavery was over, but they remained fiercely
determined to protect white supremacy and willingly used violence and
terror to achieve it.
Detailed regional studies can perform a valuable function in illuminating and giving depth to broader trends. Danielson has combed
numerous archives to uncover letters and diaries to document the changing attitudes of both Union soldiers and Southern civilians in northern
Alabama. He convincingly demonstrates the depth of the Alabamans’
determination to achieve independence as well as the shallowness of
the Union soldiers’ initial support for the policy of conciliation. He also
makes an effective case that, in the example of northern Alabama, the
breakdown of the policy of conciliation was a response to local resistance and not to changes in national attitudes or policy. This contention
directly challenges Grimsley who dismisses the role of guerilla resistance in the hardening of Union attitudes. Finally, he makes a strong
argument—whether he intended to or not—that only a policy of hard
war directed against Southern civilians would have sufficed to bring
them back into the Union, and even then it would not change their core
beliefs or unwillingness to embrace racial equality.
Unfortunately, Danielson’s presentation is marred by repetition
and at times a curious vagueness. One has to read—and perhaps
reread—carefully to understand exactly when the two periods of Union
occupation occurred. The information is there, but its presentation is
anything but clear. More seriously, he provides little concrete information on that second occupation in contrast to the first. We do not know
when it began beyond “the fall of 1863,” nor how many troops or which
units were involved, nor who commanded them. Most curiously, he notes
that Sherman made his headquarters here periodically in the spring of
1864, but outside of a letter the following October expressing pleasure
to his wife that his soldiers “take to it [foraging] like Ducks to water,”
he provides no indication of anything else he did during these months.
In short, Danielson provides some useful information and insights
into the evolution of the Civil War into a total war on a regional level,
but his work lacks the perspective to be of wide interest.
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W

hile Conflicting Memories is a welcome addition to the mountain of
works dealing with the US Civil War and its effects on this nation,
the book is less about the battle of Chickamauga as it is about remembering and enshrining the battle. The result is much more than a history, as
interesting as that history is; rather it offers insights and raises questions
as to how we remember and shape history and what happens when different histories occupy the same ground.
The battle of Chickamauga, fought between 19 and 20 September
1863, was a bloody affair which pitted the talents of Confederate General
Braxton Bragg against those of Major General William Rosecrans, commanding the forces of the Union. Other notable figures from both north
and south include Lieutenant General James Longstreet, who, with his
Corps, had been temporarily detached from Robert E. Lee’s Army of
Northern Virginia and Major General George H. Thomas, whose determined defense of the Union line at Horseshoe Ridge would make him
a national hero. Although the battle ended in a Confederate victory, all
rebel gains would be lost by November as Generals Grant, Sherman,
and Sheridan won the battles of Lookout Mountain and Lookout Ridge,
and ended the siege of Chattanooga by rebel forces. As a result of these
operations, Grant would rise to command all Union Armies and the
heart of the Deep South would be open to the Union advances of 1864
and Sherman’s “March to the Sea.” Chickamauga was the second most
costly battle of the Civil War—the first was Gettysburg—and has been
the subject of many books, of which Peter Cozzens’s This Terrible Sound
may well be the best.
Thirty five years later, Chickamauga experienced another seismic
historical event, one that could have potentially supplanted or at least
could force a sharing of historical pride of place with the civil war battle.
In 1898, as the United States prepared for and fought a war with Spain,
Chickamauga served as a vast training camp for many of the regiments
earmarked for service overseas. Although the leading wave of these
forces passed through Chickamauga in reasonably good shape, those
who followed them were ravaged by disease with attendant death tolls
that exceed any combat casualties. The memories of these deaths with
concomitant allegations of government incompetence and malfeasance
were potential competitors with those recollections of Civil War heroics
and sacrifice. A war of sorts—a war of memories—would be fought
and although the Civil War narrative would prevail, the story of needless deaths of thousands of newly recruited volunteers for the Spanish
American War would not be completely silenced.
Keefer does a commendable job showcasing how efforts to create
a military park at Chickamauga played out against a national backdrop
where southern proponents of the romanticized “Lost Cause” were
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countered by the increasingly politically powerful membership of the
Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). At stake was the place of veterans
and the units in “the national memory,” and in the case of Chickamauga
the most determined veteran was Henry Van Ness Boynton who would
make preserving the battlefield and its “lessons” his life’s work.
As Keefer relates, establishing a Chickamaugan narrative satisfactory to north and south, the hundreds of regiments, batteries, divisions
and other units that had fought there, and to leaders, many of whom
bore great antipathy toward one another was no easy task. Battle lines
had to be recreated, and one common version of events agreed upon.
Creating the park also required congressional approval and the support
of local communities. At every turn, new issues arose. Which units
would be the most prominently featured? What requirements if any,
would be applied to memorials and monuments? How accessible would
the battlefield be to tourists?
It took Boynton and others until 1895, but at last the Chickamauga
and Chattanooga National Military Park was dedicated and officially
opened. The park would celebrate “American valor and sacrifice,” serve
as instructional terrain for students of history and future military officers and, as Gettysburg had done in the east, to “sanctify” the ground
upon which so many had given their lives. In a marked difference from
Gettysburg, Chickamauga would also boast Camp Thomas, an army
installation, for the park was also intended to serve as a site for military
training and maneuvers.
Camp Thomas, as it turned out, was instrumental in initiating a
series of events which resulted in the greatest challenge to Boynton’s
vision. As war with Spain loomed, militia and volunteer units flocked
to the colors and Chickamauga was selected as a logical training facility
where regiments would be brought to fighting trim and then deployed
to the war. To some degree the martial display of thousands of men
preparing for war fit nicely with the story of the Civil War battle and the
depiction of American, vice northern or southern, heroism. However,
predictably, the less noble pursuits of young soldiers, including drinking and frequenting of bordellos that sprang into existence near the
camp, caused friction with local authorities and did not fit as well with
the narrative. Such issues in themselves could likely have been dealt
with—except for the shockingly high mortality rates that resulted from
a variety of illnesses associated with putting vulnerable populations of
young men together in close proximity with insufficient sanitation and
a lack of modern medical knowledge.
It was perhaps inevitable that the illness and death at Camp Thomas
became intertwined with other Army “scandals” of the day. In particular, there were allegations the Army’s tinned meat rations were toxic,
and that Army medicine as a whole was deficient. The response of
senior medical and Army officers at Camp Thomas was that the War
Department failed to provide adequate resources, Chickamauga was an
unhealthy locality in general, local water supplies were tainted, and there
was a lack of hygienic discipline among the volunteers.
Boynton mounted an interesting defense of the Army and the
military park. He blamed certain senior officers for falsely attacking the
War Department to excuse their own failings while at the same time
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implying the volunteers themselves were not made of the same tough
and manly material as their Civil War forebearers. This defense of the
War Department was clearly over the top. As Graham Cosmas, in An
Army for Empire brilliantly recounts, the War Department and the Army,
although not as ill prepared as popular recounting would have it, were
not ready for the demands of the Spanish-American War and subsequent
Philippine insurrection, and this lack of readiness was reflected in a
medical department that in many ways was far inferior to that of the
Civil War.
In the end, however, Boynton prevailed. Chickamauga remains
to this day primarily a Civil War battlefield, with memories of Camp
Thomas relegated to marginalia. Chickamauga’s memories are martial,
its sagas of sacrifice, courage, and eventual national reconciliation. What
Keefer has done, and done exceptionally well, is to remind us that such
commemorative landscapes do not simply appear as much as they are
manufactured and negotiated and that the story of that creation and bargaining is not only essential to understand the evolution of such national
historic shrines but important in itself.
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